idea number gives full details.     |    back to list of philosophers     |     expand these ideas

Ideas of Paul O'Grady, by Text

[Irish, fl. 2002, At Trinity College, Dublin.]

2002 Relativism
Ch.1 p.2 There has been a distinct 'Social Turn' in recent philosophy, like the earlier 'Linguistic Turn'
Ch.1 p.10 What counts as a fact partly depends on the availability of human concepts to describe them
Ch.2 p.32 Tarski made truth relative, by only defining truth within some given artificial language
Ch.2 p.33 A third value for truth might be "indeterminate", or a point on a scale between 'true' and 'false'
Ch.2 p.36 To say a relative truth is inexpressible in other frameworks is 'weak', while saying it is false is 'strong'
Ch.2 p.39 The account of truth in the 'Tractatus' seems a perfect example of the correspondence theory
Ch.2 p.41 The epistemic theory of truth presents it as 'that which is licensed by our best theory of reality'
Ch.2 p.44 Wittgenstein reduced Russell's five primitive logical symbols to a mere one
Ch.2 p.46 Logical relativism appears if we allow more than one legitimate logical system
Ch.2 p.51 Early Quine says all beliefs could be otherwise, but later he said we would assume mistranslation
Ch.3 p.58 Verificationism was attacked by the deniers of the analytic-synthetic distinction, needed for 'facts'
Ch.3 p.58 Ontological relativists are anti-realists, who deny that our theories carve nature at the joints
Ch.3 p.59 Anti-realists say our theories (such as wave-particle duality) give reality incompatible properties
Ch.3 p.74 We may say that objects have intrinsic identity conditions, but still allow multiple accounts of them
Ch.3 p.80 If we abandon the analytic-synthetic distinction, scepticism about meaning may be inevitable
Ch.4 p.90 Maybe developments in logic and geometry have shown that the a priori may be relative
Ch.4 p.93 Sense-data are only safe from scepticism if they are primitive and unconceptualised
Ch.4 p.97 Modern epistemology centres on debates about foundations, and about external justification
Ch.4 p.100 Coherence involves support from explanation and evidence, and also probability and confirmation
Ch.4 p.102 Internalists say the reasons for belief must be available to the subject, and externalists deny this
Ch.4 p.105 Contextualism says that knowledge is relative to its context; 'empty' depends on your interests
Ch.4 p.111 The chief problem for fideists is other fideists who hold contrary ideas
Ch.5 p.141 Good reasoning will avoid contradiction, enhance coherence, not ignore evidence, and maximise evidence
Ch.5 p.158 One may understand a realm of ideas, but be unable to judge their rationality or truth
Ch.5 p.169 Cryptographers can recognise that something is a language, without translating it
Ch.6 p.175 Just as maps must simplify their subject matter, so thought has to be reductionist about reality