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Ideas of C.B. Martin, by Text
[American, 1924 - 2008, Based in Australia. Later at the University of Calgary.]
01.2
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p.2
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15465
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Structures don't explain dispositions, because they consist of dispositions
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02.3
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p.15
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15466
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'The wire is live' can't be analysed as a conditional, because a wire can change its powers
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02.4
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p.16
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15467
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Powers depend on circumstances, so can't be given a conditional analysis
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02.6
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p.19
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15468
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Causal counterfactuals are just clumsy linguistic attempts to indicate dispositions
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02.7
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p.20
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15469
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Dispositions in action can be destroyed, be recovered, or remain unchanged
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02.8
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p.21
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15470
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Causal laws are summaries of powers
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03.1
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p.24
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15471
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Truth is a relation between a representation ('bearer') and part of the world ('truthmaker')
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03.3
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p.26
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15472
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It is pointless to say possible worlds are truthmakers, and then deny that possible worlds exist
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04.1
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p.35
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15474
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Properly understood, wholes do no more causal work than their parts
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04.3
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p.38
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15475
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The concept of 'identity' must allow for some changes in properties or parts
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04.3
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p.39
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15476
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Structural properties involve dispositionality, so cannot be used to explain it
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04.6
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p.42
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15477
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Ontology is highly abstract physics, containing placeholders and exclusions
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04.6
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p.42
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15479
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Properties endow a ball with qualities, and with powers or dispositions
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04.6
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p.42
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15478
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Properties are the respects in which objects resemble, which places them in classes
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04.6
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p.44
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15483
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Properties are ways particular things are, and so they are tied to the identity of their possessor
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04.6
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p.44
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15480
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Objects are not bundles of tropes (which are ways things are, not parts of things)
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04.6
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p.44
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15484
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A property is a combination of a disposition and a quality
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04.6
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p.44
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15481
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I favour the idea of a substratum for properties; spacetime seems to be just a bearer of properties
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04.6
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p.44
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15482
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We can't think of space-time as empty and propertyless, and it seems to be a substratum
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05.1
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p.46
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15485
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Instead of a cause followed by an effect, we have dispositions in reciprocal manifestation
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05.2 n1
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p.47
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15486
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Only abstract things can have specific and full identity specifications
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06.4
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p.60
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15487
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If unmanifested partnerless dispositions are still real, and are not just qualities, they can explain properties
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06.6
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p.65
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15488
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Qualities and dispositions are aspects of properties - what it exhibits, and what it does
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06.6
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p.66
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15489
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A property that cannot interact is worse than inert - it isn't there at all
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07.8
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p.91
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15491
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Causation should be explained in terms of dispositions and manifestations
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10.2
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p.132
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15492
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Explanations are mind-dependent, theory-laden, and interest-relative
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10.3
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p.134
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15493
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Memory requires abstraction, as reminders of what cannot be fully remembered
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12.2
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p.160
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15495
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Analogy works, as when we eat food which others seem to be relishing
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