| 1992 | A Study of Concepts |
| p.31 | 18568 | Philosophy should merely give necessary and sufficient conditions for concept possession |
| p.47 | 18572 | Peacocke's account separates psychology from philosophy, and is very sketchy |
| p.164 | 9335 | Concepts are constituted by their role in a group of propositions to which we are committed |
| p.165 | 9336 | A concept's reference is what makes true the beliefs of its possession conditions |
| 2.1 | p.44 | 12577 | Possessing a concept is being able to make judgements which use it |
| 3.2 | p.71 | 12578 | A concept is just what it is to possess that concept |
| 3.3 | p.77 | 12579 | Perception has proto-propositions, between immediate experience and concepts |
| 3.3 | p.89 | 12581 | Perceptual concepts causally influence the content of our experiences |
| 5.3 | p.135 | 12584 | An analysis of concepts must link them to something unconceptualized |
| 6.1 | p.149 | 12585 | Most people can't even define a chair |
| 6.2 | p.152 | 12586 | Consciousness of a belief isn't a belief that one has it |
| 7.2 | p.194 | 12587 | Employing a concept isn't decided by introspection, but by making judgements using it |
| 2000 | Explaining the A Priori |
| p.267 | p.58 | 17722 | The concept 'red' is tied to what actually individuates red things |
| 2005 | Rationale and Maxims in Study of Concepts |
| p.169 | p.5 | 11127 | If concepts just are mental representations, what of concepts we may never acquire? |
| 2008 | Truly Understood |
| Intro | p.1 | 12604 | Any explanation of a concept must involve reference and truth |
| Intro | p.3 | 12605 | A sense is individuated by the conditions for reference |
| 2.1 | p.54 | 12607 | Fregean concepts have their essence fixed by reference-conditions |
| 2.2 | p.60 | 12608 | Concepts are distinguished by roles in judgement, and are thus tied to rationality |
| 2.3 | p.76 | 12609 | Concepts have distinctive reasons and norms |
| 4.3 | p.135 | 12610 | Encountering novel sentences shows conclusively that meaning must be compositional |