| 1976 | Representation in Music |
| p.63-4 | p.63 | 12166 | If music refers to love, it contains no predication, so it is expression, not language |
| Full Idea: If a passage carries a reference to love, we are not told what it says about love. And to speak of language with 'reference' but no predication is simply to misuse the word. We leave the realm of representation and enter that of expression. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Representation in Music [1976], p.63-4) | |||
| A reaction: This is a beautifully simple objection to the idea (associated with Nelson Goodman) that art is a language. Though what an 'expression' of something amounts to I am not quite sure. |
| p.71 | p.71 | 12167 | Reference without predication is the characteristic of expression |
| Full Idea: Characteristic of expression is the presence of 'reference' without predication. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Representation in Music [1976], p.71) | |||
| A reaction: This echoes (in linguistic terms) Kant's thought that art is 'purposive without purpose'. The remark is comfortable in an essay on music, but it gets more tricky when the topic is literature, or even representational painting. |
| p.74 | p.74 | 12168 | Music is not representational, since thoughts about a subject are never essential to it |
| Full Idea: Music is not representational, since thoughts about a subject are never essential to the understanding of music. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Representation in Music [1976], p.74) | |||
| A reaction: I would not have thought that many people thought music was representational, but Scruton particularly mentions passages in opera that seem to pick up aspects of the story. Do even bell sounds not represent bells? |
| 1980 | Recent Aesthetics in England and America |
| p.13 | p.13 | 12158 | Aesthetic experience informs the world with the values of the observer |
| Full Idea: It is possible to conclude that aesthetic experience has a peculiar practical significance: it represents the world as informed by the values of the observer. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Recent Aesthetics in England and America [1980], p.13) | |||
| A reaction: An excellent remark. If you look at, or listen to, anything, you can make a conscious effort to drain away your personal values (objectivity; science?), or you can consciously flood them with values. But moral and aesthetic vision must differ... |
| p.3 | p.3 | 12156 | Aesthetics has risen and fallen with Romanticism |
| Full Idea: The rise and fall (as we presently perceive them) of aesthetics have been contemporaneous with the rise and fall of Romanticism. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Recent Aesthetics in England and America [1980], p.3) | |||
| A reaction: Maybe it started a little before Romanticism, as part of the Englightenment aim of being rational about everything, and maybe it survives Romanticism because we want to be scientific about everything. |
| 1981 | The Nature of Musical Expression |
| p.49 | p.49 | 12164 | Expressing melancholy is a good thing, but arousing it is a bad thing |
| Full Idea: To describe a piece of music as expressive of melancholy is to give a reason for listening to it; to describe it as arousing or evoking melancholy is to give a reason for avoiding it. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (The Nature of Musical Expression [1981], p.49) | |||
| A reaction: Expressing sexual desire, while avoiding arousing it, is the nice challenge for a particular type of art. Would Scruton say that expressing joy is a good thing, but arousing it is bad? It is a nice observation, though. |
| p.54 | p.54 | 12165 | Romantics say music expresses ideas, or the Will, or intuitions, or feelings |
| Full Idea: According to the Romantic theory music was an expression of something, of an idea (Hegel), of the Will (Schopenhauer), of 'intuitions' (Croce), or of feelings (Collingwood). | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (The Nature of Musical Expression [1981], p.54) | |||
| A reaction: Deryck Cooke was the culmination of music as expression of feeling, and Stravinsky was the greatest rebel against the whole idea of expression in music. You can set out to create interesting music which does or does not grab the emotions. |
| 1981 | Short History of Modern Philosophy |
| Bibliog | p.291 | 5660 | Allegiance is prior to the recognition of individual rights |
| Full Idea: Personally I regard allegiance, in the manner of Hegel, as prior to the recognition of individual rights. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Short History of Modern Philosophy [1981], Bibliog) | |||
