idea number gives full details.     |    back to list of philosophers     |     expand these ideas

Ideas of David Papineau, by Text

[British, b.1947, British, born 1947, based at Cambridge University, and then King's College, London]

1987 Reality and Representation
p.67 p.130 Belief truth-conditions are normal circumstances where the belief is supposed to occur
1993 Philosophical Naturalism
Intro p.1 Externalism may be the key idea in philosophical naturalism
1.2 p.11 Epiphenomenalism is supervenience without physicalism
1.8 p.28 Supervenience requires all mental events to have physical effects
2.2 p.35 If a mental state is multiply realisable, why does it lead to similar behaviour?
3.1 n1 p.55 How does a dualist mind represent, exist outside space, and be transparent to itself?
3.2 p.57 Functionalism needs causation and intentionality to explain actions
4.2 p.106 Knowing what it is like to be something only involves being (physically) that thing
4.4 n10 p.112 The Private Language argument only means people may misjudge their experiences
2002 Thinking about Consciousness
p.193 Most reductive accounts of representation imply broad content
p.221 Maybe a creature is conscious if its mental states represent things in a distinct way
1.2 p.17 It is absurd to think that physical effects are caused twice, so conscious causes must be physical
1.3 p.19 Causes are instantiations of properties by particulars, or they are themselves basic particulars
1.3 p.19 If causes are basic particulars, this doesn't make conscious and physical properties identical
1.4 p.23 The epiphenomenal relation of mind and brain is a 'causal dangler', unlike anything else
1.4 p.25 Maybe minds do not cause actions, but do cause us to report our decisions
1.4 p.25 If content hinges on matters outside of you, how can it causally influence your actions?
1.5 p.27 Maybe mind and body do overdetermine acts, but are linked (for some reason)
1.8 p.36 Supervenience can be replaced by identifying mind with higher-order or disjuntional properties
2.2 p.51 Mary acquires new concepts; she previously thought about the same property using material concepts
3.3 p.79 If consciousness could separate from brain, then it cannot be identical with brain
3.7 p.88 Truth conditions in possible worlds can't handle statements about impossibilities
3.7 p.88 Thought content is possible worlds that make the thought true; if that includes the actual world, it's true
4.6 p.113 Teleosemantics equates meaning with the item the concept is intended to track
4.6 p.113 Perceptual concepts can't just refer to what causes classification
4.7 p.115 Young children can see that other individuals sometimes have false beliefs
4.7 p.115 Do we understand other minds by simulation-theory, or by theory-theory?
5.3 p.147 Mind-brain reduction is less explanatory, because phenomenal concepts lack causal roles
7.1 p.175 Accept ontological monism, but conceptual dualism; we think in a different way about phenomenal thought
7.1 p.176 Researching phenomenal consciousness is peculiar, because the concepts involved are peculiar
7.11 p.205 The 'actualist' HOT theory says consciousness comes from actual higher judgements of mental states
7.11 p.206 Actualist HOT theories imply that a non-conscious mental event could become conscious when remembered
7.13 p.210 States are conscious if they could be the subject of higher-order mental judgements
7.13 p.212 Higher-order judgements may be possible where the subject denies having been conscious
7.13 p.215 Our concept of consciousness is crude, and lacks theoretical articulation
7.16 p.227 We can’t decide what 'conscious' means, so it is undecidable whether cats are conscious
7.2 p.178 Verificationists tend to infer indefinite answers from undecidable questions
App 7 p.255 The completeness of physics is needed for mind-brain identity
Ch 4 n1 p.98 Role concepts either name the realising property, or the higher property constituting the role
Intr §5 p.7 Thinking about a thing doesn't require activating it
Intr §6 p.8 The only serious mind-brain theories now are identity, token identity, realization and supervenience
Intr §6 p.8 Consciousness affects bodily movement, so thoughts must be material states
Intr §6 p.8 Causation is based on either events, or facts, or states of affairs
Intro §7 p.11 Whether octopuses feel pain is unclear, because our phenomenal concepts are too vague
2006 Phenomenal and Perceptual Concepts
p.80 There is a single file per object, memorised, reactivated, consolidated and expanded
2010 Philosophical Insignificance of A Priori Knowledge
§1 p.1 All worthwhile philosophy is synthetic theorizing, evaluated by experience
§1 p.1 A priori knowledge is analytic - the structure of our concepts - and hence unimportant
§3 p.3 Intuition and thought-experiments embody substantial information about the world
§4 p.4 Our best theories may commit us to mathematical abstracta, but that doesn't justify the commitment
§6 p.6 Verificationism about concepts means you can't deny a theory, because you can't have the concept