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Ideas of Thomas Nagel, by Text
[American, b.1937, Born in Yugoslavia. Studied with Rawls. Professor at New York University.]
§1
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p.12
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3268
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If a small brief life is absurd, then so is a long and large one
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§3
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p.16
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3269
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If your life is to be meaningful as part of some large thing, the large thing must be meaningful
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§3
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p.16
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3270
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Justifications come to an end when we want them to
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1971
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Brain Bisection and Unity of Consciousness
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p.84
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2957
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Brain bisection suggests unity of mind isn't all-or-nothing [Lockwood]
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p.164
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p.164
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3285
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We may be unable to abandon personal identity, even when split-brains have undermined it
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1974
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What is it like to be a bat?
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p.80
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4989
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Physicalism should explain how subjective experience is possible, but not 'what it is like' [Kirk,R]
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p.212
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4883
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Nagel's title creates an impenetrable mystery, by ignoring a bat's ways that may not be "like" anything [Dennett]
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p.166
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p.166
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3286
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An organism is conscious if and only if there is something it is like to be that organism
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p.174
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p.174
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3287
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We can't be objective about experience
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p.179
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p.179
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3288
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Can we describe our experiences to zombies?
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p.27
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p.27
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3271
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We can't control our own beliefs
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p.28
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p.28
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3272
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Moral luck can arise in character, preconditions, actual circumstances, and outcome
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§1
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p.106
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3273
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Equality nowadays is seen as political, social, legal and economic
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§2
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p.108
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3274
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Equality can either be defended as good for society, or as good for individual rights
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§2
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p.109
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3275
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Equality was once opposed to aristocracy, but now it opposes public utility and individual rights
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§5
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p.116
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3276
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A morality of rights is very minimal, leaving a lot of human life without restrictions or duties
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§6
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p.117
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3277
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In judging disputes, should we use one standard, or those of each individual?
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§6
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p.118
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3278
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An egalitarian system must give priority to those with the worst prospects in life
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§8
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p.123
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3281
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The ideal of acceptability to each individual underlies the appeal to equality
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§9
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p.126
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3282
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The general form of moral reasoning is putting yourself in other people's shoes
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1977
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The Fragmentation of Value
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p.135
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p.135
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3284
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There is no one theory of how to act (or what to believe)
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p.186
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p.186
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3290
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Given the nature of heat and of water, it is literally impossible for water not to boil at the right heat
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p.186
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p.186
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3291
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Emergent properties appear at high levels of complexity, but aren't explainable by the lower levels
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1979
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Subjective and Objective
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p.198
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p.198
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3292
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The most difficult problem of free will is saying what the problem is
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p.200
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p.200
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3293
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If you assert that we have an ego, you can still ask if that future ego will be me
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p.204
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p.204
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3294
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As far as possible we should become instruments to realise what is best from an eternal point of view
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p.206
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p.206
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3295
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Inner v outer brings astonishment that we are a particular person
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p.207
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p.207
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3296
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Sense-data are a false objectification of what is essentially subjective
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1986
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The View from Nowhere
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Intro
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p.4
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3240
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There is more insight in fundamental perplexity about problems than in their supposed solutions
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Intro
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p.11
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3241
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It seems mad, but the aim of philosophy is to climb outside of our own minds
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Intro
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p.12
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3242
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Philosophy is the childhood of the intellect, and a culture can't skip it
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II
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p.14
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22429
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We achieve objectivity by dropping secondary qualities, to focus on structural primary qualities
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III.2
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p.35
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3244
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Personal identity cannot be fully known a priori
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III.3
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p.37
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3245
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The question of whether a future experience will be mine presupposes personal identity
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III.4
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p.45
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3246
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I can't even conceive of my brain being split in two
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Intro
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p.5
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20989
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Views are objective if they don't rely on a person's character, social position or species
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p.14
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p.3
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22354
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Things cause perceptions, properties have other effects, hence we reach a 'view from nowhere' [Reiss/Sprenger]
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V.1
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p.69
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3247
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Epistemology is centrally about what we should believe, not the definition of knowledge
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V.1
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p.71
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3248
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Realism invites scepticism because it claims to be objective
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V.3
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p.75
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3249
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Modern science depends on the distinction between primary and secondary qualities
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V.5
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p.84
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3251
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Observed regularities are only predictable if we assume hidden necessity
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V.6
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p.88
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3252
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Scepticism is based on ideas which scepticism makes impossible
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VIII.1
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p.138
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3254
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If we can decide how to live after stepping outside of ourselves, we have the basis of a moral theory
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VIII.1
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p.139
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3255
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We find new motives by discovering reasons for action different from our preexisting motives
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VIII.2
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p.144
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3256
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Pain doesn't have a further property of badness; it gives a reason for its avoidance
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VIII.2
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p.147
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3257
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Total objectivity can't see value, but it sees many people with values
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VIII.3
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p.150
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3258
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If cockroaches can't think about their actions, they have no duties
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X.4
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p.200
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3261
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Something may be 'rational' either because it is required or because it is acceptable
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X.5
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p.205
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3262
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Utilitarianism is too demanding
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XI.2
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p.217
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3263
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If our own life lacks meaning, devotion to others won't give it meaning
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XI.2
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p.222
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3264
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We should see others' viewpoints, but not lose touch with our own values
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XI.3
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p.228
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3265
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We don't worry about the time before we were born the way we worry about death
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1987
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What Does It All Mean?
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Ch.5
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p.46
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4001
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The meaning of a word contains all its possible uses as well as its actual ones
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1988
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MacIntyre versus the Enlightenment
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203
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p.203
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1490
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You would have to be very morally lazy to ignore criticisms of your own culture
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1991
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Equality and Partiality
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Ch.10
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p.100
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6479
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Noninterference requires justification as much as interference does
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Ch.2
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p.10
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6446
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In ethics we abstract from our identity, but not from our humanity
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Ch.4
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p.34
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6447
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Game theory misses out the motivation arising from the impersonal standpoint
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Ch.4
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p.38
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6448
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A legitimate system is one accepted as both impartial and reasonably partial
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Ch.5
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p.45
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6450
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Morality must be motivating, and not because of pre-moral motives
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Ch.5
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p.48
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6477
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I can only universalise a maxim if everyone else could also universalise it
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Ch.9
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p.89
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6478
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Democracy is opposed to equality, if the poor are not a majority
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1995
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The Philosophical Culture
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§6
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p.6
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1489
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Modern philosophy tends to be a theory-constructing extension of science, but there is also problem-solving
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2000
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The Psychophysical Nexus
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§III
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p.445
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4242
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Pure supervenience explains nothing, and is a sign of something fundamental we don't know
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