| 1986 | Epistemic Norms |
| 'Cog.Mach' | p.213 | 8818 | Defeasible reasoning requires us to be able to think about our thoughts |
| Full Idea: Defeasible reasoning requires us to be able to think about our thoughts. | |||
| From: John L. Pollock (Epistemic Norms [1986], 'Cog.Mach') | |||
| A reaction: This is why I do not think animals 'know' anything, though they seem to have lots of true beliefs about their immediate situation. |
| 'Cog.Mach' | p.214 | 8819 | We need the concept of truth for defeasible reasoning |
| Full Idea: It might be wondered why we even have a concept of truth. The answer is that this concept is required for defeasible reasoning. | |||
| From: John L. Pollock (Epistemic Norms [1986], 'Cog.Mach') | |||
| A reaction: His point is that we must be able to think critically about our beliefs ('is p true?') if we are to have any knowledge at all. An excellent point. Give that man a teddy bear. |
| 'Cog.Mach' | p.215 | 8820 | Rules of reasoning precede the concept of truth, and they are what characterize it |
| Full Idea: Rather than truth being fundamental and rules for reasoning being derived from it, the rules for reasoning come first and truth is characterized by the rules for reasoning about truth. | |||
| From: John L. Pollock (Epistemic Norms [1986], 'Cog.Mach') | |||
| A reaction: This nicely disturbs our complacency about such things. There is plenty of reasoning in Homer, but I bet there is no talk of 'truth'. Pontius Pilate seems to have been a pioneer (Idea 8821). Do the truth tables define or describe logical terms? |
| 'Dir.Realism' | p.220 | 8823 | Reasons are always for beliefs, but a perceptual state is a reason without itself being a belief |
| Full Idea: When one makes a perceptual judgement on the basis of a perceptual state, I want to say that the perceptual state itself is one's reason. ..Reason are always reasons for beliefs, but the reasons themselves need not be beliefs. | |||
| From: John L. Pollock (Epistemic Norms [1986], 'Dir.Realism') | |||
| A reaction: A crucial issue. I think I prefer the view of Davidson, in Ideas 8801 and 8804. Three options: a pure perception counts as a reason, or perceptions involve some conceptual content, or you only acquire a reason when a proposition is formulated. |
| 'Ep.Norms' | p.192 | 8811 | What we want to know is - when is it all right to believe something? |
| Full Idea: When we ask whether a belief is justified, we want to know whether it is all right to believe it. The question we must ask is 'when is it permissible (epistemically) to believe P?'. | |||
| From: John L. Pollock (Epistemic Norms [1986], 'Ep.Norms') | |||
| A reaction: Nice to see someone trying to get the question clear. The question clearly points to the fact that there must at least be some sort of social aspect to criteria of justification. I can't cheerfully follow my intuitions if everyone else laughs at them. |
| 'Ep.Norms' | p.193 | 8812 | Norm Externalism says norms must be internal, but their selection is partly external |
| Full Idea: Norm Externalism acknowledges that the content of our epistemic norms must be internalist, but employs external considerations in the selection of the norms themselves. | |||
| From: John L. Pollock (Epistemic Norms [1986], 'Ep.Norms') | |||
| A reaction: It can't be right that you just set your own norms, so this must contain some truth. Equally, even the most hardened externalist can't deny that what goes on in the head of the person concerned must have some relevance. |
| 'How regulate?' | p.194 | 8813 | If we have to appeal explicitly to epistemic norms, that will produce an infinite regress |
| Full Idea: If we had to make explicit appeal to epistemic norms for justification (the 'intellectualist model') we would find ourselves in an infinite regress. The norms, their existence and their application would themselves have to be justified. | |||
| From: John L. Pollock (Epistemic Norms [1986], 'How regulate?') | |||
| A reaction: This is counter to the 'space of reasons' picture, where everything is rationally assessed. There are regresses for both reasons and for experiences, when they are offered as justifications. |
| 'How regulate?' | p.196 | 8814 | Epistemic norms are internalised procedural rules for reasoning |
| Full Idea: Epistemic norms are to be understood in terms of procedural knowledge involving internalized rules for reasoning. | |||
| From: John L. Pollock (Epistemic Norms [1986], 'How regulate?') | |||
| A reaction: He offers analogies with bicycly riding, but the simple fact that something is internalized doesn't make it a norm. Some mention of truth is needed, equivalent to 'don't crash the bike'. |
| 'Nat.Internal' | p.219 | 8822 | Statements about necessities need not be necessarily true |
| Full Idea: True statements about the necessary properties of things need not be necessarily true. The well-known example is that the number of planets (9) is necessarily an odd number. The necessity is de re, but not de dicto. | |||
| From: John L. Pollock (Epistemic Norms [1986], 'Nat.Internal') | |||
| A reaction: This would be a matter of the scope (the placing of the brackets) of the 'necessarily' operator in a formula. The quick course in modal logic should eradicate errors of this kind in your budding philosopher. |
| 'Ref.of Extern' | p.197 | 8815 | Belief externalism is false, because external considerations cannot be internalized for actual use |
| Full Idea: External considerations of reliability could not be internalized. Consequently, it is in principle impossible for us to actually employ externalist norms. I take this to be a conclusive refutation of belief externalism. | |||
| From: John L. Pollock (Epistemic Norms [1986], 'Ref.of Extern') | |||
| A reaction: Not so fast. He earlier rejected the 'intellectualist model' (Idea 8813), so he doesn't think norms have to be fully conscious and open to criticism. So they could be innate, or the result of indoctrination (sorry, teaching), or just forgotten. |
| 'Ref.of Extern' | p.199 | 8816 | Externalists tend to take a third-person point of view of epistemology |
| Full Idea: Externalists tend to take a third-person point of view in discussing epistemology. | |||
| From: John L. Pollock (Epistemic Norms [1986], 'Ref.of Extern') | |||
| A reaction: Pollock's point, quite reasonably, is that the first-person aspect must precede any objective assessment of whether someone knows. External facts, such as unpublicised information, can undermine high quality internal justification. |
| 'Ref.of Extern' | p.204 | 8817 | Logical entailments are not always reasons for beliefs, because they may be irrelevant |
| Full Idea: Epistemologists have noted that logical entailments do not always constitute reasons. P may entail Q without the connection between P and Q being at all obvious. | |||
| From: John L. Pollock (Epistemic Norms [1986], 'Ref.of Extern') | |||
| A reaction: Graham Priest and others try to develop 'relevance logic' to deal with this. This would deny the peculiar classical claim that everything is entailed by a falsehood. A belief looks promising if it entails lots of truths about the world. |