| A reaction: Scruton notoriously generates rather right-wing views from this basis, but it is also the basis of communitarianism, which can take a softer form. It seems to me self-evident that rights cannot be the prime concept in a society. What society? |
| Ch.14 | p.199 | 5653 | A right is a power which is enforced in the name of justice |
| Full Idea: Rights are enforced in the name of justice, whereas power is enforced come what may. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Short History of Modern Philosophy [1981], Ch.14) | |||
| A reaction: Presumably rights can be claimed as well as enforced, and the notion of a natural right is at least a discussable concept, as in the 'right' of self-defence. Scruton offers us a very right-wing definition of rights. |
| Ch.4 | p.44 | 5636 | Cartesian 'ideas' confuse concepts and propositions |
| Full Idea: Cartesian 'ideas' seem to be both concepts and propositions at once. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Short History of Modern Philosophy [1981], Ch.4) | |||
| A reaction: This seems to be the simple reason why modern philosophers don't like this seventeenth century notion. There is something slightly too tidy about the modern notion of propositions built out of concepts. Animals see propositions in a flash. |
| Ch.4 | p.45 | 5637 | Nowadays logic is seen as the science of extensions, not intensions |
| Full Idea: Logicians have come increasingly to realise that logic is the science not of the intension, but of the extension of terms. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Short History of Modern Philosophy [1981], Ch.4) | |||
| A reaction: I take this to be because the notion of a 'set' is basic, which is defined strictly in terms of its members. This move is probably because we can be clear about extensions, but not intensions. Tidiness is no substitute for complex truth. |
| 1982 | A Dictionary of Political Thought |
| 'abortion' | p.1 | 7587 | The issue of abortion seems insoluble, because there is nothing with which to compare it |
| Full Idea: The issue of abortion is intractable, partly because of the absence of any other case to which it can be assimilated. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (A Dictionary of Political Thought [1982], 'abortion') | |||
| A reaction: This is the legalistic approach to the problem, which always looks for precedents and comparisons. All problems must hav solutions, though (mustn't they?). The problem, though, is not the value of the foetus, but the unique form of 'ownership'. |
| 'allegiance' | p.12 | 7588 | Allegiance is fundamental to the conservative view of society |
| Full Idea: Conservatives have made the concept of allegiance, conceived as a power, fundamental to their description of the experience of society | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (A Dictionary of Political Thought [1982], 'allegiance') | |||
| A reaction: This provokes the famous slogan of "My country - right or wrong!" However, the issue here is not going to be decided by a consequentialist analysis, but by a view a of human nature. I think I would want to carefully prise allegiance apart from loyalty. |
| 'altruism' | p.14 | 7589 | Altruism is either emotional (where your interests are mine) or moral (where they are reasons for me) |
| Full Idea: Two distinct motives go by the name of altruism: the emotions of liking, love and friendship, making another's interest automatically mine; and the moral motive of respect or considerateness, where another's interests become reasons for me, but not mine. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (A Dictionary of Political Thought [1982], 'altruism') | |||
| A reaction: The second one has a strongly Kantian flavour, with its notion of impersonal duty. Virtue theorists will aspire to achieve the first state rather than the second, because good actions are then actively desired, and give pleasure to the doer. |
| 'consequentialism' | p.89 | 7590 | Consequentialism emphasises value rather than obligation in morality |
| Full Idea: According to consequentialism, the fundamental concept of morality is not obligation (deontological ethics) but value (axiological ethics). | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (A Dictionary of Political Thought [1982], 'consequentialism') | |||
| A reaction: These two views could come dramatically apart, in wartime, or in big ecological crises, or in a family breakup, or in religious disputes. Having identified the pair so clearly, why can we not aim for a civilised (virtuous) balance between the two? |
| 'law' | p.259 | 7592 | For positivists law is a matter of form, for naturalists it is a matter of content |
| Full Idea: For the positivist, law is law by virtue of its form; for the naturalist, by virtue of its content. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (A Dictionary of Political Thought [1982], 'law') | |||
