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Ideas of Thomas Reid, by Text

[British, 1710 - 1796, Born at Aberdeen. Professor at the University of Glasgow.]

1785 Essays on Intellectual Powers: Abstraction
p.157 Real identity admits of no degrees
1785 Essays on Intellectual Powers: Conception
IV.III p.182 Impossibilites are easily conceived in mathematics and geometry
1785 Essays on Intellectual Powers: Senses
p.19 Reid is seen as the main direct realist of the eighteenth century
II.16 p.59 Sensation is not committed to any external object, but perception is
1785 Essays on Intellectual Powers: Memory
III.Ch 4 p.107 Reasoning requires personal identity, to unite the steps in an argument
III.Ch 4 p.108 Commonsense says a thing can have identity at different times, but a logical definition of this seems impossible
III.Ch 4 p.108 Continuity is needed for existence, otherwise we would say a thing existed after it ceased to exist
III.Ch 4 p.109 Thoughts change continually, but the self doesn't
III.Ch 4 p.110 We accept other evidence than memory (e.g. testimony) that we performed acts in the past
III.Ch 4 p.111 A person is a unity, and doesn't come in degrees
III.Ch 4 p.112 Personal identity is the basis of all rights, obligations and responsibility
III.Ch 4 p.112 We consider objects to retain identity when they slightly change because language cannot afford a new name each time
III.Ch 4 p.112 We judge others' identity on appearance, and our own on memory
III.Ch 6 p.115 Continuous memory as the criterion produces paradoxes (e.g. an old general is and isn't his boyhood self))
III.Ch 6 p.116 Identity can only be affirmed of things which have a continued existence
III.Ch 6 p.116 If consciousness is personal identity, it is continually changing
III.Ch 6 p.116 We identify a stolen horse by its similarity to the original, but that doesn't mean that identity IS similarity
1788 Essays on Active Powers 1: Active power
p.62 Reid said that agent causation is a unique type of causation
p.186 Day and night are constantly conjoined, but they don't cause one another