green numbers give full details.     |    back to list of philosophers     |     expand these ideas

Ideas of Stephen Read, by Text

[British, fl. 2001, Professor at St Andrew's University.]

1994 Formal and Material Consequence
'Logic' p.245 14187 If logic is topic-neutral that means it delves into all subjects, rather than having a pure subject matter
'Logic' p.245 14188 Not all arguments are valid because of form; validity is just true premises and false conclusion being impossible
'Reduct' p.240 14182 If the logic of 'taller of' rests just on meaning, then logic may be the study of merely formal consequence
'Repres' p.243 14184 In modus ponens the 'if-then' premise contributes nothing if the conclusion follows anyway
'Repres' p.244 14186 Logical connectives contain no information, but just record combination relations between facts
'Repres' p.244 14185 Conditionals are just a shorthand for some proof, leaving out the details
'Suppress' p.242 14183 Maybe arguments are only valid when suppressed premises are all stated - but why?
1995 Thinking About Logic
Ch.1 p.9 10966 A proposition objectifies what a sentence says, as indicative, with secure references
Ch.2 p.35 10970 A theory of logical consequence is a conceptual analysis, and a set of validity techniques
Ch.2 p.39 10971 A logical truth is the conclusion of a valid inference with no premisses
Ch.2 p.41 10972 The non-emptiness of the domain is characteristic of classical logic
Ch.2 p.43 10973 A theory is logically closed, which means infinite premisses
Ch.2 p.43 10975 Compactness does not deny that an inference can have infinitely many premisses
Ch.2 p.43 10974 Compactness is when any consequence of infinite propositions is the consequence of a finite subset
Ch.2 p.44 10977 Compactness blocks the proof of 'for every n, A(n)' (as the proof would be infinite)
Ch.2 p.44 10976 Compactness makes consequence manageable, but restricts expressive power
Ch.2 p.47 10978 In second-order logic the higher-order variables range over all the properties of the objects
Ch.2 p.47 10979 Although second-order arithmetic is incomplete, it can fully model normal arithmetic
Ch.2 p.49 10980 Second-order arithmetic covers all properties, ensuring categoricity
Ch.2 p.51 10982 How can modal Platonists know the truth of a modal proposition?
Ch.2 p.51 10981 A possible world is a determination of the truth-values of all propositions of a domain
Ch.2 p.52 10983 Knowledge of possible worlds is not causal, but is an ontology entailed by semantics
Ch.2 p.53 10984 Logical consequence isn't just a matter of form; it depends on connections like round-square
Ch.2 p.54 10986 Not all validity is captured in first-order logic
Ch.2 p.54 10985 We should exclude second-order logic, precisely because it captures arithmetic
Ch.2 p.59 10987 Three traditional names of rules are 'Simplification', 'Addition' and 'Disjunctive Syllogism'
Ch.2 p.62 10988 Any first-order theory of sets is inadequate
Ch.3 p.66 10989 The standard view of conditionals is that they are truth-functional
Ch.3 p.72 10992 The point of conditionals is to show that one will accept modus ponens
Ch.4 p.101 10995 A haecceity is a set of individual properties, essential to each thing
Ch.4 p.106 10997 Von Neumann numbers are helpful, but don't correctly describe numbers
Ch.4 p.106 10996 Actualism is reductionist (to parts of actuality), or moderate realist (accepting real abstractions)
Ch.4 p.107 10998 The mind abstracts ways things might be, which are nonetheless real
Ch.4 p.117 11000 If worlds are concrete, objects can't be present in more than one, and can only have counterparts
Ch.4 p.118 11001 Equating necessity with truth in every possible world is the S5 conception of necessity
Ch.4 p.118 11004 Necessity is provability in S4, and true in all worlds in S5
Ch.5 p.123 11005 Negative existentials with compositionality make the whole sentence meaningless
Ch.5 p.125 11007 Quantifiers are second-order predicates
Ch.5 p.133 11011 Same say there are positive, negative and neuter free logics
Ch.5 p.140 11012 A 'supervaluation' gives a proposition consistent truth-value for classical assignments
Ch.5 p.142 11013 Identities and the Indiscernibility of Identicals don't work with supervaluations
Ch.6 p.154 11014 Self-reference paradoxes seem to arise only when falsity is involved
Ch.7 p.178 11016 Would a language without vagueness be usable at all?
Ch.7 p.184 11017 Some people even claim that conditionals do not express propositions
Ch.7 p.189 11018 There are fuzzy predicates (and sets), and fuzzy quantifiers and modifiers
Ch.7 p.200 11019 Supervaluations say there is a cut-off somewhere, but at no particular place
Ch.8 p.214 11020 Realisms like the full Comprehension Principle, that all good concepts determine sets
Ch.8 p.236 11025 Infinite cuts and successors seems to suggest an actual infinity there waiting for us
Ch.9 p.229 11024 Semantics must precede proof in higher-order logics, since they are incomplete