| A reaction: Clearly a perverse and 'unnatural' social rule (backed by government and implied force) is a 'law' in some sense of the word. It is hard to see how you could gain social consensus for a law if it didn't appear in some way to be 'natural justice'. |
| 'liberalism' | p.269 | 7593 | Liberals focus on universal human freedom, natural rights, and tolerance |
| Full Idea: Liberalism believes (roughly) in the supremacy of the individual, who has freedom and natural rights; it focuses on human, not divine affairs; it claims rights and duties are universal; and it advocates tolerance in religion and morality. | |||
| From: report of Roger Scruton (A Dictionary of Political Thought [1982], 'liberalism') by PG - Db (ideas) | |||
| A reaction: I find it hard to disagree with these principles, but the upshot in practice is often an excessive commitment to freedom and tolerance, because people fail to realise the subtle long-term erosions of society that can result. |
| 'paradox of democracy' | p.341 | 7594 | Democrats are committed to a belief and to its opposite, if the majority prefer the latter |
| Full Idea: The paradox of democracy (emphasised by Rousseau) is that I am compelled by my belief in democracy to embrace conflicting - perhaps even contradictory - opinions. If I believe A, and the majority vote for B, I am committed to enacting them both. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (A Dictionary of Political Thought [1982], 'paradox of democracy') | |||
| A reaction: The paradox would have to be resolved by qualifying what exactly one is committed to by being a democrat. I would say I am committed to the right of my opponents to enact a policy with which I disagree. |
| 'rights' | p.409 | 7595 | The idea of a right seems fairly basic; justice may be the disposition to accord rights to people |
| Full Idea: The idea of a right seems to be as basic as any other; we might even define justice in terms of it, as the disposition to accord to every person his rights. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (A Dictionary of Political Thought [1982], 'rights') | |||
| A reaction: I am inclined to think that a set of fairly pure values (such as equality, kindness, sympathy, respect) must be in place before the idea of a right would occur to anyone. Aristotle has a powerful moral sense, but rights for slaves don't cross his mind. |
| 1982 | Laughter |
| §1 | p.152 | 12169 | Since only men laugh, it seems to be an attribute of reason |
| Full Idea: Man is the only animal that laughs, so a starting point for all enquiries into laughter must be the hypothesis that it is an attribute of reason (though that gets us no further than our definition of reason). | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Laughter [1982], §1) | |||
| A reaction: I would be inclined to say that both our capacity for reason and our capacity for laughter (and, indeed, our capacity for language) are a consequence of our evolved capacity for meta-thought. |
| §12 | p.165 | 12174 | Only rational beings are attentive without motive or concern |
| Full Idea: It is only rational beings who can be attentive without a motive; only rational beings who can be interested in that in which they have no interest. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Laughter [1982], §12) | |||
| A reaction: Rational beings make long term plans, so they cannot prejudge which things may turn out to be of interest to them. Scruton (a Kantian) makes it sound a little loftier than it actually is. |
| §5 | p.156 | 12170 | Amusement rests on superiority, or relief, or incongruity |
| Full Idea: There are three common accounts of amusement: superiority theories (Hobbes's 'sudden glory'), 'relief from restraint' (Freud on jokes), and 'incongruity' theories (Schopenhauer). | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Laughter [1982], §5) | |||
| A reaction: All three contain some truth. But one need not feel superior to laugh, and one may already be in a state of unrestraint. Schopenhauer seems closest to a good general account. |
| §7 | p.159 | 12172 | Objects of amusement do not have to be real |
| Full Idea: It is a matter of indifference whether the object of amusement be thought to be real. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Laughter [1982], §7) | |||
| A reaction: Sort of. If I say 'wouldn't it be funny if someone did x?', it is probably much less funny than if I say 'apparently he really did x'. The fantasy case has to be much funnier to evoke the laughter. |
| §9 | p.163 | 12173 | The central object of amusement is the human |
| Full Idea: There are amusing buildings, but not amusing rocks and cliffs. If I were to propose a candidate for the formal object of amusement, then the human would be my choice, ...or at least emphasise its centrality. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Laughter [1982], §9) | |||
