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Ideas of Christopher Peacocke, by Text
[British, b.1950, Formerly of New College,Oxford University, then at New York University, then University College,London.]
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p.31
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18568
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Philosophy should merely give necessary and sufficient conditions for concept possession [Machery]
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p.45
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18571
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Peacocke's account of possession of a concept depends on one view of counterfactuals [Machery]
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p.47
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18572
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Peacocke's account separates psychology from philosophy, and is very sketchy [Machery]
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p.164
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9335
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Concepts are constituted by their role in a group of propositions to which we are committed [Greco]
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p.165
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9336
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A concept's reference is what makes true the beliefs of its possession conditions [Horwich]
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2.1
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p.44
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12577
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Possessing a concept is being able to make judgements which use it
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3.2
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p.71
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12578
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A concept is just what it is to possess that concept
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3.3
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p.77
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12579
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Perception has proto-propositions, between immediate experience and concepts
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3.3
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p.89
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12581
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Perceptual concepts causally influence the content of our experiences
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5.3
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p.135
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12584
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An analysis of concepts must link them to something unconceptualized
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6.1
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p.149
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12585
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Most people can't even define a chair
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6.2
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p.152
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12586
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Consciousness of a belief isn't a belief that one has it
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7.2
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p.194
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12587
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Employing a concept isn't decided by introspection, but by making judgements using it
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2000
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Explaining the A Priori
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p.267
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p.58
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17722
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The concept 'red' is tied to what actually individuates red things
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2005
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Rationale and Maxims in Study of Concepts
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p.169
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p.5
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11127
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If concepts just are mental representations, what of concepts we may never acquire?
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Intro
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p.1
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12604
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Any explanation of a concept must involve reference and truth
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Intro
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p.3
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12605
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A sense is individuated by the conditions for reference
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2.1
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p.54
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12607
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Fregean concepts have their essence fixed by reference-conditions
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2.2
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p.60
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12608
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Concepts are distinguished by roles in judgement, and are thus tied to rationality
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2.3
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p.76
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12609
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Concepts have distinctive reasons and norms
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4.3
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p.135
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12610
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Encountering novel sentences shows conclusively that meaning must be compositional
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