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Ideas of Edwin D. Mares, by Text
[New Zealand, fl. 2001, Lecturer at Victoria University, Wellington, New Zealand.]
01.5

p.6

17700

The most popular view is that coherent beliefs explain one another

02.2

p.16

17701

Possible worlds semantics has a nice compositional account of modal statements

02.3

p.17

17702

Unstructured propositions are sets of possible worlds; structured ones have components

02.9

p.31

17704

Operationalism defines concepts by our ways of measuring them

02.9

p.31

17703

Light in straight lines is contingent a priori; stipulated as straight, because they happen to be so

03.01

p.34

17705

Empiricists say rationalists mistake imaginative powers for modal insights

03.10

p.49

17706

The essence of a concept is either its definition or its conceptual relations?

06.7

p.97

17708

Maybe space has points, but processes always need regions with a size

08.1

p.123

17710

Aristotelian justification uses concepts abstracted from experience

08.2

p.125

17713

After 1903, Husserl avoids metaphysical commitments

08.9

p.135

17714

Aristotelians dislike the idea of a priori judgements from pure reason

11.4

p.178

17715

The truth of the axioms doesn't matter for pure mathematics, but it does for applied

11.7

p.182

17716

Mathematics is relations between properties we abstract from experience

1

p.181

18781

Inconsistency doesn't prevent us reasoning about some system

1

p.181

18780

Standard disjunction and negation force us to accept the principle of bivalence

1

p.182

18782

The connectives are studied either through model theory or through proof theory

1

p.182

18783

Manyvalued logics lack a natural deduction system

2.2

p.183

18784

In classical logic the connectives can be related elegantly, as in De Morgan's laws

2.2

p.184

18785

Consistency is semantic, but noncontradiction is syntactic

2.2

p.185

18786

Excluded middle standardly implies bivalence; attacks use noncontradiction, De M 3, or double negation

3.1

p.185

18787

Threevalued logic is useful for a theory of presupposition

5.1

p.196

18788

For intuitionists there are not numbers and sets, but processes of counting and collecting

5.5

p.200

18789

Intuitionist logic looks best as natural deduction

5.5

p.202

18790

Intuitionism as natural deduction has no rule for negation

6.1

p.204

18791

In 'situation semantics' our main concepts are abstracted from situations

6.2

p.206

18792

Situation semantics for logics: not possible worlds, but information in situations

7.1

p.208

18793

Material implication (and classical logic) considers nothing but truth values for implications
