| 1971 | The Absurd |
| §1 | p.12 | 3268 | If a small brief life is absurd, then so is a long and large one |
| Full Idea: If life is absurd because it only lasts seventy years, wouldn't it be infinitely absurd if it lasted for eternity? And if we are absurd because we are small, would we be any less absurd if we filled the universe? | |||
| From: Thomas Nagel (The Absurd [1971], §1) |
| §3 | p.16 | 3269 | If your life is to be meaningful as part of some large thing, the large thing must be meaningful |
| Full Idea: Those seeking to give their lives meaning usually envision a role in something larger than themselves, …but such a role can't confer significance unless that enterprise is itself significant. | |||
| From: Thomas Nagel (The Absurd [1971], §3) | |||
| A reaction: Which correctly implies that this way of finding meaning for one's life is doomed. |
| §3 | p.16 | 3270 | Justifications come to an end when we want them to |
| Full Idea: Justifications come to an end when we are content to have them end. | |||
| From: Thomas Nagel (The Absurd [1971], §3) | |||
| A reaction: This is the correct account, with the vital proviso that where justification comes to an end is usually a social matter. Robinson Crusoe doesn't care whether he 'knows' - he just acts on his beliefs. |
| 1971 | Brain Bisection and Unity of Consciousness |
| p.84 | 2957 | Brain bisection suggests unity of mind isn't all-or-nothing | |
| Full Idea: Nagel argues (because of brain bisection experiments) that we should jettison our commonsense assumption that the unity of consciousness is an all-or-nothing affair. | |||
| From: report of Thomas Nagel (Brain Bisection and Unity of Consciousness [1971]) by Michael Lockwood - Mind, Brain and the Quantum p.84 | |||
| A reaction: It seems wrong to call it 'commonsense'. It is an assumption that precedes any judgement, but if you rapidly grasp that your mind is in your brain, it becomes common sense that you can cut lumps out of your mind. |
| p.164 | p.164 | 3285 | We may be unable to abandon personal identity, even when split-brains have undermined it |
| Full Idea: As a result of the evidence of split-brains, it is possible that the ordinary, simple idea of a single person will come to seem quaint some day, …but we may be unable to abandon the idea, no matter what we discover. | |||
| From: Thomas Nagel (Brain Bisection and Unity of Consciousness [1971], p.164) | |||
| A reaction: I'm not sure what grounds you can have for a claim that we can't abandon our current view of selves, even when the new reality will be utterly different. Rather conservative? I would expect future concepts to roughly match future reality. |
| 1974 | What is it like to be a bat? |
| p.80 | 4989 | Physicalism should explain how subjective experience is possible, but not 'what it is like' | |
| Full Idea: A physicalist account of conscious experience must explain how it is possible for a physical system to be a conscious subject, but not 'what it is like' for some organism. | |||
| From: comment on Thomas Nagel (What is it like to be a bat? [1974]) by Robert Kirk - Mind and Body §4.2 | |||
| A reaction: You can't entirely evade Nagel's challenge. We are trying to discover the 'neural correlate of consciousness', which will explain why we are conscious, but we also want to know why we experience green for one wavelength, and red for another. |
| p.212 | 4883 | Nagel's title creates an impenetrable mystery, by ignoring a bat's ways that may not be "like" anything | |
| Full Idea: Nagel's title invites us to ignore all the different ways in which bats might accomplish their cunning feats without its "being like" anything for them. We create an impenetrable mystery for ourselves if we assume that Nagel's title makes sense. | |||
| From: comment on Thomas Nagel (What is it like to be a bat? [1974]) by Daniel C. Dennett - Kinds of Minds Ch.6 | |||
| A reaction: This could well be correct about bats, but the question applies to humans as well, and we can't deny that "what it is like" is a feature of some creatures' realities. On the fringes of our own consciousness there are mental events that are "like" nothing. |
| p.166 | p.166 | 3286 | An organism is conscious if and only if there is something it is like to be that organism |
