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Ideas of S.Mumford/R.Lill Anjum, by Text

[, fl. 2011, Professors in Nottingham and Norway.]

2011 Dispositional Modality
1 p.380 Dispositionality has its own distinctive type of modality
2011 Getting Causes from Powers
Pref p.-8 Causation doesn't have two distinct relata; it is a single unfolding process
1.1 p.3 Pandispositionalists say structures are clusters of causal powers
1.1 p.4 We say 'power' and 'disposition' are equivalent, but some say dispositions are manifestable
1.2 p.9 Coincidence is conjunction without causation; smoking causing cancer is the reverse
1.2 p.10 Powers explain properties, causes, modality, events, and perhaps even particulars
1.3 p.12 Nature can be interfered with, so a cause never necessitates its effects
2.3 p.23 Events are essentially changes; property exemplifications are just states of affairs
2.7 p.43 If statue and clay fall and crush someone, the event is not overdetermined
3.10 p.67 Maybe truths are necessitated by the facts which are their truthmakers
3.11 p.71 We assert causes without asserting that they necessitate their effects
3.14 p.82 If causation were necessary, the past would fix the future, and induction would be simple
3.5 p.56 Necessary causation should survive antecedent strengthening, but no cause can always survive that
3.8 p.64 There may be necessitation in the world, but causation does not supply it
4.3 p.92 Weak emergence is just unexpected, and strong emergence is beyond all deduction
4.3c p.99 Laws are nothing more than descriptions of the behaviour of powers
4.3c p.99 Powers offer no more explanation of nature than laws do
4.3d p.101 Strong emergence seems to imply top-down causation, originating in consciousness
4.4 p.103 Powers are not just basic forces, since they combine to make new powers
5.3 p.109 A collision is a process, which involves simultaneous happenings, but not instantaneous ones
5.3 p.113 Does causation need a third tying ingredient, or just two that meet, or might there be a single process?
5.5 p.120 If laws are equations, cause and effect must be simultaneous (or the law would be falsified)!
5.5 1 p.116 Perdurantism imposes no order on temporal parts, so sequences of events are contingent
5.5 1 p.117 A process is unified as an expression of a collection of causal powers
5.5 3 p.119 Causation is the passing around of powers
5.6 p.123 Sugar dissolving is a process taking time, not one event and then another
6.1 p.131 Causation by absence is not real causation, but part of our explanatory practices
6.2 p.132 Privileging one cause is just an epistemic or pragmatic matter, not an ontological one
6.2 p.133 A structure won't give a causal explanation unless we know the powers of the structure
6.5 p.138 It is tempting to think that only entailment provides a full explanation
6.6 p.142 The only full uniformities in nature occur from the essences of fundamental things
6.6 p.142 Nature is not completely uniform, and some regular causes sometimes fail to produce their effects
6.8 p.151 Occasionally a cause makes no difference (pre-emption, perhaps) so the counterfactual is false
6.8 p.151 Is a cause because of counterfactual dependence, or is the dependence because there is a cause?
6.8 p.152 Cases of preventing a prevention may give counterfactual dependence without causation
6.8 p.154 A 'ceteris paribus' clause implies that a conditional only has dispositional force
7.3 p.130 Relations are naturally necessary when they are generated by the essential mechanisms of the world
7.5 p.165 Smoking disposes towards cancer; smokers without cancer do not falsify this claim
7.6 p.171 Causation may not be transitive. Does a fire cause itself to be extinguished by the sprinklers?
8.10 p.191 The simple conditional analysis of dispositions doesn't allow for possible prevention
8.4 p.179 Possibility might be non-contradiction, or recombinations of the actual, or truth in possible worlds
8.5 p.182 Dispositionality is the core modality, with possibility and necessity as its extreme cases
8.5 p.183 Dispositions may suggest modality to us - as what might not have been, and what could have been
8.6 p.184 The normative view says laws show the natural behaviour of natural kind members
8.8 p.186 Might dispositions be reduced to normativity, or to intentionality?
8.9 p.189 Dispositionality is a natural selection function, picking outcomes from the range of possibilities
9.1 p.196 We have more than five senses; balance and proprioception, for example
Concl p.237 We take causation to be primitive, as it is hard to see how it could be further reduced