green numbers give full details.
|
back to list of philosophers
|
expand these ideas
Ideas of Ofra Magidor, by Text
[Israeli, fl. 2009, At Balliol College, Oxford.]
|
1.1
|
p.5
|
17998
|
Category mistakes are either syntactic, semantic, or pragmatic
|
|
1.1
|
p.5
|
17999
|
Strong compositionality says meaningful expressions syntactically well-formed are meaningful
|
|
1.1
|
p.5
|
18000
|
Weaker compositionality says meaningful well-formed sentences get the meaning from the parts
|
|
1.1
|
p.6
|
18001
|
Are there partial propositions, lacking truth value in some possible worlds?
|
|
1.1 n1
|
p.2
|
17997
|
Some suggest that the Julius Caesar problem involves category mistakes
|
|
1.3
|
p.18
|
18008
|
Generative semantics says structure is determined by semantics as well as syntactic rules
|
|
2.1
|
p.26
|
18010
|
'John is easy to please' and 'John is eager to please' have different deep structure
|
|
2.3
|
p.33
|
18011
|
Category mistakes seem to be universal across languages
|
|
2.3
|
p.36
|
18012
|
Category mistakes as syntactic needs a huge number of fine-grained rules
|
|
2.4
|
p.39
|
18013
|
Embedded (in 'he said that…') category mistakes show syntax isn't the problem
|
|
3.2.1
|
p.46
|
18014
|
Understanding unlimited numbers of sentences suggests that meaning is compositional
|
|
3.2.1
|
p.47
|
18015
|
The normal compositional view makes category mistakes meaningful
|
|
3.2.2
|
p.56
|
18016
|
Two good sentences should combine to make a good sentence, but that might be absurd
|
|
3.3
|
p.58
|
18017
|
If a category mistake is synonymous across two languages, that implies it is meaningful
|
|
3.4
|
p.61
|
18018
|
To grasp 'two' and 'green', must you know that two is not green?
|
|
3.4
|
p.62
|
18019
|
People have dreams which involve category mistakes
|
|
3.4
|
p.63
|
18020
|
Propositional attitudes relate agents to either propositions, or meanings, or sentence/utterances
|
|
3.5
|
p.66
|
18022
|
Metaphors tend to involve category mistakes, by joining disjoint domains
|
|
3.5
|
p.67
|
18023
|
Theories of metaphor divide over whether they must have literal meanings
|
|
3.5
|
p.67
|
18021
|
Category mistakes are meaningful, because metaphors are meaningful category mistakes
|
|
3.5
|
p.68
|
18025
|
The simile view of metaphors removes their magic, and won't explain why we use them
|
|
3.5
|
p.68
|
18024
|
One theory says metaphors mean the same as the corresponding simile
|
|
3.5
|
p.69
|
18026
|
Maybe a metaphor is just a substitute for what is intended literally, like 'icy' for 'unemotional'
|
|
3.5
|
p.71
|
18027
|
Metaphors as substitutes for the literal misses one predicate varying with context
|
|
3.5
|
p.72
|
18028
|
Gricean theories of metaphor involve conversational implicatures based on literal meanings
|
|
3.5
|
p.73
|
18029
|
Non-cognitivist views of metaphor says there are no metaphorical meanings, just effects of the literal
|
|
3.6
|
p.75
|
18030
|
A good explanation of why category mistakes sound wrong is that they are meaningless
|
|
3.6
|
p.75
|
18031
|
If a category mistake has unimaginable truth-conditions, then it seems to be meaningless
|
|
3.6.2
|
p.77
|
18032
|
Category mistakes are neither verifiable nor analytic, so verificationism says they are meaningless
|
|
3.6.2
|
p.77
|
18034
|
Category mistakes play no role in mental life, so conceptual role semantics makes them meaningless
|
|
4.1
|
p.80
|
18035
|
Two sentences with different meanings can, on occasion, have the same content
|
|
4.1
|
p.81
|
18036
|
A sentence can be meaningful, and yet lack a truth value
|
|
4.2
|
p.84
|
18037
|
Maybe when you say 'two is green', the predicate somehow fails to apply?
|
|
4.3.1
|
p.91
|
18039
|
If category mistakes aren't syntax failure or meaningless, maybe they just lack a truth-value?
|
|
4.4
|
p.100
|
18040
|
Intensional logic maps logical space, showing which predicates are compatible or incompatible
|
|
5.1
|
p.111
|
18041
|
Category mistakes suffer from pragmatic presupposition failure (which is not mere triviality)
|
|
5.2
|
p.112
|
18043
|
The infelicitiousness of trivial truth is explained by uninformativeness, or a static context-set
|
|
5.2
|
p.112
|
18042
|
The infelicitiousness of trivial falsity is explained by expectations, or the loss of a context-set
|
|
5.3.1.1
|
p.117
|
18047
|
A presupposition is what makes an utterance sound wrong if it is not assumed?
|
|
5.3.1.2
|
p.119
|
18048
|
A test for presupposition would be if it provoked 'hey wait a minute - I have no idea that....'
|
|
5.3.1.3
|
p.120
|
18049
|
The best tests for presupposition are projecting it to negation, conditional, conjunction, questions
|
|
5.3.2
|
p.124
|
18050
|
If both s and not-s entail a sentence p, then p is a presupposition
|
|
5.3.2
|
p.124
|
18051
|
In the pragmatic approach, presuppositions are assumed in a context, for successful assertion
|
|
5.3.2
|
p.127
|
18053
|
The semantics of a sentence is its potential for changing a context
|
|
5.3.2
|
p.129
|
18054
|
Why do certain words trigger presuppositions?
|
|
5.4.1
|
p.132
|
18055
|
In 'two is green', 'green' has a presupposition of being coloured
|
|
5.4.1
|
p.132
|
18056
|
Category mistakes because of presuppositions still have a truth value (usually 'false')
|
|
5.4.1
|
p.136
|
18057
|
'Numbers are coloured and the number two is green' seems to be acceptable
|
|
5.4.3
|
p.146
|
18058
|
Maybe the presuppositions of category mistakes are the abilities of things?
|
|
5.6
|
p.156
|
18059
|
The presuppositions in category mistakes reveal nothing about ontology
|
|
5.6
|
p.157
|
18060
|
We can explain the statue/clay problem by a category mistake with a false premise
|