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Ideas of Trenton Merricks, by Text

[American, fl. 2003, Professor at the University of Virginia.]

2003 Objects and Persons
p.184 Merricks agrees that there are no composite objects, but offers a different semantics
     Full Idea: Merricks agrees with van Inwagen that there are no composite objects, but disagrees with him about the semantics of talk about material objects.
     From: report of Trenton Merricks (Objects and Persons [2003]) by David Liggins - Nihilism without Self-Contradiction 4
     A reaction: Van Inwagen has one semantics for folk talk, and another semantics 'for the philosophy room'. Merricks seems to have an error theory of folk semantics (i.e. the folk don't understand what they are saying).
Pref p.-6 Empirical investigation can't discover if holes exist, or if two things share a colour
     Full Idea: Ontology is not empirical, but ontologists do make discoveries; empirical investigation won't discover that holes exist; we see that two things are the same colour, but a philosopher must resolve whether one universal is present in both.
     From: Trenton Merricks (Objects and Persons [2003], Pref)
     A reaction: This is one of the best, simplest and clearest statements I have encountered of the autonomy of philosophy. One may, of course, respond by saying 'who cares?', but then who cares about quarks, or the economy of the Spanish Empire?
§1 p.1 I say that most of the objects of folk ontology do not exist
     Full Idea: I argue against the existence of most of the objects alleged to exist by what we might call 'folk ontology'.
     From: Trenton Merricks (Objects and Persons [2003], §1)
     A reaction: This is the programme for Merricks's heroic book, denying (quite plausibly) the need for large objects in our ontology. It seems that ontology must multiply its entities prodigiously, or else be austere in the extreme. Is there no middle way?
§1 n11 p.20 'Composition' says things are their parts; 'constitution' says a whole substance is an object
     Full Idea: Composition as identity claims that a single object is identical with the many parts it comprises; constitution as identity says that a single object (a statue) is identical with a single object (clay) that 'constitutes' it.
     From: Trenton Merricks (Objects and Persons [2003], §1 n11)
     A reaction: The constitution view has been utilised (by Lynn Rudder Baker) to give an account of personal identity as constituted by a human body. Neither sounds quite right to me; the former view misses something about reality; the latter doesn't explain much.
§1.I p.3 We can eliminate objects without a commitment to simples
     Full Idea: Eliminativism about physical objects does not require a commitment to (or against) simples.
     From: Trenton Merricks (Objects and Persons [2003], §1.I)
     A reaction: His strategy is to eliminate objects in favour of whatever it is (an unknown) to which objects actually reduce. His point seems to be clearly correct, just as I might eliminate 'life' from my ontology, without quite knowing what it is.
§1.II p.8 'Unrestricted composition' says any two things can make up a third thing
     Full Idea: If my dog and the top half of my tree compose an object, this is defended under the title of 'unrestricted (universal) composition', the thesis that any two things compose something.
     From: Trenton Merricks (Objects and Persons [2003], §1.II)
     A reaction: David Lewis is cited amongst those defending this thesis. My intuition is against this thesis, because I think identity is partly dictated by nature, and is not entirely conventional. You can force an identity, but you feel the 'restriction'.
§1.II p.10 Objects decompose (it seems) into non-overlapping parts that fill its whole region
     Full Idea: Intuitively, an object's parts at one level of decomposition are parts of that object that do not overlap and that, collectively, fill the whole region the object fills.
     From: Trenton Merricks (Objects and Persons [2003], §1.II)
     A reaction: A nice case where 'intuition' must be cited as the basis for the claim, and yet it is hard to see how anyone could possibly disagree. Exhibit 73 in favour of rationalism. This ideas shows the structure of nature and the workings of our minds.
§1.IV p.21 Composition as identity is false, as identity is never between a single thing and many things
     Full Idea: One of the most obvious facts about identity is that it holds one-one (John and Mr Smith) and perhaps many-many (John+Mary and Mr Smith+Miss Jones), but never one-many. It follows that composition as identity (things are their parts) is false.
     From: Trenton Merricks (Objects and Persons [2003], §1.IV)
     A reaction: This assumes that 'having identity' and 'being identical to' are the same concept. I agree with his conclusion, but am not convinced by the argument. I'm not even quite clear why John and May can't be identical to the Smiths.
§1.IV p.22 Composition as identity is false, as it implies that things never change their parts
     Full Idea: Composition as identity implies that no persisting object ever changes its parts, which is clearly false, so composition as identity is false.
