2002 | W.V. Quine |
Ch.2 | p.15 | 8452 | Traditionally, universal sentences had existential import, but were later treated as conditional claims |
Ch.2 | p.27 | 8454 | The whole numbers are 'natural'; 'rational' numbers include fractions; the 'reals' include root-2 etc. |
Ch.2 | p.36 | 8457 | The Principle of Conservatism says we should violate the minimum number of background beliefs |
Ch.3 | p.44 | 8458 | Just individuals in Nominalism; add sets for Extensionalism; add properties, concepts etc for Intensionalism |
Ch.3 | p.55 | 8465 | Mereology has been exploited by some nominalists to achieve the effects of set theory |
Ch.3 | p.70 | 8471 | Three ways for 'Socrates is human' to be true are nominalist, platonist, or Montague's way |
Ch.5 | p.98 | 8472 | Sentential logic is consistent (no contradictions) and complete (entirely provable) |
Ch.5 | p.99 | 8474 | Unlike elementary logic, set theory is not complete |
Ch.5 | p.99 | 8473 | The logicists held that is-a-member-of is a logical constant, making set theory part of logic |
Ch.5 | p.103 | 8475 | The substitution view of quantification says a sentence is true when there is a substitution instance |
Ch.5 | p.109 | 8476 | Axiomatization simply picks from among the true sentences a few to play a special role |
Ch.6 | p.121 | 8477 | People presume meanings exist because they confuse meaning and reference |
Ch.7 | p.151 | 8480 | S4: 'poss that poss that p' implies 'poss that p'; S5: 'poss that nec that p' implies 'nec that p' |
Ch.7 | p.171 | 8484 | If two people believe the same proposition, this implies the existence of propositions |