| 2003 | Perception |
| Ch. 2 | p.29 | 7630 | Ryle's dichotomy between knowing how and knowing that is too simplistic |
| Ch. 3 | p.64 | 7632 | Perception is sensation-then-concept, or direct-concepts, or sensation-saturated-in-concepts |
| Ch. 6 | p.116 | 7635 | Sense-data have an epistemological purpose (foundations) and a metaphysical purpose (explanation) |
| Ch. 8 | p.161 | 7637 | Thought content is either satisfaction conditions, or exercise of concepts |
| Ch. 9 | p.165 | 7638 | One thesis says we are not aware of qualia, but only of objects and their qualities |
| Ch.10 | p.198 | 7640 | Mountains are adverbial modifications of the earth, but still have object- characteristics |
| Ch.10 | p.199 | 7641 | Adverbialism tries to avoid sense-data and preserve direct realism |
| Ch.10 | p.201 | 7642 | The Myth of the Given claims that thought is rationally supported by non-conceptual experiences |