     From: Trenton Merricks (Objects and Persons [2003], §1.IV)
     A reaction: Presumably Lewis can say that when a thing subtly changes its parts, it really does lose its strict identity, but becomes another 'time-slice' or close 'counterpart' of the original object. This is a coherent view, but I disagree. I'm a believer.
§1.IV p.27 If my counterpart is happy, that is irrelevant to whether I 'could' have been happy
     Full Idea: The existence of someone in another world who is a lot like me, but happier, is irrelevant to whether I - this very person - could have been happier, even if we call that other-worldly someone 'my counterpart'.
     From: Trenton Merricks (Objects and Persons [2003], §1.IV)
     A reaction: He says this is a familiar objection. I retain a lingering deterministic doubt about whether it ever makes to sense to say that I 'could' have been happy, given that I am not. It does seem to make sense to say that I was close to happiness, but missed it.
§2.I p.30 Is swimming pool water an object, composed of its mass or parts?
     Full Idea: Some - such as those who endorse unrestricted composition or those who believe in a kind of entity called 'a mass' - say that 'the water in the swimming pool' refers to a big material object.
     From: Trenton Merricks (Objects and Persons [2003], §2.I)
     A reaction: A well-chosen example to support his thesis that large objects don't (strictly) exist. We certainly must not say (in Quine fashion) that we must accept the ontology of our phrases. I cut nature at the joints, and I say a pool is an obvious joint.
§2.II p.33 A crumbling statue can't become vague, because vagueness is incoherent
     Full Idea: Some would say that annihilating grains of stone from the statue of David (playing the 'Sorites Game') could never make its identity vague, because metaphysical vagueness is simply unintelligible.
     From: Trenton Merricks (Objects and Persons [2003], §2.II)
     A reaction: He cites Russell, Dummett and Lewis in support. But Russell is a logical atomist, and Lewis says identity is composition. It strikes me as obvious that identity can be vague; the alternative is the absurdities of the Sorites paradox.
§2.II p.35 Eliminativism about objects gives the best understanding of the Sorites paradox
     Full Idea: I say we should endorse eliminativism about physical objects, because it offers the most plausible understanding of what occurs during the Sorites Game (eliminating grains of a thing one at a time).
     From: Trenton Merricks (Objects and Persons [2003], §2.II)
     A reaction: That is one route to go in explaining the paradox (i.e. by saying there never was a 'heap' in the first place). I suspect a better route is to say that heaps really exist as natural phenomena, but they suffer from vague identity and borderline cases.
§2.III p.38 Clay does not 'constitute' a statue, as they have different persistence conditions (flaking, squashing)
     Full Idea: A statue is not identical with its constituent lump of clay because they have different persistence conditions; the statue, but not the lump, could survive the loss of a few smallish bits, and the lump, but not the statue, could survive being squashed.
     From: Trenton Merricks (Objects and Persons [2003], §2.III)
     A reaction: I don't see why a lump can't survive losing a few bits (if the lump never had a precise identity), but it is hard to argue that squashing is a problem. However, presumably the identity (or constitution) between lump and statue is not a necessity.
§2.III p.38 It seems wrong that constitution entails that two objects are wholly co-located
     Full Idea: Many philosophers deny that two numerically distinct physical objects could be 'wholly co-located'.
     From: Trenton Merricks (Objects and Persons [2003], §2.III)
     A reaction: A fish can be located in a river; the Appenines can be located in Italy. If you accept the objection you will probably have to accept identity-as-composition, or object-eliminativism. One object can have two causal roles, supporting two identities.
§2.IV p.50 Maybe the word 'I' can only refer to persons
     Full Idea: One might say that the word 'I' can only have a person as its reference.
     From: Trenton Merricks (Objects and Persons [2003], §2.IV)
     A reaction: To infer the existence of persons from this would be to commit what I think of as the Linguistic Fallacy, of deducing ontology directly from language. We might allow (Dennett fashion) that folk categories require the fiction of persons.
§2.V p.55 There is no visible difference between statues, and atoms arranged statuewise
     Full Idea: If we imagine a world like ours except that, while there are atoms arranged statuewise in that world, there are no statues, ...no amount of looking around could distinguish that imagined world from ours.
     From: Trenton Merricks (Objects and Persons [2003], §2.V)
     A reaction: This is one of his arguments for ontological eliminativism about physical objects. If we accept the argument, it will wreak havoc with our entire ontology, and we will end up anti-realists. I say you have to see statues - you just can't miss them.
