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Ideas of Karl Popper, by Text
[Austrian, 1902 - 1994, Born in Vienna. Refugee. Professor at the London School of Economics.]
1932
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Two Problems of Epistemology
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p.256
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p.345
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18284
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Particulars can be verified or falsified, but general statements can only be falsified (conclusively)
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1934
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The Logic of Scientific Discovery
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p.15
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3856
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Good theories have empirical content, explain a lot, and are not falsified [Newton-Smith]
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p.31
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7779
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There is no such thing as induction [Magee]
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p.36
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22188
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Give Nobel Prizes for really good refutations? [Gorham]
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p.43
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7780
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Falsification is the criterion of demarcation between science and non-science [Magee]
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p.52
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3860
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Science cannot be shown to be rational if induction is rejected [Newton-Smith]
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p.87
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16830
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We don't only reject hypotheses because we have falsified them [Lipton]
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p.179
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6794
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If falsification requires logical inconsistency, then probabilistic statements can't be falsified [Bird]
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p.180
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6795
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When Popper gets in difficulties, he quietly uses induction to help out [Bird]
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p.22
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p.6
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22358
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Scientific objectivity lies in inter-subjective testing
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1945
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Open Society and Its Enemies:Hegel and Marx
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p.179
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5451
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Popper felt that ancient essentialism was a bar to progress [Mautner]
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1963
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Conjectures and Refutations
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3.3
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p.104
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12175
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Galilean science aimed at true essences, as the ultimate explanations
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3.3
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p.105
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12176
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Science does not aim at ultimate explanations
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3.3
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p.106
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12179
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Essentialist views of science prevent further questions from being raised
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3.3 n17
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p.106
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12177
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Human artefacts may have essences, in their purposes
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1993
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A World of Propensities
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p.14
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p.106
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11946
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Propensities are part of a situation, not part of the objects
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