| Full Idea: An organism only has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to be that organism. | |||
| From: Thomas Nagel (What is it like to be a bat? [1974], p.166) | |||
| A reaction: It is hard to argue with this, but one should push on and ask what features of its consciousness make it such that there is a 'what it is like'. What is it like to have a subconscious mind, or be deeply asleep, or drive while daydreaming? |
| p.174 | p.174 | 3287 | We can't be objective about experience |
| Full Idea: If the subjective character of experience is fully comprehensible only from one point of view, then any shift to greater objectivity does not take us nearer to the real nature of the phenomenon: it takes us further away from it. | |||
| From: Thomas Nagel (What is it like to be a bat? [1974], p.174) | |||
| A reaction: We can, however, talk to one another about our subjectivity, and compare notes, and such 'inter-subjectivity' may be one approach to objectivity. We must concede Nagel's point, but we also miss something about a stone if we must remain outside of it. |
| p.179 | p.179 | 3288 | Can we describe our experiences to zombies? |
| Full Idea: The goal of an objective phenomenology would be to describe, at least in part, the subjective character of experiences in a form comprehensible to beings incapable of having those experiences. | |||
| From: Thomas Nagel (What is it like to be a bat? [1974], p.179) | |||
| A reaction: This seems a bizarre expectation. We can already explain visual experience to the blind up to a point, but no one is dreaming of an "objective phenomenology" which will give blind people total understanding, just by reading about it in braille. |
| 1976 | Moral Luck |
| p.27 | p.27 | 3271 | We can't control our own beliefs |
| Full Idea: Our beliefs are always due to factors outside of our control. | |||
| From: Thomas Nagel (Moral Luck [1976], p.27) |
| p.28 | p.28 | 3272 | Moral luck can arise in character, preconditions, actual circumstances, and outcome |
| Full Idea: Moral luck involves one's character, the antecedent circumstances of the act, the actual circumstances of the act, and the outcome of the act. | |||
| From: Thomas Nagel (Moral Luck [1976], p.28) | |||
| A reaction: Meaning, I take it, that there can be luck in any one of those four. A neat slicing up that doesn't quite fit the real world, where things flow. Helpful, though. |
| 1977 | Equality |
| §1 | p.106 | 3273 | Equality nowadays is seen as political, social, legal and economic |
| Full Idea: Contemporary political debate recognises four types of equality: political, social, legal and economic. | |||
| From: Thomas Nagel (Equality [1977], §1) | |||
| A reaction: Meaning equality of 1) power and influence, 2) status and respect, 3) rights and justice, 4) wealth. |
| §2 | p.108 | 3274 | Equality can either be defended as good for society, or as good for individual rights |
| Full Idea: The communitarian defence of equality says it is good for society as a whole, whereas the individualistic defence defends equality as a correct distributive principle. | |||
| From: Thomas Nagel (Equality [1977], §2) |
| §2 | p.109 | 3275 | Equality was once opposed to aristocracy, but now it opposes public utility and individual rights |
| Full Idea: Egalitarianism was once opposed to aristocratic values, but now it is opposed by adherents of two non-aristocratic values: utility (increase benefit, even if unequally) and individual rights (which redistribution violates). | |||
| From: Thomas Nagel (Equality [1977], §2) |
| §5 | p.116 | 3276 | A morality of rights is very minimal, leaving a lot of human life without restrictions or duties |
| Full Idea: The morality of rights tends to be a limited, even minimal, morality. It leaves a great deal of human life ungoverned by moral restrictions or requirements. | |||
| From: Thomas Nagel (Equality [1977], §5) |
| §6 | p.117 | 3277 | In judging disputes, should we use one standard, or those of each individual? |
| Full Idea: In assessing equality of claims, it must be decided whether to use a single, objective standard, or whether interests should be ranked by the person's own estimation. Also should they balance momentary or long-term needs? | |||
| From: Thomas Nagel (Equality [1977], §6) |
