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Ideas of Vassilis Politis, by Text

[Greek, fl. 2004, Lecturer at Trinity College, Dublin.]

2004 Aristotle and the Metaphysics
p.62 The Pythagoreans were the first to offer definitions
     Full Idea: Aristotle praises the Pythagoreans for being the first to offer definitions.
     From: report of Vassilis Politis (Aristotle and the Metaphysics [2004]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 2.4
     A reaction: This sounds like a hugely important step in the development of Greek philosophy which is hardly ever mentioned.
1.4 p.14 'True of' is applicable to things, while 'true' is applicable to words
     Full Idea: It is crucial not to confuse 'true' with 'true of'. 'True of' is applicable to things, while 'true' is applicable to words.
     From: Vassilis Politis (Aristotle and the Metaphysics [2004], 1.4)
     A reaction: A beautifully simple distinction which had never occurred to me, and which (being a thoroughgoing realist) I really like.
2.3 p.46 Necessary truths can be two-way relational, where essential truths are one-way or intrinsic
     Full Idea: An essence is true in virtue of what the thing is in itself, but a necessary truth may be relational, as the consequence of the relation between two things and their essence. The necessary relation may be two-way, but the essential relation one-way.
     From: Vassilis Politis (Aristotle and the Metaphysics [2004], 2.3)
     A reaction: He is writing about Aristotle, but has in mind Kit Fine 1994 (qv). Politis cites Plato's answer to the Euthyphro Question as a good example. The necessity comes from the intrinsic nature of goodness/piety, not from the desire of the gods.
4.1 p.93 Maybe 'What is being? is confusing because we can't ask what non-being is like
     Full Idea: We may be unfamiliar with the question 'What is being?' because there appear to be no contrastive questions of the form: how do beings differ from things that are not beings?
     From: Vassilis Politis (Aristotle and the Metaphysics [2004], 4.1)
     A reaction: We can, of course, contrast actual beings with possible beings, or imaginary beings, or even logically impossible beings, but in those cases 'being' strikes me as an entirely inappropriate word.