idea number gives full details.     |    back to list of philosophers     |     expand these ideas

Ideas of Charles Sanders Peirce, by Text

[American, 1839 - 1914, Born at Cambridge, Massachusetts. Educated at Harvard. Died at Milford.]

1877 The Fixation of Belief
p.126 We need our beliefs to be determined by some external inhuman permanency
p. 7 p.7 Reason aims to discover the unknown by thinking about the known
p. 8 p.8 What is true of one piece of copper is true of another (unlike brass)
p. 8 p.8 Natural selection might well fill an animal's mind with pleasing thoughts rather than true ones
p.10 p.10 The feeling of belief shows a habit which will determine our actions
p.10 p.10 We are entirely satisfied with a firm belief, even if it is false
p.11 p.11 We want true beliefs, but obviously we think our beliefs are true
p.11 p.11 A mere question does not stimulate a struggle for belief; there must be a real doubt
p.11 p.11 Demonstration does not rest on first principles of reason or sensation, but on freedom from actual doubt
p.11 p.11 Once doubt ceases, there is no point in continuing to argue
p.12 p.12 If death is annihilation, belief in heaven is a cheap pleasure with no disappointment
p.15 p.15 Metaphysics does not rest on facts, but on what we are inclined to believe
p.18 p.18 Doubts should be satisfied by some external permanency upon which thinking has no effect
p.19 p.19 If someone doubted reality, they would not actually feel dissatisfaction
1878 How to Make our Ideas Clear
EP i.132 p.174 Our whole conception of an object is its possible practical consequences
p.28 p.28 We are aware of beliefs, they appease our doubts, and they are rules of action, or habits
p.38 p.38 Truth is the opinion fated to be ultimately agreed by all investigators
1880 What is a Leading Principle?
I p.130 A 'belief' is a habit which determines how our imagination and actions proceed
1891 The Architecture of Theories
p.319 p.319 The world is full of variety, but laws seem to produce uniformity
p.320 p.320 Darwinian evolution is chance, with the destruction of bad results
p.321 p.321 Physical and psychical laws of mind are either independent, or derived in one or other direction
1892 The Doctrine of Necessity Examined
p.331 p.331 The more precise the observations, the less reliable appear to be the laws of nature
p.333 p.333 Is chance just unknown laws? But the laws operate the same, whatever chance occurs
p.334 p.334 Is there any such thing as death among the lower organisms?
p.337 p.337 If the world is just mechanical, its whole specification has no more explanation than mere chance
1892 works
p.70 Pragmatic 'truth' is a term to cover the many varied aims of enquiry
p.73 Peirce did not think a belief was true if it was useful
p.75 Bivalence is a regulative assumption of enquiry - not a law of logic
p.162 The possible can only be general, and the force of actuality is needed to produce a particular
p.220 The real is the idea in which the community ultimately settles down
4 p.89 Peirce and others began the mapping out of relations
CP 5.589 p.83 Inquiry is not standing on bedrock facts, but standing in hope on a shifting bog
1895 On the Algebra of Logic
p.218 p.45 Truth-functional conditionals have a simple falsification, when A is true and B is false
1897 Concerning the Author
p.1 p.1 I am saturated with the spirit of physical science
p.2 p.2 The demonstrations of the metaphysicians are all moonshine
p.2 p.2 Duns Scotus offers perhaps the best logic and metaphysics for modern physical science
p.2 p.2 Association of ideas is the best philosophical idea of the prescientific age
p.3 p.3 Infallibility in science is just a joke
1897 Logic as Semiotic: Theory of Signs
p.77 Icons resemble their subject, an index is a natural sign, and symbols are conventional
1898 The Approach to Metaphysics
p.311 p.311 Metaphysics rests on observations, but ones so common we hardly notice them
1898 The Nature of Mathematics
p.149 Experience is indeed our only source of knowledge, provided we include inner experience
I p.139 Philosophy is an experimental science, resting on common experience
II p.142 Logic, unlike mathematics, is not hypothetical; it asserts categorical ends from hypothetical means
II p.144 Ethics is the science of aims
III p.146 The world is one of experience, but experiences are always located among our ideas
III p.146 Some logical possibility concerns single propositions, but there is also compatibility between propositions
III p.147 Self-contradiction doesn't reveal impossibility; it is inductive impossibility which reveals self-contradiction
IV p.148 Mathematics is close to logic, but is even more abstract
1898 Reasoning and the Logic of Things
I p.109 Metaphysics is pointless without exact modern logic
I p.109 Metaphysical reasoning is simple enough, but the concepts are very hard
I p.110 We may think animals reason very little, but they hardly ever make mistakes!
I p.110 Everybody overrates their own reasoning, so it is clearly superficial
I p.111 Men often answer inner 'whys' by treating unconscious instincts as if they were reasons