| A reaction: Sounds good. Animal behaviour only seems to amuse if it evokes something human. Plants would have to look a bit human to be funny. |
| 1982 | Public Text and Common Reader |
| p.15 | p.15 | 12159 | Without intentions we can't perceive sculpture, but that is not the whole story |
| Full Idea: A person for whom it made no difference whether a sculpture was carved by wind and rain or by human hand would be unable to interpret or perceive sculptures - even though the interpretation of sculpture is not the reading of an intention. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Public Text and Common Reader [1982], p.15) | |||
| A reaction: Scruton compares it to the role of intention in language, where there is objective meaning, even though intention is basic to speech. |
| p.18 | p.18 | 12160 | In aesthetic interest, even what is true is treated as though it were not |
| Full Idea: In aesthetic interest, even what is true is treated as though it were not. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Public Text and Common Reader [1982], p.18) | |||
| A reaction: A nice aphorism. I always feel uncomfortable reading novels about real people, although the historical Macbeth doesn't bother me much. Novels are too close to reality. Macbeth didn't speak blank verse. |
| p.24 | p.24 | 12161 | We can be objective about conventions, but love of art is needed to understand its traditions |
| Full Idea: An historian can elucidate convention while having no feeling for the art that exploits it; whereas an understanding of tradition is reserved for those with the critical insight which comes from the love of art, both past and present. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Public Text and Common Reader [1982], p.24) | |||
| A reaction: This aesthetic observation is obviously close to Scruton's well-known conservatism in politics. I am doubtful whether the notion of 'tradition' can stand up to close examination, though we all know roughly what he means. |
| p.25 | p.25 | 12162 | In literature, word replacement changes literary meaning |
| Full Idea: In literary contexts semantically equivalent words cannot replace each other without loss of literary meaning. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Public Text and Common Reader [1982], p.25) | |||
| A reaction: The notion of 'literary meaning' is not a standard one, and is questionable whether 'meaning' is the right word, given that a shift in word in a poem is as much to do with sound as with connotations. |
| p.27 | p.27 | 12163 | Literary meaning emerges in comparisons, and tradition shows which comparisons are relevant |
| Full Idea: We must discover the meanings that emerge when works of literature are experience in relation to each other. ...The importance of tradition is that it denotes - ideally, at least - the class of relevant comparisons. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Public Text and Common Reader [1982], p.27) | |||
| A reaction: This is a nice attempt to explain why we all agree that a thorough education in an art is an essential prerequisite for good taste. Some people (e.g. among the young) seem to have natural good taste. How does that happen? |
| 1993 | Upon Nothing: Swansea lecture |
| p.9 | 8989 | The benefits of social freedom outweigh the loneliness, doubt and alienation it brings | |
| Full Idea: While the goods of freedom, such as rights, property, education and prosperity, can be obtained only at a price - the price of loneliness, doubt and alienation - it is a price worth paying. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Upon Nothing: Swansea lecture [1993]) | |||
| A reaction: A striking way for a liberal-conservative to confront the accusations of the marxists - by conceding a lot of their criticisms, but living with them. I still don't see why we shouldn't aspire to have both. |
| p.2 | p.2 | 8987 | On the surface of deconstructive writing, technicalities float and then drift away |
| Full Idea: Deconstructive writing has a peculiar surface, in which technicalities float on the syntactic flood and vanish unexplained downstream. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Upon Nothing: Swansea lecture [1993], p.2) | |||
| A reaction: Not even the greatest fans of deconstruction can deny this, and Derrida more or less admits it. At first glance it certainly looks more like the ancient idea of rhetoric than it looks anything like dialectic. |
| p.29 | p.29 | 8992 | Deconstruction is the last spasm of romanticism, now become hopeless and destructive |
| Full Idea: The subversive patterns of thought in deconstruction are a last spasm of romanticism: one that has given up hope of an otherworldly redemption, and set out instead to destroy the illusions in which other still believe, the source of their power. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Upon Nothing: Swansea lecture [1993], p.29) | |||
