| 2001 | Resemblance Nominalism and Russell's Regress |
| p.397 | p.105 | 18435 | Resemblance Nominalists say that resemblance explains properties (not the other way round) |
| Full Idea: Resemblance Nominalists cannot explain the resemblance between particulars in terms of their properties, because they explain particulars' properties in terms of their resemblances. | |||
| From: Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (Resemblance Nominalism and Russell's Regress [2001], p.397), quoted by Douglas Edwards - Properties 5.5.1 | |||
| A reaction: While resemblance does seem to be a primitive fact of experience, and it points us towards the properties, to say that resemblance explains properties is obviously (as so often...) getting things the wrong way round. Properties ARE resemblances?? |
| 2002 | Resemblance Nominalism: a solution to universals |
| p.115 | p.107 | 18436 | Entities are truthmakers for their resemblances, so no extra entities or 'resemblances' are needed |
| Full Idea: A and B are the sole truthmakers for 'A and B resemble each other'. There is no need to postulate extra entities - the resembling entities suffice to account for them. There is no regress of resemblances, ...since there are no resemblances at all. | |||
| From: Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (Resemblance Nominalism: a solution to universals [2002], p.115), quoted by Douglas Edwards - Properties 5.5.2 | |||
| A reaction: This seems to flatly reject the ordinary conversational move of asking in what 'respect' the two things resemble, which may be a genuine puzzle which gets an illuminating answer. We can't fully explain resemblance, but we can do better than this! |