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Ideas of John Perry, by Text
[American, fl. 1975, Professor at Standford University.]
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n12
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p.99
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12155
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Statements of 'relative identity' are really statements of resemblance
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1979
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The Problem of the Essential Indexical
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p.28
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15203
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Tense is essential for thought and action [Le Poidevin]
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p.29
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15204
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Actual tensed sentences cannot be tenseless, because they can cite their own context [Le Poidevin]
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'Intro'
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p.167
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12149
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Indexicals are a problem for beliefs being just subject-proposition relations
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'Intro'
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p.167
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12151
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If we replace 'I' in sentences about me, they are different beliefs and explanations of behaviour
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'Obvious'
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p.181
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18412
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Indexicals individuate certain belief states, helping in explanation and prediction
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'Prob'
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p.172
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12150
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Indexicals reveal big problems with the traditional idea of a proposition
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2001
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Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness
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§1.2
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p.6
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4884
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Brain states must be in my head, and yet the pain seems to be in my hand
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§1.2
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p.6
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4885
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Identity is a very weak relation, which doesn't require interdefinability, or shared properties
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§2.4
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p.38
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4887
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We try to cause other things to occur by causing mental events to occur
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§3.1
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p.48
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4888
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It seems plausible that many animals have experiences without knowing about them
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§3.2
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p.51
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4889
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Although we may classify ideas by content, we individuate them differently, as their content can change
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§3.2
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p.54
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4890
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A sharp analytic/synthetic line can rarely be drawn, but some concepts are central to thought
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§4.2
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p.78
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4891
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If epiphenomenalism just says mental events are effects but not causes, it is consistent with physicalism
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§4.3
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p.88
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4892
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If physicalists stick with identity (not supervenience), Martian pain will not be like ours
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§8.1
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p.170
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4896
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The intension of an expression is a function from possible worlds to an appropriate extension
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§8.1
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p.170
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4897
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A proposition is a set of possible worlds for which its intension delivers truth
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§8.1
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p.170
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4898
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Possible worlds are indices for a language, or concrete realities, or abstract possibilities
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§8.1
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p.170
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4899
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Possible worlds thinking has clarified the logic of modality, but is problematic in epistemology
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§8.1
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p.171
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4900
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Prior to Kripke, the mind-brain identity theory usually claimed that the identity was contingent
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§8.1
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p.175
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4901
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Truth has to be correspondence to facts, and a match between relations of ideas and relations in the world
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2001
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Reference and Reflexivity
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p.249
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16391
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Indexical thoughts are about themselves, and ascribe properties to themselves [Recanati]
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