| A reaction: It seems to be strongly connected with the failure of marxism in Europe, but it also seems to inherit all the values of the Dada movement. |
| p.7 | p.6 | 8988 | Two marxist ideas have dominated in France: base and superstructure, and ideology |
| Full Idea: Two tenets of classical Marxism have played a decisive role in French culture during our century: the theory of base and superstructure, and the concept of ideology. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Upon Nothing: Swansea lecture [1993], p.7) | |||
| A reaction: It is striking how marxist attitudes permeate even the least political of French philosophical writings, to the point where you wonder if they are even aware of it any more. They largely have marxism and reaction, with liberalism passing them by. |
| p.9 | p.9 | 8990 | So-called 'liberation' is the enemy of freedom, destroying the very structures that are needed |
| Full Idea: The promise of 'liberation' has always been the enemy of freedom - in 1968 as much as in 1789 and 1917. Its first desire, and its only policy, is to destroy the institutions and traditions (the 'structures') which make freedom durable. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Upon Nothing: Swansea lecture [1993], p.9) | |||
| A reaction: There is a dilemma, though, if your legal system is corrupt. Far too many political attitudes are formed because of high-profile spectacular cases, instead of looking at daily routines. The latter might make a corrupt legal system still worth saving. |
| 1994 | Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey |
| 1.1 | p.6 | 3878 | Why should you believe someone who says there are no truths? |
| Full Idea: A writer who says that there are no truths, or that all truth is 'merely relative', is asking you not to believe him. So don't. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 1.1) |
| 1.2 | p.7 | 3879 | Philosophy aims to provide a theory of everything |
| Full Idea: Philosophy studies everything: it tries to provide a theory of the whole of things. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 1.2) | |||
| A reaction: Good, but you can't avoid value-judgements about which things are important; philosophers place more value on moral theories than on theories about glacier movement. There is a tension in philosophy between human and eternal concerns. |
| 3.2 | p.25 | 3880 | Logical positivism avoids scepticism, by closing the gap between evidence and conclusion |
| Full Idea: If the evidence for p is q, and that is the only evidence there is or can be, then 'p' means q. Hence there is no gap between evidence and conclusion, and the sceptical problem does not arise. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 3.2) |
| 4 | p.41 | 3881 | In the Cogito argument consciousness develops into self-consciousness |
| Full Idea: In the course of the argument the first person has acquired a character; he is not merely conscious, but self-conscious. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 4) |
| 5.3 | p.54 | 3882 | Wittgenstein makes it impossible to build foundations from something that is totally private |
| Full Idea: Wittgenstein's point is that if I search for foundations in what can only be known to me, then the belief that I have discovered those foundations will also fall victim to Descartes' demon. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 5.3) | |||
| A reaction: Why should foundations based in wider society or a language community fare any better? Getting a lot of people to agree won't trouble the demon too much. Flat earthers. |
| 9.1 | p.99 | 3883 | A true proposition is consistent with every other true proposition |
| Full Idea: A true proposition is consistent with every other true proposition: no truth is contradicted by another. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 9.1) | |||
| A reaction: Interesting. It resembles the rule that if you always tell the truth you don't need to remember what you said. Close to the heart of the concept of truth. Coherence and correspondence. |
| 9.4 | p.106 | 3884 | The pragmatist does not really have a theory of truth |
| Full Idea: The pragmatist does not really have a theory of truth. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 9.4) |
| 10.1 | p.114 | 3885 | We only conceive of primary qualities as attached to secondary qualities |
| Full Idea: Bradley argued that we cannot conceive of primary qualities except as attached to secondary qualities. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 10.1) |
| 11.2 | p.127 | 3886 | Membership is the greatest source of obligation |
| Full Idea: Membership is the greatest source of obligation. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 11.2) | |||