§3 n14 p.82 Prolonged events don't seem to endure or exist at any particular time
     Full Idea: That events endure is difficult to reconcile with the claim that, say, the American Civil War existed; for such an event seems never to have been 'wholly present' at any single time.
     From: Trenton Merricks (Objects and Persons [2003], §3 n14)
     A reaction: A nice problem example for those who, like Kim, want their ontology to include events. Personally I am happy to allow some vagueness here. The Civil War only became an 'event' on the day it finished. An event's time need not be an instant.
§3.III p.75 The 'folk' way of carving up the world is not intrinsically better than quite arbitrary ways
     Full Idea: It is hard to see why the folk way of carving up the material world should - barring further argument - be elevated to a loftier status than the unrestricted compositionist way.
     From: Trenton Merricks (Objects and Persons [2003], §3.III)
     A reaction: There are some right ways to carve up the world, though there is also the capacity to be quite arbitrary, if it is useful, or even amusing. Thus Cyprus is an island (fact), Britons are a nation (useful), and Arsenal fans are sad (amusing).
§4 p.85 You hold a child in your arms, so it is not mental substance, or mental state, or software
     Full Idea: When you hold your child, you do exactly that - hold the child himself or herself - and not some stand-in. This implies that we are not two substances, and we are not mental states nor akin to software.
     From: Trenton Merricks (Objects and Persons [2003], §4)
     A reaction: And it is not just a brain, either. This is a nice simple example to support the sensible view that a person is a type of animal. Like all other physical objects that is a bit vague, so we should not be distracted by borderline cases like brain bisection.
§4.I p.92 Intrinsic properties are those an object still has even if only that object exists
     Full Idea: Intrinsic properties are, by and large, those properties that an object can exemplify even if that object and its parts (if any) are the only objects that exist.
     From: Trenton Merricks (Objects and Persons [2003], §4.I)
     A reaction: This leads to all sorts of properties that seemed intrinsic turning out to be relational. In what sense would a single object have mass, or impenetrability?
§4.II p.93 Before Creation it is assumed that God still had many many mental properties
     Full Idea: The belief of theists that God might never have created implies that there is a possible world that contains just a single entity with many conscious mental properties.
     From: Trenton Merricks (Objects and Persons [2003], §4.II)
     A reaction: So if we believe content is wide, we must believe that God was incapable of thought before creation, and thus couldn't plan creation, and so didn't create, and so the Creator is a logical impossibility. Cool.
§4.II p.94 The hypothesis of solipsism doesn't seem to be made incoherent by the nature of mental properties
     Full Idea: The hypothesis of solipsism, that I - an entity with many conscious mental properties - am all that exists, while surely false, is not rendered incoherent simply by the nature of the mental properties.
     From: Trenton Merricks (Objects and Persons [2003], §4.II)
     A reaction: This, along with the thought of a pre-Creation God, is a nice intuitive case for showing that we strongly believe in some degree of narrow content.
§4.VII p.116 Human organisms can exercise downward causation
     Full Idea: Human organisms have non-redundant causal powers, and so can exercise downward causation.
     From: Trenton Merricks (Objects and Persons [2003], §4.VII)
     A reaction: The hallmark of property dualism. This notion needs a lot more expansion and exploration than Merricks gives it, and I don't think it will be enough to provide 'free will', or even, as Merricks hopes, to place humans in a distinct ontological category.
§6.III p.155 Free will and determinism are incompatible, since determinism destroys human choice
     Full Idea: The main recent support for incompatibilism is the 'no choice' argument: we have no choice that the past and the laws of nature entail human actions, we have no choice about what the past or the laws are like, so we have no choice about our actions.
     From: Trenton Merricks (Objects and Persons [2003], §6.III)
     A reaction: Since I consider free will to be an absurd chimera, I think this argument involves a total misunderstanding of what a 'choice' is. Since the human brain is a wonderfully sophisticated choosing machine, our whole life consists of choices.
§7.II p.173 The 'warrant' for a belief is what turns a true belief into knowledge
     Full Idea: The 'warrant' for a belief is that, whatever it is, that makes the difference between mere true belief and knowledge.
     From: Trenton Merricks (Objects and Persons [2003], §7.II)
     A reaction: Hence a false belief could be well justified, but it could never be warranted. This makes warrant something like the externalist view of justification, a good supporting situation for a belief, rather than an inner awareness of support for it.