I p.112 Scientists will give up any conclusion, if experience opposes it
I p.112 We act on 'full belief' in a crisis, but 'opinion' only operates for trivial actions
I p.114 We now know that mathematics only studies hypotheses, not facts
I p.114 I classify science by level of abstraction; principles derive from above, and data from below
I p.115 Sciences concern existence, but philosophy also concerns potential existence
I p.115 Philosophy is a search for real truth
I p.116 Metaphysics is the science of both experience, and its general laws and types
I p.119 People should follow what lies before them, and is within their power
I p.120 Metaphysics is turning into logic, and logic is becoming mathematics
II p.126 In ordinary language a conditional statement assumes that the antecedent is true
II p.128 Indexicals are unusual words, because they stimulate the hearer to look around
II p.139 'Induction' doesn't capture Greek 'epagoge', which is singulars in a mass producing the general
II p.139 How does induction get started?
II p.140 Induction can never prove that laws have no exceptions
III p.142 Deduction is true when the premises facts necessarily make the conclusion fact true
III p.156 The logic of relatives relies on objects built of any relations (rather than on classes)
III p.161 There may be no reality; it's just our one desperate hope of knowing anything
III p.161 Realism is the belief that there is something in the being of things corresponding to our reasoning
III p.163 An idea on its own isn't an idea, because they are continuous systems
III p.163 Generalization is the true end of life
IV p.165 If each inference slightly reduced our certainty, science would soon be in trouble
IV p.169 Chemists rely on a single experiment to establish a fact; repetition is pointless
IV p.171 We are not inspired by other people's knowledge; a sense of our ignorance motivates study
IV p.178 'Holding for true' is either practical commitment, or provisional theory
IV p.179 The one unpardonable offence is reasoning is blocking the route to further truth
V p.182 Reasoning involves observation, experiment, and habituation
V p.186 'Know yourself' is not introspection; it is grasping how others see you
V p.188 Everything interesting should be recorded, with records that can be rearranged
V p.194 The worst fallacy in induction is generalising one recondite property from a sample
VI p.204 Objective chance is the property of a distribution
VII p.234 We talk of 'association by resemblance' but that is wrong: the association constitutes the resemblance
VII p.240 Our laws of nature may be the result of evolution
VII p.241 Generalisation is the great law of mind
VIII p.257 Our research always hopes that reality embodies the logic we are employing
VIII p.260 Whatever is First must be sentient
1899 Scientific Attitude and Fallibilism
I p.43 Only imagination can connect phenomena together in a rational way
II p.56 Reasoning is based on statistical induction, so it can't achieve certainty or precision
II p.57 Innate truths are very uncertain and full of error, so they certainly have exceptions
II p.57 A truth is hard for us to understand if it rests on nothing but inspiration
II p.57 If we decide an idea is inspired, we still can't be sure we have got the idea right
II p.57 Only reason can establish where some deliverance of revelation really is inspired
II p.59 That two two-eyed people must have four eyes is a statement about numbers, not a fact
II p.59 Numbers are just names devised for counting
1901 Abduction and Induction
I p.151 'Abduction' is beginning a hypothesis, particularly if it includes preference of one explanation over others
I p.153 Abduction involves original suggestions, and not just the testing involved in induction
1903 Criterion of Validity in Reasoning
I p.121 That a judgement is true and that we judge it true are quite different things
I p.125 I reason in order to avoid disappointment and surprise
I p.125 Facts are hard unmoved things, unaffected by what people may think of them
II p.127 Only study logic if you think your own reasoning is deficient
1905 Critical Common-Sensism
I p.294 Vagueness is a neglected but important part of mathematical thought
I p.295 All communication is vague, and is outside the principle of non-contradiction
1905 Essentials of Pragmatism
I p.252 The definition of a concept is just its experimental implications
I p.252 A 'conception', the rational implication of a word, lies in its bearing upon the conduct of life
I p.257 Instead of seeking Truth, we should seek belief that is beyond doubt
1905 Issues of Pragmaticism
EP ii.246 p.169 The meaning or purport of a symbol is all the rational conduct it would lead to
1906 Pragmatism in Retrospect
p.13 Peirce's theory offers anti-realist verificationism, but surely how things are is independent of us?
p.271 p.271 Pragmatism is a way of establishing meanings, not a theory of metaphysics or a set of truths
p.288 p.288 Independent truth (if there is any) is the ultimate result of sufficient enquiry