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Ideas of Cynthia Macdonald, by Text
[New Zealand, b.1951, Professor at the University of Canterybury, New Zealand.]
Ch.1
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p.25
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7923
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'Did it for the sake of x' doesn't involve a sake, so how can ontological commitments be inferred?
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Ch.2
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p.59
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7926
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We 'individuate' kinds of object, and 'identify' particular specimens
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Ch.2
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p.63
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7927
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At different times Leibniz articulated three different versions of his so-called Law
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Ch.2
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p.242
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7965
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Does the knowledge of each property require an infinity of accompanying knowledge?
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Ch.2 n32
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p.75
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7928
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The Identity of Indiscernibles is false, because it is not necessarily true
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Ch.3
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p.81
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7929
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A substance is either a bundle of properties, or a bare substratum, or an essence
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Ch.3
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p.82
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7930
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The bundle theory of substance implies the identity of indiscernibles
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Ch.3
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p.84
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7932
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A phenomenalist cannot distinguish substance from attribute, so must accept the bundle view
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Ch.3
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p.89
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7934
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Tropes are abstract (two can occupy the same place), but not universals (they have locations)
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Ch.3
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p.91
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7936
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Unlike bundles of properties, substances have an intrinsic unity
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Ch.3
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p.95
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7937
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When we ascribe a property to a substance, the bundle theory will make that a tautology
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Ch.3
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p.101
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7938
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Relational properties are clearly not essential to substances
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Ch.3
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p.102
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7939
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Substances persist through change, but the bundle theory says they can't
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Ch.3
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p.104
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7940
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A substance might be a sequence of bundles, rather than a single bundle
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Ch.3
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p.111
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7941
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Each substance contains a non-property, which is its substratum or bare particular
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Ch.3
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p.112
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7942
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The substratum theory explains the unity of substances, and their survival through change
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Ch.3
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p.113
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7943
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A substratum has the quality of being bare, and they are useless because indiscernible
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Ch.3 n5
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p.123
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7944
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Reduce by bridge laws (plus property identities?), by elimination, or by reducing talk
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Ch.4
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p.166
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7947
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In continuity, what matters is not just the beginning and end states, but the process itself
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Ch.4
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p.172
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7948
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A statue and its matter have different persistence conditions, so they are not identical
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Ch.5
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p.85
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7933
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Don't assume that a thing has all the properties of its parts
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Ch.6
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p.219
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7950
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Philosophy tries to explain how the actual is possible, given that it seems impossible
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Ch.6
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p.219
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7951
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Numerical sameness is explained by theories of identity, but what explains qualitative identity?
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Ch.6
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p.230
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7955
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Resemblance Nominalism cannot explain either new resemblances, or absence of resemblances
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Ch.6
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p.234
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7958
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Properties are sets of exactly resembling property-particulars
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Ch.6
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p.235
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7959
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How do a group of resembling tropes all resemble one another in the same way?
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Ch.6
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p.236
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7960
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Trope Nominalism is the only nominalism to introduce new entities, inviting Ockham's Razor
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Ch.6
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p.237
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7961
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A 'thing' cannot be in two places at once, and two things cannot be in the same place at once
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Ch.6
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p.240
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7964
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How can universals connect instances, if they are nothing like them?
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Ch.6
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p.249
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7967
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Being taller is an external relation, but properties and substances have internal relations
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Ch.6 n16
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p.255
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7971
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Real Nominalism is only committed to concrete particulars, word-tokens, and (possibly) sets
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Ch.6 n16
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p.255
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7972
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Tropes are abstract particulars, not concrete particulars, so the theory is not nominalist
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