3 p.21 If atoms 'arranged baseballwise' break a window, that analytically entails that a baseball did it
     Full Idea: Given the proper understanding of 'arranged baseballwise', the fact that atoms arranged baseballwise are causally relevant to a shattering analytically entails that a baseball is.
     From: report of Trenton Merricks (Objects and Persons [2003], 3) by Amie L. Thomasson - Ordinary Objects 01.3
     A reaction: This is the key argument of Thomasson's book. Presumably, following Idea 14471, 'I bought some atoms arranged baseballwise' is held to entail 'I bought a baseball'. That seems to beg the question against Van Inwagen and Merricks.
3 p.56 Overdetermination: the atoms do all the causing, so the baseball causes no breakage
     Full Idea: The Overdetermination Argument: a baseball is irrelevant to whether its atoms shatter a window, the shattering is caused by the atoms in concert, the shattering is not overdetermined, so if the baseball exists it doesn't cause the shattering.
     From: Trenton Merricks (Objects and Persons [2003], 3)
     A reaction: An obvious thought is that no individual atom does any sort of breaking at all - it is only when they act as a team, and an appropriate name for the team is a 'baseball', and the team is real.
2006 Goodbye Growing Block
1 p.103 Eternalism says all times are equally real, and future and past objects and properties are real
     Full Idea: Eternalism says all times are equally real. Objects existing at past times and objects existing at future times are just as real as objects existing at the present. Properties had at past and future times are as much properties as those at the present.
     From: Trenton Merricks (Goodbye Growing Block [2006], 1)
     A reaction: He adds that the present is therefore 'subjective', resulting from one's perspective. Why would eternalists reject their subjective experiences of time, unless they reject all their other subjective experiences as well?
4 p.108 Growing block has a subjective present and a growing edge - but these could come apart
     Full Idea: Merricks argues that the growing block view says that we live in the subjective present, and that there is a growing edge of being, but he then suggests that these two could come apart, and it would make no difference, so the growing block is incoherent.
     From: report of Trenton Merricks (Goodbye Growing Block [2006], 4) by PG - Db (ideas)
     A reaction: [I think that is the nub of his argument. I couldn't find a concise summary in his words]
2007 Truth and Ontology
1.IV p.15 Truthmaker isn't the correspondence theory, because it offers no analysis of truth
     Full Idea: Because Truthmaker offers no analysis of being true, Truthmaker is not the correspondence theory of truth.
     From: Trenton Merricks (Truth and Ontology [2007], 1.IV)
     A reaction: I'm not convinced that the correspondence theory offers an 'analysis' of truth. It doesn't seem to do much more than offer a word which suggests an analogy with some relation in the world.
2.II p.26 If the correspondence theory is right, then necessary truths must correspond to something
     Full Idea: Suppose for the sake of argument that the correspondence theory is correct. Then it is analytic that each necessary truth, in virtue of being true, corresponds to something.
     From: Trenton Merricks (Truth and Ontology [2007], 2.II)
     A reaction: The sort of nice simple observation for which I admire Merricks. You don't have to give up on the correspondence theory at this point, but you will have to go through with some substantial metaphysics to keep it afloat.
3.II p.43 Fregeans say 'hobbits do not exist' is just 'being a hobbit' is not exemplified
     Full Idea: A Fregean about existence claims would say that 'that hobbits do not exist' is nothing other than the claim that 'being a hobbit' is not exemplified.
     From: Trenton Merricks (Truth and Ontology [2007], 3.II)
     A reaction: 'My passport has ceased to exist' seems to be a bit more dramatic than a relationship with a concept.
3.III p.57 The totality state is the most plausible truthmaker for negative existential truths
     Full Idea: The claim that the totality state is the sole truthmaker for negative existential truths emerges as the best position for a truthmaker theorist.
     From: Trenton Merricks (Truth and Ontology [2007], 3.III)
3.V p.64 It is implausible that claims about non-existence are about existing things
     Full Idea: It is implausible that a claim asserting that a thing fails to exist is made true by - and so is appropriately about - some other, existing thing.
     From: Trenton Merricks (Truth and Ontology [2007], 3.V)
3.V p.66 If a ball changes from red to white, Truthmaker says some thing must make the change true
     Full Idea: If a single ball goes from being red to being white, Truthmaker implies that something exists which makes it true that the second thing follows the first.
