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Ideas of W.H. Newton-Smith, by Text
[Canadian, fl. 1980, At Balliol College, Oxford University.]
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1981
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The Rationality of Science
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I.2
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p.3
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3853
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For science to be rational, we must explain scientific change rationally
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Full Idea:
We are only justified in regarding scientific practice as the very paradigm of rationality if we can justify the claim that scientific change is rationally explicable.
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From:
W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], I.2)
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I.4
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p.11
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3854
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Positivists hold that theoretical terms change, but observation terms don't
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Full Idea:
For positivists it was taken that while theory change meant change in the meaning of theoretical terms, the meaning of observational terms was invariant under theory change.
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From:
W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], I.4)
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I.4
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p.12
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3855
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Critics attack positivist division between theory and observation
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Full Idea:
The critics of positivism attacked the conception of a dichotomy between theory and observation.
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From:
W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], I.4)
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I.6
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p.18
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3857
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Defeat relativism by emphasising truth and reference, not meaning
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Full Idea:
The challenge of incommensurability can be met once it is realised that in comparing theories the notions of truth and reference are more important than that of meaning.
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From:
W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], I.6)
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II.2
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p.27
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3858
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A full understanding of 'yellow' involves some theory
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Full Idea:
A full grasp of the concept '…is yellow' involves coming to accept as true bits of theory; that is, generalisations involving the term 'yellow'.
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From:
W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], II.2)
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II.3
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p.31
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3859
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We do not wish merely to predict, we also want to explain
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Full Idea:
We do not wish merely to predict, we also want to explain.
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From:
W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], II.3)
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III.4
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p.55
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3861
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Theories generate infinite truths and falsehoods, so they cannot be used to assess probability
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Full Idea:
We cannot explicate a useful notion of verisimilitude in terms of the number of truths and the number of falsehoods generated by a theory, because they are infinite.
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From:
W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], III.4)
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III.9
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p.72
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3862
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All theories contain anomalies, and so are falsified!
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Full Idea:
According to Feyerabend all theories are born falsified, because no theory has ever been totally free of anomalies.
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From:
W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], III.9)
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III.9
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p.73
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3863
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The anomaly of Uranus didn't destroy Newton's mechanics - it led to Neptune's discovery
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Full Idea:
When scientists observed the motion of Uranus, they did not give up on Newtonian mechanics. Instead they posited the existence of Neptune.
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From:
W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], III.9)
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III.9
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p.75
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3864
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Anomalies are judged against rival theories, and support for the current theory
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Full Idea:
Whether to reject an anomaly has to be decided on the basis of the availability of a rival theory, and on the basis of the positive evidence for the theory in question.
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From:
W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], III.9)
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IV.3
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p.90
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3865
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Why should it matter whether or not a theory is scientific?
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Full Idea:
Why should it be so important to distinguish between theories that are scientific and those that are not?
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From:
W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], IV.3)
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IX.2
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p.211
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3870
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The real problem of science is how to choose between possible explanations
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Full Idea:
Once we move beyond investigating correlations between observables the question of what does or should guide our choice between alternative explanatory accounts becomes problematic.
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From:
W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], IX.2)
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VII.1
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p.148
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3866
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If theories are really incommensurable, we could believe them all
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Full Idea:
If theories are genuinely incommensurable why should I be faced with the problem of choosing between them? Why not believe them all?
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From:
W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], VII.1)
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VII.6
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p.170
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3867
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De re necessity arises from the way the world is
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Full Idea:
A necessary truth is 'de re' if its necessity arises from the way the world is.
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From:
W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], VII.6)
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VIII.8
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p.197
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3869
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More truthful theories have greater predictive power
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Full Idea:
If a theory is a better approximation to the truth, then it is likely that it will have greater predictive power.
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From:
W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], VIII.8)
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X.2
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p.241
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3871
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Explaining an action is showing that it is rational
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Full Idea:
To explain an action as an action is to show that it is rational.
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From:
W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], X.2)
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X.4
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p.249
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3872
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We must assess the truth of beliefs in identifying them
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Full Idea:
We cannot determine what someone's beliefs are independently of assessing to some extent the truth or falsity of the beliefs.
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From:
W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], X.4)
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