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Ideas of Jonathan Kvanvig, by Text
[American, fl. 2005, Professor at the University of Missouri, and at Baylor University.]
2003
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The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding
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198
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p.816
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19261
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Understanding is seeing coherent relationships in the relevant information
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2005
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Truth is not the Primary Epistemic Goal
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'Epistemic'
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p.355
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19567
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The 'defeasibility' approach says true justified belief is knowledge if no undermining facts could be known
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'Epistemic'
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p.361
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19568
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Making sense of things, or finding a good theory, are non-truth-related cognitive successes
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Notes 2
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p.362
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19570
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Reliabilism cannot assess the justification for propositions we don't believe
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'What'
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p.353
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19566
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Epistemology does not just concern knowledge; all aspects of cognitive activity are involved
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2011
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Epistemic Justification
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II
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p.27
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19678
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Strong foundationalism needs strict inferences; weak version has induction, explanation, probability
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III
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p.31
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19679
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'Access' internalism says responsibility needs access; weaker 'mentalism' needs mental justification
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III
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p.202
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19730
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Epistemic virtues: love of knowledge, courage, caution, autonomy, practical wisdom...
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IV B
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p.204
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19731
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If epistemic virtues are faculties or powers, that doesn't explain propositional knowledge
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IV B
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p.206
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19732
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The value of good means of attaining truth are swamped by the value of the truth itself
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