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Ideas of W. David Ross, by Text

[British, 1877 - 1971, Of Oriel College, Oxford University.]

1930 The Right and the Good
p.29 Innocent pleasure, knowledge, and virtue are final values
p.412 Ross said moral principles are self-evident from the facts, but not from pure thought
I p.3 'Right' and 'good' differ in meaning, as in a 'right action' and a 'good man'
I p.4 If there are two equally good acts, they may both be right, but neither a duty
I p.6 We should do our duty, but not from a sense of duty
I p.12 In the past 'right' just meant what is conventionally accepted
II p.17 Promise-keeping is bound by the past, and is not concerned with consequences
II p.17 We clearly value good character or understanding, as well as pleasure
II p.20 Prima facie duties rest self-evidently on particular circumstance
II p.21 Be faithful, grateful, just, beneficent, non-malevolent, and improve yourself
II p.24 The three intrinsic goods are virtue, knowledge and pleasure
II p.29 Moral duties are as fundamental to the universe as the axioms of mathematics
II p.30 We should use money to pay debts before giving to charity
II p.40 The moral convictions of thoughtful educated people are the raw data of ethics
II p.42 An act may be described in innumerable ways
II App I p.50 Rights can be justly claimed, so animals have no rights, as they cannot claim any
II App I p.53 Rights were originally legal, and broadened to include other things
II App II p.60 People lose their rights if they do not respect the rights of others
IV p.75 The thing is intrinsically good if it would be good when nothing else existed
IV p.75 Value is held to be either a quality, or a relation (usually between a thing and a mind)
IV p.102 Goodness is a wider concept than just correct ethical conduct
IV p.105 We can ask of pleasure or beauty whether they are valuable, but not of goodness
IV p.108 An instrumentally good thing might stay the same, but change its value because of circumstances
IV p.114 The arguments for value being an objective or a relation fail, so it appears to be a quality
IV p.115 Identical objects must have identical value
IV p.120 The beauty of a patch of colour might be the most important fact about it
IV p.127 Beauty is neither objective nor subjective, but a power of producing certain mental events
IV p.127 I prefer the causal theory to sense data, because sensations are events, not apprehensions
V p.134 No one thinks it doesn't matter whether pleasure is virtuously or viciously acquired
V p.138 All things being equal, we all prefer the virtuous to be happy, not the vicious
V p.139 All other things being equal, a universe with more understanding is better
V p.140 The four goods are: virtue, pleasure, just allocation of pleasure, and knowledge
V p.141 Aesthetic enjoyment combines pleasure with insight
VI p.147 The goodness of opinions depends on their grounds, and corresponding degrees of conviction
VI p.147 Knowledge is superior to opinion because it is certain
VI p.151 Virtue is superior to pleasure, as pleasure is never a duty, but goodness is
VI p.153 Morality is not entirely social; a good moral character should love truth
VI p.154 Two goods may be comparable, although they are not commensurable
VII p.156 Motives decide whether an action is good, and what is done decides whether it was right
VII p.164 We like people who act from love, but admire more the people who act from duty