| §6 | p.118 | 3278 | An egalitarian system must give priority to those with the worst prospects in life |
| Full Idea: What makes a system egalitarian is the priority it gives to the claims of those whose overall life prospects put them at the bottom. | |||
| From: Thomas Nagel (Equality [1977], §6) |
| §8 | p.123 | 3281 | The ideal of acceptability to each individual underlies the appeal to equality |
| Full Idea: The ideal of acceptability to each individual underlies the appeal to equality. | |||
| From: Thomas Nagel (Equality [1977], §8) |
| §9 | p.126 | 3282 | The general form of moral reasoning is putting yourself in other people's shoes |
| Full Idea: I believe the general form of moral reasoning is to put yourself in other people's shoes. | |||
| From: Thomas Nagel (Equality [1977], §9) |
| 1977 | The Fragmentation of Value |
| p.135 | p.135 | 3284 | There is no one theory of how to act (or what to believe) |
| Full Idea: To look for a single general theory of how to decide the right thing to do is like looking for a single theory of how to decide what to believe. | |||
| From: Thomas Nagel (The Fragmentation of Value [1977], p.135) | |||
| A reaction: Depends on your level of generality. Values and virtues are general guides which should be brought to every action, with 'higher' values guiding choice of what is relevant. |
| 1979 | Panpsychism |
| p.186 | p.186 | 3290 | Given the nature of heat and of water, it is literally impossible for water not to boil at the right heat |
| Full Idea: Given what heat is and what water is, it is literally impossible for water to be heated beyond a certain point at normal atmospheric pressure without boiling. | |||
| From: Thomas Nagel (Panpsychism [1979], p.186) |
| p.186 | p.186 | 3291 | Emergent properties appear at high levels of complexity, but aren't explainable by the lower levels |
| Full Idea: The supposition that a diamond or organism should truly have emergent properties is that they appear at certain complex levels of organisation, but are not explainable (even in principle) in terms of any more fundamental properties of the system. | |||
| From: Thomas Nagel (Panpsychism [1979], p.186) |
| 1979 | Subjective and Objective |
| p.198 | p.198 | 3292 | The most difficult problem of free will is saying what the problem is |
| Full Idea: The most difficult problem of free will is saying what the problem is. | |||
| From: Thomas Nagel (Subjective and Objective [1979], p.198) |
| p.200 | p.200 | 3293 | If you assert that we have an ego, you can still ask if that future ego will be me |
| Full Idea: The metaphysical ego, if it is a continuing individual with its identity over time, is just one more thing about which the same problem can be raised - will that ego still be me? | |||
| From: Thomas Nagel (Subjective and Objective [1979], p.200) | |||
| A reaction: You can worry too much about some philosophical questions. If it is me now, and it has continuing individual identity over time, I'm not going to lose sleep over the possibility that it might nevertheless somehow cease to be me. I'm overrated. |
| p.204 | p.204 | 3294 | As far as possible we should become instruments to realise what is best from an eternal point of view |
| Full Idea: The right thing to do is to turn oneself as far as possible into an instrument for the realisation of what is best 'sub specie aeternitatis'. | |||
| From: Thomas Nagel (Subjective and Objective [1979], p.204) |
| p.206 | p.206 | 3295 | Inner v outer brings astonishment that we are a particular person |
| Full Idea: The problem of reconciling the objective and subjective points of view takes its purest form in a sense of incredulity that one should be anyone in particular. | |||
| From: Thomas Nagel (Subjective and Objective [1979], p.206) | |||
| A reaction: Nice observation. This idea has always struck me forcibly, and seems to be one of those basic intuitions which motivates philosophy, and yet the subject has almost nothing to say about it. Of course you are you, or you wouldn't be amazed by it… |
| p.207 | p.207 | 3296 | Sense-data are a false objectification of what is essentially subjective |
| Full Idea: The private object or sense datum view is an instance of the false objectification of what is essentially subjective. | |||
| From: Thomas Nagel (Subjective and Objective [1979], p.207) |
