2007 | Real Essentialism |
1.1 | p.2 | 12234 | Realism about possible worlds is circular, since it needs a criterion of 'possible' |
1.1 | p.5 | 12235 | Necessity of identity seems trivial, because it leaves out the real essence |
1.1 | p.5 | 12237 | Rigid designation has at least three essentialist presuppositions |
1.1 | p.5 | 12236 | Leibniz's Law is an essentialist truth |
1.2 | p.9 | 12238 | The Aristotelian view is that numbers depend on (and are abstracted from) other things |
1.3 | p.13 | 12239 | The real essentialist is not merely a scientist |
1.3 | p.16 | 12240 | Essentialism is the main account of the unity of objects |
1.4 | p.18 | 12241 | Essences are real, about being, knowable, definable and classifiable [PG] |
1.4 | p.19 | 12242 | Definition distinguishes one kind from another, and individuation picks out members of the kind |
1.4 | p.20 | 12243 | The reductionism found in scientific essentialism is mistaken |
2.1 | p.20 | 12244 | Nominalism is consistent with individual but not with universal essences |
2.1 | p.23 | 12245 | Essence is the source of a thing's characteristic behaviour |
3.1 | p.46 | 12246 | What makes Parmenidean reality a One rather than a Many? |
3.1 | p.47 | 12247 | Essence is not explanatory but constitutive |
3.5 | p.60 | 12249 | 'Animal' is a genus and 'rational' is a specific difference |
4.1 | p.63 | 12250 | Bodies have act and potency, the latter explaining new kinds of existence |
4.4 | p.76 | 12252 | Empiricists gave up 'substance', as unknowable substratum, or reducible to a bundle |
4.5 | p.83 | 12253 | If tropes are in space and time, in what sense are they abstract? |
5.3 | p.107 | 12254 | Being is substantial/accidental, complete/incomplete, necessary/contingent, possible, relative, intrinsic.. |
6.3 | p.132 | 12256 | We need to distinguish the essential from the non-essential powers |
6.3 | p.142 | 12257 | Could we replace essence with collections of powers? |
7.2 | p.156 | 12258 | Properties are not part of an essence, but they flow from it |