| A reaction: An interesting and rather Aristotelian idea. The alternative is individual debt or obligation. |
| 13.2 | p.162 | 3887 | Maybe our knowledge of truth and causation is synthetic a priori |
| Full Idea: 'Every event has a cause' and 'truth is correspondence to facts' are candidates for being synthetic a priori knowledge. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 13.2) |
| 13.5 | p.168 | 3888 | Hume assumes that necessity can only be de dicto, not de re |
| Full Idea: It was one of the assumptions of Hume's empiricism that all necessities are de dicto: i.e. they are artefacts of language. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 13.5) |
| 14 | p.173 | 3890 | 'Cause' used to just mean any valid explanation |
| Full Idea: Traditionally (before Leibniz and Spinoza) the world 'cause' signified any valid explanation. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 14) |
| 15.7 | p.194 | 3891 | If p entails q, then p is sufficient for q, and q is necessary for p |
| Full Idea: If p entails q, then p is sufficient for q, and q is necessary for p. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 15.7) |
| 17.1 | p.228 | 3892 | Every event having a cause, and every event being determined by its cause, are not the same |
| Full Idea: To say that every event has a cause is one thing; to say that every event is determined by its cause is quite another thing. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 17.1) |
| 20.1 | p.273 | 3894 | We may define 'good' correctly, but then ask whether the application of the definition is good |
| Full Idea: The 'open question' argument is clearly invalid. A question remains open just so long as our ignorance permits. …It may be an open question whether promoting happiness is good, even though this is what 'good' means. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 20.1) | |||
| A reaction: A nice objection. Like small children, we can keep asking questions forever. Whether there is a question to be asked about a thing is not a property of that thing, but of us who ask it. |
| 20.6 | p.290 | 3895 | The categorical imperative is not just individual, but can be used for negotiations between strangers |
| Full Idea: The categorical imperative is also an instrument of negotiation and compromise between strangers, through which they can rise out of enmity and confront each other as equals. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 20.6) |
| 20.6 | p.291 | 3896 | Any social theory of morality has the problem of the 'free rider', who only pretends to join in |
| Full Idea: Any attempt to provide a social justification of morality runs the risk of the 'free rider' - one who pretends to play the game in order to enjoy the fruits of it. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 20.6) |
| 22 | p.317 | 3897 | Epistemology is about the justification of belief, not the definition of knowledge |
| Full Idea: In my view the concept of knowledge is of no very great interest in epistemology, which actually concerns the justification of belief. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 22) | |||
| A reaction: I think this is an excellent thought. I see knowledge as slippery, and partially contextual, and I don't care whether someone precisely 'knows' something. I just want to know why they believe it. |
| 22.4 | p.322 | 3898 | My belief that it will rain tomorrow can't be caused by its raining tomorrow |
| Full Idea: It is impossible that my present belief that it will rain tomorrow is caused by its raining tomorrow. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 22.4) | |||
| A reaction: This doesn't demolish a causal account of belief. It would be very surprising if I were to believe it was going to rain tomorrow for no cause whatsoever. That would be irrational. |
| 23.3 | p.334 | 3899 | The representational theory says perceptual states are intentional states |
| Full Idea: The representational theory is the unsurprising view that perceptual states are intentional, like beliefs, emotions and desires. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 23.3) |
| 24 | p.341 | 3901 | Touch only seems to reveal primary qualities |
| Full Idea: Touch seems to deliver a purely primary-quality account of the world. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 24) | |||
| A reaction: Interesting, though a little over-confident. It seems occasionally possible for touch to be an illusion. |
| 25 | p.355 | 3903 | The conceivable can't be a test of the possible, if there are things which are possible but inconceivable |
| Full Idea: If there are things which are possible but inconceivable, we must abandon the view, which has had a considerable following since Descartes, that the conceivable is a test of the possible. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 25) |