| 1986 | The View from Nowhere |
| Intro | p.4 | 3240 | There is more insight in fundamental perplexity about problems than in their supposed solutions |
| Full Idea: Certain forms of perplexity (say about freedom, knowledge and the meaning of life) seem to me to embody more insight than any of the supposed solutions to those problems. | |||
| From: Thomas Nagel (The View from Nowhere [1986], Intro) | |||
| A reaction: Obviously false solutions won't embody much insight. This sounds good, but I suspect that the insight is in the recognition of the facts which give rise to the perplexity. I can't think of anything in favour of perplexity for its own sake. |
| Intro | p.11 | 3241 | It seems mad, but the aim of philosophy is to climb outside of our own minds |
| Full Idea: We are trying to climb outside of our own minds, an effort that some would regard as insane and that I regard as philosophically fundamental. | |||
| From: Thomas Nagel (The View from Nowhere [1986], Intro) | |||
| A reaction: It is not only philosophers who do this. It is an essential feature of the mind, and is inherent in the concept of truth. |
| Intro | p.12 | 3242 | Philosophy is the childhood of the intellect, and a culture can't skip it |
| Full Idea: Philosophy is the childhood of the intellect, and a culture that tries to skip it will never grow up. | |||
| From: Thomas Nagel (The View from Nowhere [1986], Intro) | |||
| A reaction: Can he really mean that a mature culture doesn't need philosophy? |
| II | p.14 | 22429 | We achieve objectivity by dropping secondary qualities, to focus on structural primary qualities |
| Full Idea: At the end [of the three stages of objectivity] the secondary qualities drop out of our picture of the external world, and the underlyiing primary qualities such as shape, size, weight, and motion are thought of structurally. | |||
| From: Thomas Nagel (The View from Nowhere [1986], II) | |||
| A reaction: This is the orthodox view for realists about the external world, and I largely agree. The only problem I see is that secondary qualities contain information, such as the colour of rotting fruit - but then colour is not an essential feature of rot. |
| III.2 | p.35 | 3244 | Personal identity cannot be fully known a priori |
| Full Idea: The full conditions of personal identity cannot be extracted from the concept of a person at all: they cannot be arrived at a priori. | |||
| From: Thomas Nagel (The View from Nowhere [1986], III.2) | |||
| A reaction: However, if you turn to experience to get the hang of what a person is, it is virtually impossible to disentangle the essentials from the accidental features of being a person. How essential are memories or reasoning or hopes or understandings or plans? |
| III.3 | p.37 | 3245 | The question of whether a future experience will be mine presupposes personal identity |
| Full Idea: The identity of the self must have some sort of objectivity, otherwise the subjective question whether a future experience will be mine or not will be contentless. | |||
| From: Thomas Nagel (The View from Nowhere [1986], III.3) | |||
| A reaction: This sounds a bit circular and question-begging. If there is no objective self, then the question of whether a future experience will be mine would be a misconceived question. I sympathise with Nagel's attempt to show how personal identity is a priori. |
| III.4 | p.45 | 3246 | I can't even conceive of my brain being split in two |
| Full Idea: It is hard to think of myself as being identical with my brain. If my brain is to be split, with one half miserable and the other half euphoric, my expectations can take no form, as my idea of myself doesn't allow for divisibility. | |||
| From: Thomas Nagel (The View from Nowhere [1986], III.4) | |||
| A reaction: Nagel is trying to imply that there is some sort of conceptual impossibility here, but it may just be very difficult. I can think about my lovely lunch while doing my miserable job. Does Nagel want to hang on to a unified thing which doesn't exist? |
| Intro | p.5 | 20989 | Views are objective if they don't rely on a person's character, social position or species |
| Full Idea: A view or form of thought is more objective than another if it relies less on the specifics of the individual's makeup and position in the world, or on the character of the particular type of creature he is. | |||
