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Ideas of David Liggins, by Text
[British, fl. 2008, Lecturer at the University of Manchester.]
2008
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Nihilism without Self-Contradiction
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8
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p.191
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14231
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We should always apply someone's theory of meaning to their own utterances
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8
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p.192
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14232
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We normally formalise 'There are Fs' with singular quantification and predication, but this may be wrong
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9
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p.193
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14233
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Nihilists needn't deny parts - they can just say that some of the xs are among the ys
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2012
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Truth-makers and dependence
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10.1
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p.254
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17318
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Truthmakers for existence is fine; otherwise maybe restrict it to synthetic truths?
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10.3 n5
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p.260
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17320
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Either p is true or not-p is true, so something is true, so something exists
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10.4
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p.261
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17322
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Necessities supervene on everything, but don't depend on everything
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10.4
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p.261
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17321
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Value, constitution and realisation are non-causal dependences that explain
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10.4
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p.262
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17323
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If explanations track dependence, then 'determinative' explanations seem to exist
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10.5
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p.263
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17324
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'Because' can signal an inference rather than an explanation
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10.6
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p.264
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17325
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Truth-maker theory can't cope with non-causal dependence
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10.6
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p.266
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17326
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The dependence of {Socrates} on Socrates involves a set and a philosopher, not facts
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10.8
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p.270
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17327
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Non-causal dependence is at present only dimly understood
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