| 1992 | Theories of Truth: a Critical Introduction |
| 2.3 | p.54 | 18369 | There are at least fourteen candidates for truth-bearers |
| Full Idea: Among the candidates [for truthbearers] are beliefs, propositions, judgments, assertions, statements, theories, remarks, ideas, acts of thought, utterances, sentence tokens, sentence types, sentences (unspecified), and speech acts. | |||
| From: Richard L. Kirkham (Theories of Truth: a Critical Introduction [1992], 2.3) | |||
| A reaction: I vote for propositions, but only in the sense of the thoughts underlying language, not the Russellian things which are supposed to exist independently from thinkers. |
| 5.4 | p.150 | 19315 | In quantified language the components of complex sentences may not be sentences |
| Full Idea: In a quantified language it is possible to build new sentences by combining two expressions neither of which is itself a sentence. | |||
| From: Richard L. Kirkham (Theories of Truth: a Critical Introduction [1992], 5.4) | |||
| A reaction: In propositional logic the components are other sentences, so the truth value can be given by their separate truth-values, through truth tables. Kirkham is explaining the task which Tarski faced. Truth-values are not just compositional. |
| 5.4 | p.153 | 19317 | An open sentence is satisfied if the object possess that property |
| Full Idea: An object satisfies an open sentence if and only if it possesses the property expressed by the predicate of the open sentence. | |||
| From: Richard L. Kirkham (Theories of Truth: a Critical Introduction [1992], 5.4) | |||
| A reaction: This applies to atomic sentence, of the form Fx or Fa (that is, some variable is F, or some object is F). So strictly, only the world can decide whether some open sentence is satisfied. And it all depends on things called 'properties'. |
| 5.4 | p.154 | 19318 | A 'sequence' of objects is an order set of them |
| Full Idea: A 'sequence' of objects is like a set of objects, except that, unlike a set, the order of the objects is important when dealing with sequences. ...An infinite sequence satisfies 'x2 is purple' if and only if the second member of the sequence is purple. | |||
| From: Richard L. Kirkham (Theories of Truth: a Critical Introduction [1992], 5.4) | |||
| A reaction: This explains why Tarski needed set theory in his metalanguage. |
| 5.4 | p.157 | 19319 | If one sequence satisfies a sentence, they all do |
| Full Idea: If one sequence satisfies a sentence, they all do. ...Thus it matters not whether we define truth as satisfaction by some sequence or as satisfaction by all sequences. | |||
| From: Richard L. Kirkham (Theories of Truth: a Critical Introduction [1992], 5.4) | |||
| A reaction: So if the striker scores a goal, the team has scored a goal. |
| 5.5 | p.159 | 19320 | If we define truth by listing the satisfactions, the supply of predicates must be finite |
| Full Idea: Because the definition of satisfaction must have a separate clause for each predicate, Tarski's method only works for languages with a finite number of predicates, ...but natural languages have an infinite number of predicates. | |||
| From: Richard L. Kirkham (Theories of Truth: a Critical Introduction [1992], 5.5) | |||
| A reaction: He suggest predicates containing natural numbers, as examples of infinite predicates. Davidson tried to extend the theory to natural languages, by (I think) applying it to adverbs, which could generate the infinite predicates. Maths has finite predicates. |
| 5.6 | p.163 | 19322 | Why can there not be disjunctive, conditional and negative facts? |
| Full Idea: It has been said that there are no disjunctive facts, conditional facts, or negative facts. ...but it is not at all clear why there cannot be facts of this sort. | |||
| From: Richard L. Kirkham (Theories of Truth: a Critical Introduction [1992], 5.6) | |||
| A reaction: I love these sorts of facts, and offer them as a naturalistic basis for logic. You probably need the world to have modal features, but I have those in the form of powers and dispositions. |