| 1976 | On the Necessity of Origin |
| p.134 | 12019 | McGinn falsely claims necessity of origin is a special case of the necessity of identity [Forbes,G] |
| p.132 | p.209 | 18892 | Suppose a world where I'm from different gametes; add my gametes; which one is more me? |
| 1982 | The Structure of Content |
| p.108 | 6171 | Beliefs are states of the head that explain behaviour, and also items with referential truth-conditions |
| 1983 | Subjective View: sec qualities and indexicals |
| 2 | p.5 | 22412 | Lockean secondary qualities (unlike primaries) produce particular sensory experiences |
| 2 | p.6 | 22413 | Being red simply consists in looking red |
| 2 | p.8 | 22414 | You don't need to know how a square thing looks or feels to understand squareness |
| 2 | p.10 | 22415 | Relativity means differing secondary perceptions are not real disagreements |
| 2 | p.12 | 22416 | Phenomenalism is correct for secondary qualities, so scepticism is there impossible |
| 2 | p.17 | 18410 | Indexical thought is in relation to my self-consciousness |
| 2 | p.22 | 22417 | Indexicals do not figure in theories of physics, because they are not explanatory causes |
| 3 | p.42 | 22418 | I can know indexical truths a priori, unlike their non-indexical paraphrases |
| 5 | p.69 | 22420 | The indexical perspective is subjective, incorrigible and constant |
| 6 | p.73 | 22421 | Could there be a mind which lacked secondary quality perception? |
| 6 | p.81 | 22422 | Maybe all possible sense experience must involve both secondary and primary qualities |
| 6 | p.85 | 22423 | Touch doesn't provide direct experience of primary qualities, because touch feels temperature |
| 6 | p.97 | 22424 | Secondary qualities contain information; their variety would be superfluous otherwise |
| 6 | p.98 | 22425 | The utility theory says secondary qualities give information useful to human beings |
| 6 | p.104 | 18402 | Indexical concepts are indispensable, as we need them for the power to act |
| 6 | p.107 | 22426 | We can perceive objectively, because primary qualities are not mind-created |
| 6 n 52 | p.107 | 22427 | To explain object qualities, primary qualities must be more than mere sources of experience |
| 8 | p.138 | 22428 | You understood being red if you know the experience involved; not so with thngs being square |
| Ch.8 n1 | p.129 | 7629 | We see objects 'directly' by representing them |
| 1991 | The Problem of Consciousness |
| p.435 | 7388 | McGinn invites surrender, by saying it is hopeless trying to imagine conscious machines [Dennett] |
| p.132 | p.188 | 3185 | Multiple realisability rules out hidden essences and experts as the source of water- and gold-concepts |
| 1999 | The Mysterious Flame |
| p.100 | p.100 | 2543 | Brains aren't made of anything special, suggesting panpsychism |
| p.147 | p.147 | 2544 | Thoughts have a dual aspect: as they seem to introspection, and their underlying logical reality |
| p.167 | p.167 | 2545 | Free will is mental causation in action |
| p.209 | p.209 | 2546 | Philosophy is a magnificent failure in its attempt to overstep the limits of our knowledge |
| p.225 | p.225 | 2547 | There is information if there are symbols which refer, and which can combine into a truth or falsehood |
| p.40 | p.40 | 2539 | Mental modules for language, social, action, theory, space, emotion |
| p.47 | p.47 | 2540 | Examining mind sees no brain; examining brain sees no mind |
| p.92 | p.92 | 2542 | Causation in the material world is energy-transfer, of motion, electricity or gravity |
| 2000 | Logical Properties |
| Pref | p.-3 | 6042 | The quantifier is overrated as an analytical tool |
| Ch.1 | p.2 | 6043 | Type-identity is close similarity in qualities |
| Ch.1 | p.2 | 6044 | Qualitative identity is really numerical identity of properties |
| Ch.1 | p.3 | 6046 | Qualitative identity can be analysed into numerical identity of the type involved |
| Ch.1 | p.7 | 6050 | Leibniz's Law presupposes the notion of property identity |
