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Ideas of Michael J. Sandel, by Text
[American, b.1953, Taught at Oxford University, and then Harvard University.]
1982
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Liberalism and the Limits of Justice
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p.96
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20594
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Choosers in the 'original position' have been stripped of most human characteristics [Tuckness/Wolf]
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p.86
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p.25
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21120
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The self is 'unencumbered' if it can abandon its roles and commitments without losing identity [Shorten]
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1984
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Procedural republic and unencumbered self
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p.7
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22805
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Liberalism concerns rights, and communitarianism concerns the common good [Avineri/De-Shalit]
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'Kantian'
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p.159
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22262
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Kant's moral law has no foundation - because that would undermine its priority
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'Present'
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p.171
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22264
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Modern liberal rights in democracies protect individuals against the majority
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'The right'
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p.157
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22261
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Liberals say rights always come first, and justice is neutral on social values
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'Transcendental'
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p.163
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22263
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Liberal justice means the withdrawal of the self, as transcendental or as unencumbered
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1988
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Beyond Individualism
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p.35
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p.35
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22258
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Passion for progress is always short-lived
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p.38
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p.38
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22259
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Conservatives are either individualistic, or communal
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p.45
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p.45
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22260
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Modern liberalism fails to articulate a vision of the common good
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1998
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The Limits of Communitarianism
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'Free speech'
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p.258
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22267
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In the liberal view an insult to my group doesn't hurt me, since I'm defined by choices not groups
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'Free speech'
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p.258
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22268
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If persons define themselves by a group membership, insults to that group are a real harm
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'Religious'
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p.257
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22266
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The case for religious liberty depends on the religion contributing to a morally good life
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'Where'
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p.252
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22265
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I can't defend the view that the majority values of a community are thereby right
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2009
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Justice: What's the right thing to do?
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01
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p.19
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21027
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Justice concerns how a society distributes what it prizes - wealth, rights, power and honours
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01
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p.19
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21028
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We can approach justice through welfare, or freedom, or virtue
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05
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p.124
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21030
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The categorical imperative is not the Golden Rule, which concerns contingent desires
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05
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p.130
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21031
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Man cannot dispose of himself, because he is not a thing to be owned
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05
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p.132
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21032
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Speak truth only to those who deserve the truth
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05
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p.137
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21033
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Careful evasions of truth at least show respect for it
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05
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p.138
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21034
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A just constitution harmonises the different freedoms
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06
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p.140
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21035
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Just visiting (and using roads) is hardly ratifying the Constitution
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06
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p.142
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21036
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Not all deals are fair deals
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06
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p.143
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21037
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A ratified constitution may not be a just constitution
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06
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p.144
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21038
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Does consent create the obligation, or must there be some benefit?
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06
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p.149
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21039
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Moral contracts involve both consent and reciprocity; making the deal, and keeping it
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06
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p.157
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21040
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Libertarians just want formal equality in a free market; the meritocratic view wants fair equality
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07
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p.170
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21042
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Should we redress wrongs done by a previous generation?
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07
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p.179
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21043
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Distributive justice concern deserts, as well as who gets what
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08
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p.190
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21045
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Teleological thinking is essential for social and political issues
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08
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p.203
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21048
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Work is not fair if it is negotiated, even in a fair situation, but if it suits the nature of the worker
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09
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p.221
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21049
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Liberal freedom was a response to assigned destinies like caste and class
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10
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p.261
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21052
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Justice is about how we value things, and not just about distributions
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