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Ideas of Richard Rorty, by Text
[American, 1931 - 2007, Born in New York. Professor at the University of Virginia, and at Stanford University.]
1980
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Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature
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p.108
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4726
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Rorty seems to view truth as simply being able to hold one's view against all comers [O'Grady]
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Intro
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p.9
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2548
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If knowledge is merely justified belief, justification is social
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Intro
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p.10
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2549
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For James truth is "what it is better for us to believe" rather than a correct picture of reality
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1.2
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p.22
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2550
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Pain lacks intentionality; beliefs lack qualia
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1.3
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p.32
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2554
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Is intentionality a special sort of function?
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1.3
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p.32
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2553
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The mind is a property, or it is baffling
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3.4
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p.156
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2556
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Rational certainty may be victory in argument rather than knowledge of facts
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4.1
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p.172
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2557
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Analytical philosophy seems to have little interest in how to tell a good analysis from a bad one
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4.3
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p.192
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2558
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Since Hegel we have tended to see a human as merely animal if it is outside a society
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6.1
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p.260
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2559
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Davidson's theory of meaning focuses not on terms, but on relations between sentences
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6.2
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p.271
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2560
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Can meanings remain the same when beliefs change?
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6.3
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p.274
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2562
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A theory of reference seems needed to pick out objects without ghostly inner states
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6.5
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p.300
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2565
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Nature has no preferred way of being represented
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6.6
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p.311
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2566
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You can't debate about whether to have higher standards for the application of words
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Ch.5
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p.126
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6599
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Knowing has no definable essence, but is a social right, found in the context of conversations
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1998
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Brandom on Social Practices and Representations
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iii.127
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p.178
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19090
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If we can't check our language against experience, philosophy is just comparing beliefs and words
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