| From: Thomas Nagel (The View from Nowhere [1986], Intro) | |||
| A reaction: Notice that this defines comparative objectivity, rather than an absolute. I take it that something must be entirely objective to qualify as a 'fact', and so anything about which there is a consensus that it is a fact can be taken as wholly objective. |
| p.14 | p.3 | 22354 | Things cause perceptions, properties have other effects, hence we reach a 'view from nowhere' |
| Full Idea: First we realise that perceptions are caused by things, second we realise that properties have other effects (as well as causing perceptions), and third we conceive of a thing's true nature without perspectives. That is the 'view from nowhere'. | |||
| From: report of Thomas Nagel (The View from Nowhere [1986], p.14) by Reiss,J/Spreger,J - Scientific Objectivity 2.1 | |||
| A reaction: [My summary of their summary] This is obviously an optimistic view. I''m not sure how he can justify three precise stages, given than animals probably jump straight to the third stage, and engage with the nature's of things. |
| V.1 | p.69 | 3247 | Epistemology is centrally about what we should believe, not the definition of knowledge |
| Full Idea: The central problem of epistemology is what to believe and how to justify one's beliefs, not the impersonal problem of whether my beliefs can be said to be knowledge. | |||
| From: Thomas Nagel (The View from Nowhere [1986], V.1) | |||
| A reaction: Wrong. The question of whether what one has is 'knowledge' is not impersonal at all - it is having the social status of a knower or expert. |
| V.1 | p.71 | 3248 | Realism invites scepticism because it claims to be objective |
| Full Idea: The search for objective knowledge, because of its commitment to realism, cannot refute scepticism and must proceed under its shadow, and scepticism is only a problem because of the realist claims of objectivity. | |||
| From: Thomas Nagel (The View from Nowhere [1986], V.1) |
| V.3 | p.75 | 3249 | Modern science depends on the distinction between primary and secondary qualities |
| Full Idea: The distinction between primary and secondary qualities is the precondition for the development of modern physics and chemistry. | |||
| From: Thomas Nagel (The View from Nowhere [1986], V.3) |
| V.5 | p.84 | 3251 | Observed regularities are only predictable if we assume hidden necessity |
| Full Idea: Observed regularities provide reason to believe that they will be repeated only to the extent that they provide evidence of hidden necessary connections, which hold timelessly. | |||
| From: Thomas Nagel (The View from Nowhere [1986], V.5) |
| V.6 | p.88 | 3252 | Scepticism is based on ideas which scepticism makes impossible |
| Full Idea: The sceptic reaches scepticism through thoughts that scepticism makes unthinkable. | |||
| From: Thomas Nagel (The View from Nowhere [1986], V.6) |
| VIII.1 | p.138 | 3254 | If we can decide how to live after stepping outside of ourselves, we have the basis of a moral theory |
| Full Idea: If we can make judgements about how we should live even after stepping outside of ourselves, they will provide the material for moral theory. | |||
| From: Thomas Nagel (The View from Nowhere [1986], VIII.1) |
| VIII.1 | p.139 | 3255 | We find new motives by discovering reasons for action different from our preexisting motives |
| Full Idea: There are reasons for action, and we must discover them instead of deriving them from our preexisting motives - and in that way we can acquire new motives superior to the old. | |||
| From: Thomas Nagel (The View from Nowhere [1986], VIII.1) |
| VIII.2 | p.144 | 3256 | Pain doesn't have a further property of badness; it gives a reason for its avoidance |
| Full Idea: The objective badness of pain is not some mysterious further property that all pains have, but just the fact that there is reason for anyone capable of viewing the world objectively to want it to stop. | |||
| From: Thomas Nagel (The View from Nowhere [1986], VIII.2) | |||
| A reaction: Presumably all pains (e.g. of grief and of toothache) have something in common, to qualify as pains. It must be more than being disliked, because we can dislike a food. |