     From: Trenton Merricks (Truth and Ontology [2007], 3.V)
4 p.68 If 'truth supervenes on being', worlds with the same entities, properties and relations have the same truths
     Full Idea: 'Truth supervenes on being' says that any two possible worlds alike with respect to what entities exist and which properties (and relations) each of those entities exemplifies are thereby alike with respect to what is true.
     From: Trenton Merricks (Truth and Ontology [2007], 4)
     A reaction: Merricks says this view is found in early Wittgenstein, as well as in David Lewis. He suggests that this is a weaker and more plausible thesis than the full commitment to truthmakers. It still allows some truths to lack truthmakers. Sounds plausible.
4.I p.69 Truthmaker demands not just a predication, but an existing state of affairs with essential ingredients
     Full Idea: The claim 'that Fido is brown' seems to demand only a brown Fido, but Truthmaker demands more. It demands both that a state of affairs along the lines of 'Fido's being brown' exists, and also that this state has its constituents essentially.
     From: Trenton Merricks (Truth and Ontology [2007], 4.I)
     A reaction: One would need to reread Merricks to get this clear, but my instinct is that the two scenarios are not very different. 'A brown Fido' would require Fido to be necessarily brown to do the job.
4.I-3 p.71 Truthmaker says if an entity is removed, some nonexistence truthmaker must replace it
     Full Idea: Truthmaker makes it impossible simply to remove an entity. One must always replace it with something else; namely, a truthmaker for the claim that that entity does not exist.
     From: Trenton Merricks (Truth and Ontology [2007], 4.I-3)
     A reaction: This is a particularly strong and persuasive argument from Merricks against the truthmaker view. Clearly the truthmaker for non-existence can't be there when it exists, and the destruction bringing the negative truthmaker into existence sounds odd.
4.VI p.88 If truth supervenes on being, that won't explain why truth depends on being
     Full Idea: If 'truth supervenes on being' aims to articulate the idea that truth depends on being, it must say more than that truth supervenes on being.
     From: Trenton Merricks (Truth and Ontology [2007], 4.VI)
     A reaction: This is a perennial problem with supervenience accounts, such as the supervenience of beauty on the object, or of mind on brain.
5.I p.99 If 'Fido is possibly black' depends on Fido's counterparts, then it has no actual truthmaker
     Full Idea: If Fido's being possibly black reduces (in Lewis's account) to the existence of black counterparts of Fido, then 'Fido is possibly black' is actually true, but it has no actually existing truthmaker.
     From: Trenton Merricks (Truth and Ontology [2007], 5.I)
     A reaction: This problem is increasingly the target of my views about dispositions and powers. Fido is not possibly a prize-winning novelist, but is possibly dead or in good health, because of the actual nature and dispositions of Fido.
5.III p.112 If Truthmaker says each truth is made by the existence of something, the theory had de re modality at is core
     Full Idea: Truthmaker says that, for each truth, there is something that, by its mere existence, makes that truth true, …so Truthmaker has de re modality at its core.
     From: Trenton Merricks (Truth and Ontology [2007], 5.III)
     A reaction: I have no problem with de re modality, so this doesn't bother me. Merricks brings out nicely the baggage which you must carry if you are a Truthmaker.
6.I p.122 How can a presentist explain an object's having existed?
     Full Idea: I am not sure what account presentists should give of an object's having existed.
     From: Trenton Merricks (Truth and Ontology [2007], 6.I)
     A reaction: Personally I am pretty puzzled by the eternalist and growing-block accounts of an object having existed, so we are all up a gum tree here. The best bet is to pull truth and existence apart, but heaven knows what that implies. See Idea 14399.
6.I p.124 Presentists say that things have existed and will exist, not that they are instantaneous
     Full Idea: Presentists deny that everything is instantaneous; they think that many objects not only exist, but also have existed and will exist.
     From: Trenton Merricks (Truth and Ontology [2007], 6.I)
     A reaction: The second half is because presentists are committed to the truth of tensed existence claims (despite a lack of any theory as to how they work). Does anyone hold a theory of Instantaneousism?
6.I p.125 Presentist should deny there is a present time, and just say that things 'exist'
     Full Idea: I think presentists should deny that there is anything at all that is the present time, just as they should deny that there are past times or future times. They should say that existing at the present time is just 'existing'.
     From: Trenton Merricks (Truth and Ontology [2007], 6.I)
     A reaction: The whole context is needed to understand Merrick's interesting claim. If there is no present, when can events happen?
