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Ideas of Alvin Plantinga, by Text

[American, b.1932, Based at the University of Michigan, Calvin College, then at Notre-Dame.]

1965 Free Will Defence
III p.118 It is logically possible that natural evil like earthquakes is caused by Satan
Pref. p.106 Moral evil may be acceptable to God because it allows free will (even though we don't see why this is necessary)
1969 De Re and De Dicto
p.26 p.26 Expressing modality about a statement is 'de dicto'; expressing it of property-possession is 'de re'
p.27 p.27 'De dicto' true and 'de re' false is possible, and so is 'de dicto' false and 'de re' true
p.35 p.35 An object has a property essentially if it couldn't conceivably have lacked it
p.37 p.37 Surely self-identity is essential to Socrates?
p.40 p.40 Could I name all of the real numbers in one fell swoop? Call them all 'Charley'?
p.41 p.41 Can we find an appropriate 'de dicto' paraphrase for any 'de re' proposition?
p.43 p.43 Maybe proper names involve essentialism
p.44 p.44 What Socrates could have been, and could have become, are different?
1970 World and Essence
p.2 Plantinga proposes necessary existent essences as surrogates for the nonexistent things
Intro p.47 'De re' modality is as clear as 'de dicto' modality, because they are logically equivalent
Intro p.49 X is essentially P if it is P in every world, or in every X-world, or in the actual world (and not P elsewhere)
I p.49 Properties are 'trivially essential' if they are instantiated by every object in every possible world
I p.50 The 'identity criteria' of a name are a group of essential and established facts
II p.56 Does Socrates have essential properties, plus a unique essence (or 'haecceity') which entails them?
II p.58 'Being Socrates' and 'being identical with Socrates' characterise Socrates, so they are among his properties
II p.58 Does 'being identical with Socrates' name a property? I can think of no objections to it
III p.63 We can imagine being beetles or alligators, so it is possible we might have such bodies
III p.65 If a property is ever essential, can it only ever be an essential property?
IV p.69 Essences are instantiated, and are what entails a thing's properties and lack of properties
1973 Transworld Identity or worldbound Individuals?
I p.147 A possible world is a maximal possible state of affairs
I p.150 If possible Socrates differs from actual Socrates, the Indiscernibility of Identicals says they are different
I p.152 It doesn't matter that we can't identify the possible Socrates; we can't identify adults from baby photos
I p.155 Asserting a possible property is to say it would have had the property if that world had been actual
II p.157 If individuals can only exist in one world, then they can never lack any of their properties
II p.162 The counterparts of Socrates have self-identity, but only the actual Socrates has identity-with-Socrates
II p.163 Counterpart Theory absurdly says I would be someone else if things went differently
1974 The Nature of Necessity
p.80 Possibilities for an individual can only refer to that individual, in some possible world
p.83 Plantinga says there is just this world, with possibilities expressed in propositions
1976 Actualism and Possible Worlds
p.117 Plantinga has domains of sets of essences, variables denoting essences, and predicates as functions
p.118 Plantinga's essences have their own properties - so will have essences, giving a hierarchy
p.123 Plantinga's actualism is nominal, because he fills actuality with possibilia
Intro p.103 Possible worlds clarify possibility, propositions, properties, sets, counterfacts, time, determinism etc.
1 p.108 Are propositions and states of affairs two separate things, or only one? I incline to say one
2 p.110 Necessary beings (numbers, properties, sets, propositions, states of affairs, God) exist in all possible worlds
4 p.116 Socrates is a contingent being, but his essence is not; without Socrates, his essence is unexemplified
1979 De Essentia
p.130 A snowball's haecceity is the property of being identical with itself
1993 Why Propositions cannot be concrete
p.229 p.229 Propositions can't just be in brains, because 'there are no human beings' might be true
p.230 p.230 If propositions are concrete they don't have to exist, and so they can't be necessary truths
p.232 p.232 The idea of abstract objects is not ontological; it comes from the epistemological idea of abstraction
p.233 p.233 Theists may see abstract objects as really divine thoughts
1993 Warrant and Proper Function
p.26 Maybe a reliable justification must come from a process working with its 'proper function'