| VIII.2 | p.147 | 3257 | Total objectivity can't see value, but it sees many people with values |
| Full Idea: A purely objective view has no way of knowing whether anything has any value, but actually its data include the appearance of value to individuals with particular perspectives, including oneself. | |||
| From: Thomas Nagel (The View from Nowhere [1986], VIII.2) | |||
| A reaction: I would have thought that a very objective assessment of someone's health is an obvious revelation of value, irrespective of anyone's particular perspective. |
| VIII.3 | p.150 | 3258 | If cockroaches can't think about their actions, they have no duties |
| Full Idea: If cockroaches cannot think about what they should do, there is nothing they should do. | |||
| From: Thomas Nagel (The View from Nowhere [1986], VIII.3) |
| X.4 | p.200 | 3261 | Something may be 'rational' either because it is required or because it is acceptable |
| Full Idea: "Rational" may mean rationally required or rationally acceptable | |||
| From: Thomas Nagel (The View from Nowhere [1986], X.4) |
| X.5 | p.205 | 3262 | Utilitarianism is too demanding |
| Full Idea: Utilitarianism is too demanding. | |||
| From: Thomas Nagel (The View from Nowhere [1986], X.5) |
| XI.2 | p.217 | 3263 | If our own life lacks meaning, devotion to others won't give it meaning |
| Full Idea: If no one's life has any meaning in itself, how can it acquire meaning through devotion to the meaningless lives of others? | |||
| From: Thomas Nagel (The View from Nowhere [1986], XI.2) | |||
| A reaction: This is one of the paradoxes of compassion. The other is that the virtue requires other people to be in need of help, which can't be a desirable situation. |
| XI.2 | p.222 | 3264 | We should see others' viewpoints, but not lose touch with our own values |
| Full Idea: One should occupy a position far enough outside your own life to reduce the importance of the difference between yourself and other people, yet not so far outside that all human values vanish in a nihilistic blackout (i.e.aim for a form of humility). | |||
| From: Thomas Nagel (The View from Nowhere [1986], XI.2) |
| XI.3 | p.228 | 3265 | We don't worry about the time before we were born the way we worry about death |
| Full Idea: We do not regard the period before we were born in the same way that we regard the prospect of death. | |||
| From: Thomas Nagel (The View from Nowhere [1986], XI.3) | |||
| A reaction: This is a challenge to Epicurus, who said death is no worse than pre-birth. This idea may be true of the situation immediately post-death, but a thousand years from now it is hard to distinguish them. |
| 1987 | What Does It All Mean? |
| Ch.5 | p.46 | 4001 | The meaning of a word contains all its possible uses as well as its actual ones |
| Full Idea: The meaning of a word contains all its possible uses, true and false, not only its actual ones. | |||
| From: Thomas Nagel (What Does It All Mean? [1987], Ch.5) | |||
| A reaction: It has always seemed to me that meaning is not use, because you can't use it if it hasn't already got a meaning. What use is a meaningless word? |
| 1988 | MacIntyre versus the Enlightenment |
| 203 | p.203 | 1490 | You would have to be very morally lazy to ignore criticisms of your own culture |
| Full Idea: One would have to be very morally lazy to be unconcerned with the possibility that the prevailing morality of one's culture had something fundamentally wrong with it. | |||
| From: Thomas Nagel (MacIntyre versus the Enlightenment [1988], 203) |
| 1991 | Equality and Partiality |
| Ch.10 | p.100 | 6479 | Noninterference requires justification as much as interference does |
| Full Idea: Noninterference requires justification as much as interference does. | |||
| From: Thomas Nagel (Equality and Partiality [1991], Ch.10) | |||
| A reaction: I'm not convinced by this, as a simple rule. If I spend my whole life doing just the minimum for my own survival, I don't see why I should have to justify that, and I don't see a state is obliged to justify it either. |
| Ch.2 | p.10 | 6446 | In ethics we abstract from our identity, but not from our humanity |
| Full Idea: In pursuit of the kind of objectivity needed in the physical sciences, we abstract even from our humanity; but nothing further than abstraction from our identity (that is, who we are) enters into ethical theory. | |||
