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Ideas of L.A. Paul, by Text

[American, fl. 2006, University of Arizona and Australia National University, then N.Carolina,Chapel Hill.]

2006 In Defense of Essentialism
Intro p.333 Deep essentialist objects have intrinsic properties that fix their nature; the shallow version makes it contextual
Intro p.333 'Modal realists' believe in many concrete worlds, 'actualists' in just this world, 'ersatzists' in abstract other worlds
Intro p.334 Essentialism must deal with charges of arbitrariness, and failure to reduce de re modality
Intro p.334 Deep essentialists say essences constrain how things could change; modal profiles fix natures
§1 p.334 'Substance theorists' take modal properties as primitive, without structure, just falling under a sortal
§1 p.340 If an object's sort determines its properties, we need to ask what determines its sort
§1 p.341 Substance essentialism says an object is multiple, as falling under various different sortals
§3 p.349 An object's modal properties don't determine its possibilities
§5 p.360 Absolutely unrestricted qualitative composition would allow things with incompatible properties