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Ideas of Richard Rorty, by Text

[American, b.1931, Born in New York. Professor at the University of Virginia, and at Stanford University.]

1980 Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature
p.108 Rorty seems to view truth as simply being able to hold one's view against all comers
Intro p.9 If knowledge is merely justified belief, justification is social
Intro p.10 For James truth is "what it is better for us to believe" rather than a correct picture of reality
1.2 p.22 Pain lacks intentionality; beliefs lack qualia
1.3 p.32 Is intentionality a special sort of function?
1.3 p.32 The mind is a property, or it is baffling
3.2 p.141 For Locke knowledge relates to objects, not to propositions
3.4 p.156 Rational certainty may be victory in argument rather than knowledge of facts
4.1 p.172 Analytical philosophy seems to have little interest in how to tell a good analysis from a bad one
4.3 p.192 Since Hegel we have tended to see a human as merely animal if it is outside a society
6.1 p.260 Davidson's theory of meaning focuses not on terms, but on relations between sentences
6.2 p.271 Can meanings remain the same when beliefs change?
6.3 p.273 For Feyerabend the meaning of a term depends on a whole theory
6.3 p.274 A theory of reference seems needed to pick out objects without ghostly inner states
6.5 p.300 Nature has no preferred way of being represented
6.6 p.311 You can't debate about whether to have higher standards for the application of words
Ch.5 p.126 Knowing has no definable essence, but is a social right, found in the context of conversations
1998 Brandom on Social Practices and Representations
iii.127 p.178 If we can't check our language against experience, philosophy is just comparing beliefs and words