6.III p.137 Truthmaker needs truths to be 'about' something, and that is often unclear
     Full Idea: It is not always obvious what (if anything) a truth is about, in the sense of 'about' relevant to Truthmaker and truth-supervenient-on-being. Prior says 'Queen Anne is dead' is not about Queen Anne, and may be about the Earth.
     From: Trenton Merricks (Truth and Ontology [2007], 6.III)
     A reaction: A very nice and rather subtle objection to the Truthmaker thesis. Specifying the truthmaker for a given truth looks like a doddle in simple cases, but clearly it can become extremely elusive in other cases.
6.IV n20 p.141 You believe you existed last year, but your segment doesn't, so they have different beliefs
     Full Idea: Your belief that you existed in the year 2000 is true; the belief of a segment of you that it then existed is false; so, by the indiscernibility of identicals, there must be two beliefs here.
     From: Trenton Merricks (Truth and Ontology [2007], 6.IV n20)
     A reaction: Merricks may be begging the question here. But in the segment view there is nothing which can truly believe it existed a year ago, so therefore nothing here has continued existence, so the segments cannot be part of a single thing.
6.IV n23 p.142 Maybe only presentism allows change, by now having a property, and then lacking it
     Full Idea: Maybe presentism alone allows for genuine change, by permitting the direct having of a property by something and then, later, the absolute lacking of that property by that same thing.
     From: Trenton Merricks (Truth and Ontology [2007], 6.IV n23)
     A reaction: Four-dimensionalism (perdurantism) is the view which is most often charged with not explaining change, and that tends to be associated with eternalism. Are there just two coherent packages of views here?
6.VI p.145 Speculations about non-existent things are not about existent things, so Truthmaker is false
     Full Idea: That 'there might have been a dozen more fundamental particles' is true, but not appropriately about any existing entities or their properties. Since Truthmaker says that all truths are about existing entities, it must be false.
     From: Trenton Merricks (Truth and Ontology [2007], 6.VI)
     A reaction: Since I don't necessarily agree that 'there might have been a dozen more fundamental particles' (see Scientific Essentialism), and I take the disagreement to have some basis, I doubt this idea. What stops 'there could be circular squares' from being true?
7.I p.148 Some properties seem to be primitive, but others can be analysed
     Full Idea: Some properties (perhaps negative charge, or the relation of identity) admit of no analysis, and so are primitive. But others are analysable, and so not primitive
     From: Trenton Merricks (Truth and Ontology [2007], 7.I)
7.I p.152 I am a truthmaker for 'that a human exists', but is it about me?
     Full Idea: I am a truthmaker for 'that a human exists', but it is not obvious that that proposition is thus about me.
     From: Trenton Merricks (Truth and Ontology [2007], 7.I)
     A reaction: This is part of the general rather good objection that it is often unclear what a truth is 'about' (Idea 14408). The original Gettier examples about justification illustrate this problem. They make things true, in a surprising way.
7.II p.156 A ground must be about its truth, and not just necessitate it
     Full Idea: A ground does not merely necessitate its truth. A ground is also what its truth is appropriately about.
     From: Trenton Merricks (Truth and Ontology [2007], 7.II)
7.III p.159 An object can have a disposition when the revelant conditional is false
     Full Idea: It is possible for an object to have a disposition even though the relevant conditional is false.
     From: Trenton Merricks (Truth and Ontology [2007], 7.III)
     A reaction: This is the now standard observation that finks (killing the disposition) and antidotes (blocking the effect of the disposition) can intervene, as in safety mechanisms in electrical gadgets. There may be replies available here.
7.IV p.166 Counterfactuals aren't about actuality, so they lack truthmakers or a supervenience base
     Full Idea: A counterfactual is not appropriately about the way anything is, …but about how something would be, had other things differed from how they actually are. As a result, true counterfactuals have neither truthmakers nor a superveniece base.
     From: Trenton Merricks (Truth and Ontology [2007], 7.IV)
     A reaction: Might not the truthmakers for counterfactuals reside in the dispositional facts about actuality? We assess the truth of counterfactuals in degrees, so something must determine our views.
8.IV p.182 Being true is not a relation, it is a primitive monadic property
     Full Idea: Being true is not a relation. …Being true is a monadic property. …Being true is a primitive property.
     From: Trenton Merricks (Truth and Ontology [2007], 8.IV)
     A reaction: Even after reading Merricks on this, I am not sure I understand it. If a single sentence floats in the void, it is hard to see how the 'monadic' property of truth could accrue to it.