| From: Thomas Nagel (Equality and Partiality [1991], Ch.2) | |||
| A reaction: The 'brief' summary of this boils down to a nice and interesting slogan. It epitomises the modern Kantian approach to ethics. But compare Idea 4122, from Bernard Williams. |
| Ch.4 | p.34 | 6447 | Game theory misses out the motivation arising from the impersonal standpoint |
| Full Idea: I do not favour the route taken by Hobbes's modern descendants, using game theory, since I believe the impersonal standpoint makes an essential contribution to individual motivation which must be addressed by any ethically acceptable theory. | |||
| From: Thomas Nagel (Equality and Partiality [1991], Ch.4) | |||
| A reaction: The assumption of self-seeking at the core of game theory seems very bizarre, and leads to moral approval of free riders. Nagel offers the best response, which is the Kantian impersonal view. Nagel may be optimistic about motivation, though. |
| Ch.4 | p.38 | 6448 | A legitimate system is one accepted as both impartial and reasonably partial |
| Full Idea: A legitimate system is one which reconciles the two universal principles of impartiality and reasonable partiality so that no one can object that his interests are not being accorded sufficient weight or that the demands on him are excessive. | |||
| From: Thomas Nagel (Equality and Partiality [1991], Ch.4) | |||
| A reaction: This seems an appealing principle, and a nice attempt at stating the core of Kantian liberalism. It is obviously influenced by Scanlon's contractualist view, in the idea that 'no one can object', because everyone sees the justification. |
| Ch.5 | p.45 | 6450 | Morality must be motivating, and not because of pre-moral motives |
| Full Idea: My own view is that moral justification must be capable of motivating, but not in virtue of reliance on pre-moral motives. | |||
| From: Thomas Nagel (Equality and Partiality [1991], Ch.5) | |||
| A reaction: This may well be the core and essence of Kantian moral theory. I'm inclined to think of it as 'Kant's dream', which is of ultra-rational beings who are driven by pure rationality as a motivator. People who fit this bill tend to be academics. |
| Ch.5 | p.48 | 6477 | I can only universalise a maxim if everyone else could also universalise it |
| Full Idea: It is implicit in the categorical imperative that I can will that everyone should adopt as a maxim only what everyone else can also will that everyone should adopt as a maxim. | |||
| From: Thomas Nagel (Equality and Partiality [1991], Ch.5) | |||
| A reaction: This is a nice move, because it shifts the theory away from a highly individualistic Cartesian view of morality towards the idea that morality is a community activity. |
| Ch.9 | p.89 | 6478 | Democracy is opposed to equality, if the poor are not a majority |
| Full Idea: As things are, democracy is the enemy of comprehensive equality, once the poor cease to be a majority. | |||
| From: Thomas Nagel (Equality and Partiality [1991], Ch.9) | |||
| A reaction: This is obvious once you think about it, but it is well worth saying, because it is tempting to think that we live in an 'equal' society, merely because we are equal in things such as voting rights and equality before the law. |
| 1995 | The Philosophical Culture |
| §6 | p.6 | 1489 | Modern philosophy tends to be a theory-constructing extension of science, but there is also problem-solving |
| Full Idea: Philosophy is now dominated by a spirit of theory construction which sees philosophy as continuous with science, but the other problem-centred style is still in existence and it is important to keep it alive. | |||
| From: Thomas Nagel (The Philosophical Culture [1995], §6) |
| 2000 | The Psychophysical Nexus |
| §III | p.445 | 4242 | Pure supervenience explains nothing, and is a sign of something fundamental we don't know |
| Full Idea: Pure, unexplained supervenience is never a solution to a problem but a sign that there is something fundamental we don't know. | |||
| From: Thomas Nagel (The Psychophysical Nexus [2000], §III) | |||
| A reaction: This seems right. It is not a theory or an explanation, merely the observation of a correlation which will require explanation. Why are they correlated? |