| Ch.1 | p.7 | 6049 | Leibniz's Law says 'x = y iff for all P, Px iff Py' |
| Ch.1 | p.8 | 6051 | In 'x is F and x is G' we must assume the identity of x in the two statements |
| Ch.1 | p.8 | 6052 | Definitions identify two concepts, so they presuppose identity |
| Ch.1 | p.9 | 6053 | Identity is as basic as any concept could ever be |
| Ch.1 | p.10 | 6054 | Sherlock Holmes does not exist, but he is self-identical |
| Ch.1 | p.11 | 6055 | Both non-contradiction and excluded middle need identity in their formulation |
| Ch.1 | p.13 | 6058 | Identity propositions are not always tautological, and have a key epistemic role |
| Ch.1 | p.14 | 6059 | Identity is unitary, indefinable, fundamental and a genuine relation |
| Ch.1 n4 | p.2 | 6045 | It is best to drop types of identity, and speak of 'identity' or 'resemblance' |
| Ch.1 n5 | p.3 | 6047 | All identity is necessary, though identity statements can be contingently true |
| Ch.1 n8 | p.5 | 6048 | Leibniz's Law is so fundamental that it almost defines the concept of identity |
| Ch.2 | p.22 | 6062 | Existence can't be analysed as instantiating a property, as instantiation requires existence |
| Ch.2 | p.27 | 6065 | We can't analyse the sentence 'something exists' in terms of instantiated properties |
| Ch.2 | p.30 | 6066 | Existence is a property of all objects, but less universal than self-identity, which covers even conceivable objects |
| Ch.2 | p.32 | 6067 | Existential quantifiers just express the quantity of things, leaving existence to the predicate 'exists' |
| Ch.2 | p.33 | 6068 | We need an Intentional Quantifier ("some of the things we talk about.."), so existence goes into the proposition |
| Ch.2 | p.35 | 6069 | 'Partial quantifier' would be a better name than 'existential quantifier', as no existence would be implied |
| Ch.2 | p.45 | 6071 | Scepticism about reality is possible because existence isn't part of appearances |
| Ch.2 | p.49 | 6072 | If Satan is the most imperfect conceivable being, he must have non-existence |
| Ch.2 | p.50 | 6073 | I think the fault of the Ontological Argument is taking the original idea to be well-defined |
| Ch.2 n11 | p.25 | 6064 | Regresses are only vicious in the context of an explanation |
| Ch.2 n29 | p.43 | 6070 | Existence is a primary quality, non-existence a secondary quality |
| Ch.3 | p.52 | 6074 | Clearly predicates have extensions (applicable objects), but are the extensions part of their meaning? |
| Ch.3 | p.63 | 6075 | Facts are object-plus-extension, or property-plus-set-of-properties, or object-plus-property |
| Ch.3 | p.68 | 6077 | Semantics should not be based on set-membership, but on instantiation of properties in objects |
| Ch.4 | p.70 | 6079 | If 'possible' is explained as quantification across worlds, there must be possible worlds |
| Ch.4 | p.83 | 6080 | Modality is not objects or properties, but the type of binding of objects to properties |
| Ch.4 | p.84 | 6081 | Necessity and possibility are big threats to the empiricist view of knowledge |
| Ch.4 | p.86 | 6082 | If causal power is the test for reality, that will exclude necessities and possibilities |
| Ch.5 | p.89 | 6083 | The coherence theory of truth implies idealism, because facts are just coherent beliefs |
| Ch.5 | p.90 | 6084 | 'Snow does not fall' corresponds to snow does fall |
| Ch.5 | p.91 | 6085 | The idea of truth is built into the idea of correspondence |
| Ch.5 | p.96 | 6086 | Truth is the property of propositions that makes it possible to deduce facts |
| Ch.5 | p.101 | 6087 | Without the disquotation device for truth, you could never form beliefs from others' testimony |
| Ch.5 | p.102 | 6088 | Truth is a method of deducing facts from propositions |
| 2002 | The Making of a Philosopher |
| Ch. 5 | p.138 | 4690 | If meaning is speaker's intentions, it can be reduced to propositional attitudes, and philosophy of mind |
| Ch. 6 | p.174 | 4691 | If all mental life were conscious, we would be unable to see things, or to process speech |