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Ideas of J Pollock / J Cruz, by Text

[American, fl. 1999, Collaborators on a book on epistemology]

1999 Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd)
Pref p.-4 The main epistemological theories are foundationalist, coherence, probabilistic and reliabilist
1.2 p.10 Most people now agree that our reasoning proceeds defeasibly, rather than deductively
1.4.6 p.19 Enumerative induction gives a universal judgement, while statistical induction gives a proportion
1.5.3 p.25 Direct realism says justification is partly a function of pure perceptual states, not of beliefs
1.5.3 p.25 People rarely have any basic beliefs, and never enough for good foundations
1.5.3 p.25 Coherence theories fail, because they can't accommodate perception as the basis of knowledge
2.1 p.29 Reason cannot be an ultimate foundation, because rational justification requires prior beliefs
2.3.1 p.36 One belief may cause another, without being the basis for the second belief
2.3.3.2 p.40 Phenomenalism offered conclusive perceptual knowledge, but conclusive reasons no longer seem essential
2.3.3.3 p.41 Scientific confirmation is best viewed as inference to the best explanation
2.5.3 p.59 Foundationalism requires self-justification, not incorrigibility
2.5.5 p.61 Sense evidence is not beliefs, because they are about objective properties, not about appearances
2.5.5 p.65 Foundationalism is wrong, because either all beliefs are prima facie justified, or none are
3.1 p.66 We can't start our beliefs from scratch, because we wouldn't know where to start
3.2.3 p.73 Negative coherence theories do not require reasons, so have no regress problem
3.2.3 p.74 Perception causes beliefs in us, without inference or justification
3.2.4 p.74 Coherence theories isolate justification from the world.
4.1 p.91 Externalism comes as 'probabilism' (probability of truth) and 'reliabilism' (probability of good cognitive process)
4.3.1 p.101 Bayesian epistemology is Bayes' Theorem plus the 'simple rule' (believe P if it is probable)
4.3.1.5 p.105 Since every tautology has a probability of 1, should we believe all tautologies?
5.4.3 p.137 Internalism says if anything external varies, the justifiability of the belief does not vary
6.6 p.176 To believe maximum truths, believe everything; to have infallible beliefs, believe nothing