8.V p.187 Deflationism just says there is no property of being truth
     Full Idea: I take 'deflationism' to be nothing other than the claim that there is no property of being true.
     From: Trenton Merricks (Truth and Ontology [2007], 8.V)
2015 Propositions
Intro p.-3 Propositions can be 'about' an entity, but that doesn't make the entity a constituent of it
     Full Idea: If a singular proposition is 'directly about' an entity, I argue that a singular proposition does not have the entity that it is directly about as a constituent.
     From: Trenton Merricks (Propositions [2015], Intro)
     A reaction: This opposes the view of the early Russell, that propositions actually contain the entities they are about, thus making propositions real features of the external world. I take that view of Russell's to be absurd.
Intro p.-3 Propositions are standardly treated as possible worlds, or as structured
     Full Idea: The thesis that propositions are sets of possible worlds is one of the two leading accounts of the nature of propositions. The other leading account endorses structured propositions.
     From: Trenton Merricks (Propositions [2015], Intro)
     A reaction: Merricks sets out to reject both main views. I take the idea that propositions actually are sets of possible worlds to be ridiculous (though they may offer a way of modelling them). The idea that they have no structure at all strikes me as odd.
Intro p.-2 Propositions are necessary existents which essentially (but inexplicably) represent things
     Full Idea: My account says that each proposition is a necessary existent that essentially represents things as being a certain way, ...and there is no explanation of how propositions do that.
     From: Trenton Merricks (Propositions [2015], Intro)
     A reaction: Since I take propositions to be brain events, I don't expect much of an explanation either. The idea that propositions necessarily exist strikes me as false. If there were no minds, there would have been no propositions.
1.II p.6 A sentence's truth conditions depend on context
     Full Idea: A sentence has truth conditions only in a context of use. And the truth conditions of many sentences can differ from one context of use to another (as in 'I am a philosopher').
     From: Trenton Merricks (Propositions [2015], 1.II)
     A reaction: He is building a defence of propositions, because they are eternal, and have their truth conditions essentially. I too am a fan of propositions.
1.V p.22 True propositions existed prior to their being thought, and might never be thought
     Full Idea: 1,000 years ago, no sentence had ever expressed, and no one had believed, the true proposition 'a water molecule has two hydrogen and one oxygen atoms'. There are surely true propositions that have never been, and never will be, expressed or believed.
     From: Trenton Merricks (Propositions [2015], 1.V)
     A reaction: 'Surely'? Surely not! How many propositions exist? Where do they exist? What are they made of? If they already exist when we think them, how do we tune into them? When did his example come into existence? Before water did? No! No!
1.V n14 p.25 'Snow is white' only contingently expresses the proposition that snow is white
     Full Idea: It is contingently true that 'snow is white' expresses the proposition that snow is white.
     From: Trenton Merricks (Propositions [2015], 1.V n14)
     A reaction: Tarski stuck to sentences, but Merricks rightly argues that truth concerns propositions, not sentences. Sentences are subservient entities - mere tools used to express what matters, which is our thoughts (say I).
2.II p.41 'Cicero is an orator' represents the same situation as 'Tully is an orator', so they are one proposition
     Full Idea: The proposition expressed by 'Cicero is an orator' represents things as being exactly the same way as does the proposition expressed by 'Tully is an orator'. Hence two sentences express the same proposition. Fregeans about names deny this.
     From: Trenton Merricks (Propositions [2015], 2.II)
     A reaction: Merricks makes the situation in the world fix the contents of the proposition. I don't agree. I would expand the first proposition as 'The person I know as 'Cicero' was an orator', but I might never have heard of 'Tully'.
2.II p.45 Sentence logic maps truth values; predicate logic maps objects and sets
     Full Idea: The models for sentential logic map sentences to truth-values. The models for predicate logic map parts of sentences to objects and sets.
     From: Trenton Merricks (Propositions [2015], 2.II)
     A reaction: Logic books rarely tell you important things like this. That is why this database is so incredibly important! You will never understand the subject if you don't collect together the illuminating asides of discussion. They say it all so much more simply.
2.V p.65 Simple Quantified Modal Logc doesn't work, because the Converse Barcan is a theorem
     Full Idea: Logical consequence guarantees preservation of truth. The Converse Barcan, a theorem of Simple Quantified Modal Logic, says that an obvious truth implies an obvious falsehood. So SQML gets logical consequence wrong. So SQML is mistaken.
