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Ideas of Stathis Psillos, by Text

[Greek, b.1965, Formerly at the London School of Economics, then at the University of Athens]

1999 Scientific Realism
p.156 14933 Scientific properties are defined by the laws that embody them [Ladyman/Ross]
2002 Causation and Explanation
p.175 4799 Dispositional essentialism can't explain its key distinction between essential and non-essential properties
Intro p.2 4395 There are non-causal explanations, most typically mathematical explanations
Intro p.4 4397 Regularity doesn't seem sufficient for causation
Intro p.6 4399 Causes clearly make a difference, are recipes for events, explain effects, and are evidence
Intro p.7 4400 Theories of causation are based either on regularity, or on intrinsic relations of properties
Intro p.8 4401 It is not a law of nature that all the coins in my pocket are euros, though it is a regularity
Intro p.10 4402 Empiricists tried to reduce causation to explanation, which they reduced to logic-plus-a-law
Intro p.11 4403 We can't base our account of causation on explanation, because it is the wrong way round
Intro p.16 4404 Maybe explanation is entirely relative to the interests and presuppositions of the questioner
§1.6 p.34 4767 Traditionally, rational beliefs are those which are justified by reasons
§1.6 p.40 4768 The 'epistemic fallacy' is inferring what does exist from what can be known to exist
§1.7 p.42 4769 It is hard to analyse causation, if it is presupposed in our theory of the functioning of the mind
§1.8 p.47 4770 Nothing is more usual than to apply to external bodies every internal sensation which they occasion
§11.1 p.281 4812 Explanation is either showing predictability, or showing necessity, or showing causal relations
§2.2 p.62 4774 Counterfactual claims about causation imply that it is more than just regular succession
§3.3 p.98 4780 In some counterfactuals, the counterfactual event happens later than its consequent
§4.5 p.127 4789 Three divisions of causal theories: generalist/singularist, intrinsic/extrinsic, reductive/non-reductive
§4.5.2 p.128 4790 If causation is 'intrinsic' it depends entirely on the properties and relations of the cause and effect
§4.5.4 p.131 4791 Counterfactual theories say causes make a difference - if c hadn't occurred, then e wouldn't occur
§4.5.4 p.133 4792 A Humean view of causation says it is regularities, and causal facts supervene on non-causal facts
§5.3 p.141 4793 "All gold cubes are smaller than one cubic mile" is a true universal generalisation, but not a law
§5.6 p.149 4796 Laws are sets of regularities within a simple and strong coherent system of wider regularities
§8.1 p.217 4801 The regularity of a cock's crow is used to predict dawn, even though it doesn't cause it
§8.2 p.218 4802 Just citing a cause does not enable us to understand an event; we also need a relevant law
§8.2 p.219 4803 An explanation is the removal of the surprise caused by the event
§8.2 p.222 4804 The 'covering law model' says only laws can explain the occurrence of single events
§8.5 p.224 4805 If laws explain the length of a flagpole's shadow, then the shadow also explains the length of the pole
§8.6 p.231 4806 An explanation can just be a 'causal story', without laws, as when I knock over some ink
§8.8 p.236 4807 A good barometer will predict a storm, but not explain it
§8.9 p.236 4808 If we say where Mars was two months ago, we offer an explanation without a prediction
§9.2.1 p.248 4811 Induction (unlike deduction) is non-monotonic - it can be invalidated by new premises
§9.2.1 p.248 4810 Valid deduction is monotonic - that is, it remains valid if further premises are added
2006 What do powers do when they are not manifested?
p.151 p.27 17996 Powers are claimed to be basic because fundamental particles lack internal structure