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Ideas of Kathrin Koslicki, by Text

[German, fl. 2008, Professor at the University of Colorado, Boulder.]

1997 Isolation and Non-arbitrary Division
p.424 There is no deep reason why we count carrots but not asparagus
1 p.405 Frege's 'isolation' could be absence of overlap, or drawing conceptual boundaries
2.2 p.411 We can still count squares, even if they overlap
2.2 p.413 We struggle to count branches and waves because our concepts lack clear boundaries
2.2 p.416 Objects do not naturally form countable units
2.2 p.417 We talk of snow as what stays the same, when it is a heap or drift or expanse
2008 The Structure of Objects
Info p.6 The clay is just a part of the statue (its matter); the rest consists of its form or structure
Intro p.4 Wholes in modern mereology are intended to replace sets, so they closely resemble them
Intro p.5 I aim to put the notion of structure or form back into the concepts of part, whole and object
Intro p.6 Structure or form are right at the centre of modern rigorous modes of enquiry
2.2 p.25 For three-dimensionalist parthood must be a three-place relation, including times
3.1 p.45 Wholes are entities distinct from their parts, and have different properties p.55 'Categorical' properties exist in the actual world, and 'hypothetical' properties in other worlds
4.2.2 p.115 If a whole is just a structure, a dinner party wouldn't need the guests to turn up
5.1 p.93 The 'aggregative' objections says mereology gets existence and location of objects wrong
7.2.11 p.192 Wholes are not just their parts; a whole is an entity distinct from the proper parts
7.2.12 p.195 The parts may be the same type as the whole, like a building made of buildings p.179 Statue and clay differ in modal and temporal properties, and in constitution n17 p.179 There are at least six versions of constitution being identity
8.2 p.202 Should vernacular classifications ever be counted as natural kind terms?
8.3.1 p.204 Natural kinds support inductive inferences, from previous samples to the next one
8.4.1 p.211 There are apparently no scientific laws concerning biological species
8.4.1 p.212 Concepts for species are either intrinsic structure, or relations like breeding or ancestry
8.6.2 p.231 The Kripke/Putnam approach to natural kind terms seems to give them excessive stability
9.3.1 n6 p.241 Some questions concern mathematical entities, rather than whole structures
9.3.2 p.242 'Roses are red; therefore, roses are colored' seems truth-preserving, but not valid in a system
9.3.2 n8 p.243 Consequence is truth-preserving, either despite substitutions, or in all interpretations
9.6 p.259 Structures have positions, constituent types and number, and some invariable parts
2012 Essence, Necessity and Explanation
13.1 p.187 Aristotle doesn't see essential truths or essential properties as necessary
13.1 p.188 An essence and what merely follow from it are distinct
13.1 p.189 In demonstration, the explanatory order must mirror the causal order of the phenomena
13.2 p.190 If an object exists, then its essential properties are necessary
13.3.1 p.198 Individuals are perceived, but demonstration and definition require universals
13.3.1 p.199 In a demonstration the middle term explains, by being part of the definition
13.3.1 p.200 A successful Aristotelian 'definition' is what sciences produces after an investigation
13.3.1 p.200 Essences cause necessary features, and definitions describe those necessary features
13.3.1 n10 p.198 Discovering the Aristotelian essence of thunder will tell us why thunder occurs
13.3.1 n15 p.200 Greek uses the same word for 'cause' and 'explanation'
13.4 p.206 Aristotelian explanation by essence may need to draw on knowledge of other essences
2012 Varieties of Ontological Dependence
7.4 p.196 For Fine, essences are propositions true because of identity, so they are just real definitions
7.4 p.198 Real definitions don't just single out a thing; they must also explain its essence
7.4 p.199 It is more explanatory if you show how a number is constructed from basic entities and relations
7.4 n13 p.200 Modern views want essences just to individuate things across worlds and times
7.5 n25 p.211 The relata of grounding are propositions or facts, but for dependence it is objects and their features
7.6 p.212 We need a less propositional view of essence, and so must distinguish it clearly from real definitions
7.6 p.212 We can abstract to a dependent entity by blocking out features of its bearer
7.6 p.213 A good explanation captures the real-world dependence among the phenomena