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Ideas of D.J. O'Connor, by Text

[British, fl. 1970, Professor at Exeter University.]

1975 The Correspondence Theory of Truth
Ch.4 p.20 Beliefs must match facts, but also words must match beliefs
     Full Idea: Our beliefs must claim a correspondence with facts, and then the verbal expression of the belief must correspond to the belief itself.
     From: D.J. O'Connor (The Correspondence Theory of Truth [1975], Ch.4)
Ch.5 p.32 We can't contemplate our beliefs until we have expressed them
     Full Idea: It is only when beliefs are given some symbolic expression that they acquire the precision and stability that enables us to entertain them.
     From: D.J. O'Connor (The Correspondence Theory of Truth [1975], Ch.5)
Ch.6 p.35 Must sentences make statements to qualify for truth?
     Full Idea: Maybe a sentence is not a candidate for truth until it is used to make a statement.
     From: D.J. O'Connor (The Correspondence Theory of Truth [1975], Ch.6)
Ch.6 p.35 The semantic theory requires sentences as truth-bearers, not propositions
     Full Idea: The Semantic Theory of truth requires that sentences are truth-bearers (rather than statements, or propositions).
     From: D.J. O'Connor (The Correspondence Theory of Truth [1975], Ch.6)
Ch.6 p.40 Logic seems to work for unasserted sentences
     Full Idea: If sentences can have truth-values only when they occur as asserted, it would be impossible to have a truth-functional basis to logic.
     From: D.J. O'Connor (The Correspondence Theory of Truth [1975], Ch.6)
Ch.7 p.62 Events are fast changes which are of interest to us
     Full Idea: The standard cases of events are physical changes which happen sufficiently fast to be observed as changes, and which are of sufficient interest to us to be noticed or commented on.
     From: D.J. O'Connor (The Correspondence Theory of Truth [1975], Ch.7)
Ch.8 p.85 Without language our beliefs are particular and present
     Full Idea: Without language we would be restricted to particular beliefs about the here and now.
     From: D.J. O'Connor (The Correspondence Theory of Truth [1975], Ch.8)
II.1 p.104 What does 'true in English' mean?
     Full Idea: We do not seem to have any use in ordinary discourse for phrases like 'true in English', 'false in German'.
     From: D.J. O'Connor (The Correspondence Theory of Truth [1975], II.1)