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Ideas of Derek Parfit, by Text

[British, b.1942, Fellow of All Soul's College, Oxford.]

1971 Personal Identity
p.269 Personal identity is just causally related mental states
1 p.203 If we split like amoeba, we would be two people, neither of them being us
5 p.219 One of my future selves will not necessarily be me
6 p.220 Concern for our own lives isn't the source of belief in identity, it is the result of it
1984 Reasons and Persons
116 p.341 We should focus less on subjects of experience, and more on the experiences themselves
1995 The Unimportance of Identity
p.293 p.293 Imaginary cases are good for revealing our beliefs, rather than the truth
p.293 p.293 Psychologists are interested in identity as a type of person, but philosophers study numerical identity
p.295 p.295 Reduction can be by identity, or constitution, or elimination
p.302 p.302 It doesn't matter whether I exist with half my components replaced (any more than an audio system)
p.308 p.308 It is fine to save two dying twins by merging parts of their bodies into one, and identity is irrelevant
p.310 p.310 If two humans are merged surgically, the new identity is a purely verbal problem
p.314 p.314 If my brain-halves are transplanted into two bodies, I have continuity, and don't need identity
p.316 p.316 Over a period of time what matters is not that 'I' persist, but that I have psychological continuity