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Ideas of Tim Maudlin, by Text
[American, fl. 2003, Professor at Rutgers University.]
2007
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The Metaphysics within Physics
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Intro
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p.1
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16242
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Laws of nature are ontological bedrock, and beyond analysis
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Intro
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p.1
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16241
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The metaphysics of nature should focus on physics
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Intro
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p.3
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16243
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The Humean view is wrong; laws and direction of time are primitive, and atoms are decided by physics
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Intro
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p.4
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16244
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If the universe is profligate, the Razor leads us astray
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1.2
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p.8
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16245
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Laws should help explain the things they govern, or that manifest them
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1.4
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p.17
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16247
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Laws are primitive, so two indiscernible worlds could have the same laws
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1.5
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p.21
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16248
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Evaluating counterfactuals involves context and interests
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1.5
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p.23
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16249
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A counterfactual antecedent commands the redescription of a selected moment
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1.5
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p.33
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16250
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We don't pick a similar world from many - we construct one possibility from the description
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1.6
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p.36
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16251
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'Humans with prime house numbers are mortal' is not a law, because not a natural kind
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2.5
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p.72
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16253
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A property is fundamental if two objects can differ in only that respect
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2.5
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p.75
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16254
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Induction leaps into the unknown, but usually lands safely
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2.5
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p.76
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16255
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The Razor rightly prefers one cause of multiple events to coincidences of causes
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3
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p.78
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16257
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Kant survives in seeing metaphysics as analysing our conceptual system, which is a priori
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3.1
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p.81
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16258
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To get an ontology from ontological commitment, just add that some theory is actually true
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3.1
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p.82
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16259
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Naïve translation from natural to formal language can hide or multiply the ontology
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3.1
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p.83
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16260
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Existence of universals may just be decided by acceptance, or not, of second-order logic
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3.2
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p.96
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16263
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Fundamental physics seems to suggest there are no such things as properties
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4
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p.107
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16264
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I believe the passing of time is a fundamental fact about the world
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4.1
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p.112
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16265
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If time passes, presumably it passes at one second per second
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4.3 n11
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p.126
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16266
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There is one ordered B series, but an infinitude of A series, depending on when the present is
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5
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p.143
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16267
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If we know the cause of an event, we seem to assent to the counterfactual
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5
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p.143
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16268
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The counterfactual is ruined if some other cause steps in when the antecedent fails
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5
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p.144
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16269
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If the effect hadn't occurred the cause wouldn't have happened, so counterfactuals are two-way
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5.2
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p.150
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16270
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If laws are just regularities, then there have to be laws
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6
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p.171
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16271
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Lewis says it supervenes on the Mosaic, but actually thinks the Mosaic is all there is
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6
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p.172
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16273
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If the Humean Mosaic is ontological bedrock, there can be no explanation of its structure
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6
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p.172
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16272
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Fundamental laws say how nature will, or might, evolve from some initial state
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7 Epilogue
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p.185
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16275
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The 'spinning disc' is just impossible, because there cannot be 'homogeneous matter'
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7 Epilogue
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p.188
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16276
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Wide metaphysical possibility may reduce metaphysics to analysis of fantasies
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7 Epilogue
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p.189
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16277
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Logically impossible is metaphysically impossible, but logically possible is not metaphysically possible
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