     From: Trenton Merricks (Propositions [2015], 2.V)
     A reaction: I admire this. The Converse Barcan certainly strikes me as wrong (Idea 19208). Merricks grasps this nettle. Williamson grasps the other nettle. Most people duck the issue, I suspect. Merricks says later that domains are the problem.
2.V p.65 The Converse Barcan implies 'everything exists necessarily' is a consequence of 'necessarily, everything exists'
     Full Idea: The Converse Barcan Formula has a startling result. Simple Quantified Modal Logic (SQML) has the following as a theorem: □∀xFx → ∀x□Fx. So 'everything exists necessarily' is a consequence of 'necessarily, everything exists'.
     From: Trenton Merricks (Propositions [2015], 2.V)
     A reaction: He says this is blatantly wrong. Williamson is famous for defending it. I think I'm with Merricks on this one.
3.VII p.113 The standard view of propositions says they never change their truth-value
     Full Idea: The standard view among philosophers nowadays seems to be that propositions do not and even cannot change in truth-value. But my own view is that some propositions can, and do, change in truth value.
     From: Trenton Merricks (Propositions [2015], 3.VII)
     A reaction: He gives 'that A sits' as an example of one which can change, though 'that A sits at time t' cannot change. I take Merricks to be obviously right, and cannot get my head round the 'standard' view. What on earth do they think a proposition is?
4.II p.124 Early Russell says a proposition is identical with its truthmaking state of affairs
     Full Idea: I describe Russell's 1903 account of propositions as the view that each proposition is identical with the state of affairs that makes that proposition true. That is, a proposition is identical with its 'truthmaking' state of affairs.
     From: Trenton Merricks (Propositions [2015], 4.II)
     A reaction: Russell soon gave this view up (false propositions proving tricky), and I'm amazed anyone takes it seriously. I take it as axiomatic that if there were no minds there would be no propositions. Was the Big Bang a set of propositions?
4.II p.126 Unity of the proposition questions: what unites them? can the same constituents make different ones?
     Full Idea: What binds the constituents of a structured proposition together into a single unity, a proposition? Can the very same constituents constitute two distinct propositions? These are questions about 'the unity of the proposition'.
     From: Trenton Merricks (Propositions [2015], 4.II)
     A reaction: Merricks solves it by saying propositions have no structure. The problem is connected to the nature of predication (instantiation, partaking). You can't just list objects and their properties. Objects are united, and thus propositions are too.
4.X p.155 We want to explain not just what unites the constituents, but what unites them into a proposition
     Full Idea: A successful account of the unity of the proposition tells us what unites the relevant constituents not merely into some entity or other, but into a proposition.
     From: Trenton Merricks (Propositions [2015], 4.X)
     A reaction: Merrickes takes propositions to be unanalysable unities, but their central activity is representation, so if they needed uniting, that would be the place to look. Some people say that we unite our propositions. Others say the world does. I dunno.
5.V p.176 In twinning, one person has the same origin as another person
     Full Idea: Origin essentialists claim that parental union results in a person, and that person could not have resulted from any other union. However, if the fertilised egg undergoes twinning, at least one of the resultant persons is not the original person.
     From: Trenton Merricks (Propositions [2015], 5.V)
     A reaction: Merricks says that therefore that origin could have just produced the second twin, rather than the original person. This is interesting, but doesn't seem to threaten the necessity of origin thesis. Once I'm here, I have that origin, despite my twin.
5.VII p.182 Arguers often turn the opponent's modus ponens into their own modus tollens
     Full Idea: There is a seasoned method of turning your opponent's modus ponens into your own modus tollens.
     From: Trenton Merricks (Propositions [2015], 5.VII)
     A reaction: That is, they say 'if he's coming he'll be hear by now, and he's definitely coming', to which you say 'I'm afraid he's not here, so he obviously isn't coming after all'. They say if-A-then-B, and A, so B. You say not-B, so you're wrong about A.
5.VII p.186 I don't accept that if a proposition is directly about an entity, it has a relation to the entity
     Full Idea: The Aboutness Assumption says that necessarily, if a proposition is directly about an entity, then that proposition stands in a relation to the entity. I shall argue that the Assumption is false.
     From: Trenton Merricks (Propositions [2015], 5.VII)
     A reaction: This feels sort of right, though the nature of aboutness remains elusive. He cites denials of existence. I take speech to be fairly internal, even though its main role is communication. Maybe its a Cambridge relation, as far as the entity is concerned.