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Ideas of Jonathan Kvanvig, by Text

[American, fl. 2005, Professor at the University of Missouri, and at Baylor University.]

2003 The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding
198 p.816 Understanding is seeing coherent relationships in the relevant information
2005 Truth is not the Primary Epistemic Goal
'Epistemic' p.355 The 'defeasibility' approach says true justified belief is knowledge if no undermining facts could be known
'Epistemic' p.361 Making sense of things, or finding a good theory, are non-truth-related cognitive successes
Notes 2 p.362 Reliabilism cannot assess the justification for propositions we don't believe
'What' p.353 Epistemology does not just concern knowledge; all aspects of cognitive activity are involved
2011 Epistemic Justification
II p.27 Strong foundationalism needs strict inferences; weak version has induction, explanation, probability
III p.31 'Access' internalism says responsibility needs access; weaker 'mentalism' needs mental justification
2011 Virtue Epistemology
III p.202 Epistemic virtues: love of knowledge, courage, caution, autonomy, practical wisdom...
IV B p.204 If epistemic virtues are faculties or powers, that doesn't explain propositional knowledge
IV B p.206 The value of good means of attaining truth are swamped by the value of the truth itself