| 25.3 | p.360 | 3904 | Measuring space requires no movement while I do it |
| Full Idea: I can measure the length of something only if I know that it has not moved between the moment when I locate one end of it and the moment when I locate the other. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 25.3) | |||
| A reaction: A nice example of how even simple propositions have many presuppositions. |
| 26.2 | p.386 | 3905 | 'Existence' is not a predicate of 'man', but of the concept of man, saying it has at least one instance |
| Full Idea: When I say that a man exists, Frege argues, I do not predicate existence of a man, but rather of the concept man: I say the concept has at least one instance (and existence is a predicate of predicates). | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 26.2) |
| 26.4 | p.392 | 3906 | If possible worlds are needed to define properties, maybe we should abandon properties |
| Full Idea: If the only way of defining properties involves quantifying over possible worlds, this could be taken as another reason for abandoning properties altogether. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 26.4) |
| 26.6 | p.394 | 3907 | Could you be intellectually acquainted with numbers, but unable to count objects? |
| Full Idea: Could someone have a perfect intellectual acquaintance with numbers, but be incapable of counting a flock of sheep? | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 26.6) |
| 26.7 | p.395 | 3908 | If maths contains unprovable truths, then maths cannot be reduced to a set of proofs |
| Full Idea: If there can be unprovable truths of mathematics, then mathematics cannot be reduced to the proofs whereby we construct it. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 26.7) |
| Ch.10 n | p.524 | 3910 | If primary and secondary qualities are distinct, what has the secondary qualities? |
| Full Idea: If primary and secondary qualities are distinct, what do secondary qualities inhere in? | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], Ch.10 n) | |||
| A reaction: What is the problem? A pin causes me pain, but I know the pain isn't in the pin. It is the same with colour. It is a mental property, if you like, triggered by a wavelength of radiation. |
| Ch.16 n | p.539 | 3911 | The very concept of a substance denies the possibility of mutual interaction and dependence |
| Full Idea: It is often held to be a consequence of the rationalist conception of substance, that separate substances cannot interact (since causal interaction is a form of mutual dependence). | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], Ch.16 n) | |||
| A reaction: Yes, substances seem incapable of interaction, just as Leibniz argues that perfections could never interact. They are too pure. |
| 1996 | Animal Rights and Wrongs |
| p.104 | p.104 | 4295 | We favour our own animals over foreign ones because we see them as fellow citizens |
| Full Idea: We don't give help to British animals (through the RSPCA) rather than foreign animals because of their nearness or needs, but because of our sense of them as fellow citizens. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.104) | |||
| A reaction: A bit strong. It may, in fact, be because we look after them the way we look after the rest of our property. Even Kantians can be sentimental sometimes. |
| p.107 | p.107 | 4296 | Brutal animal sports are banned because they harm the personality of the watcher |
| Full Idea: Dog-fights and bear-baiting are naturally forbidden by law, because they threaten the personality of those who attend them. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.107) | |||
| A reaction: Hm. If this is so, it is mainly because it takes place in a closed pen, where we can get a close look at the brutality and blood. It could be said to be more honest than hunting with gun or hounds. 'Go on eyes, look your worst'. |
| p.13 | p.13 | 4263 | Many of the stranger forms of life (e.g. worms) interest us only as a species, not as individuals |
| Full Idea: Most of the stranger forms of life (worms, fleas, locusts etc.) are not really suitors for our moral concern, and interest us primarily as species, and only rarely as individuals. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.13) | |||
| A reaction: Interesting, but that seems to reflect on us, rather than cutting nature at the joints. As soon as you look closely, you recognise an individual rather than a member of a species. |
| p.14 | p.14 | 4264 | Perception (which involves an assessment) is a higher state than sensation |
| Full Idea: Perception is a higher state than sensation: it involves not just a response to the outer world, but also an assessment of it. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.14) | |||
| A reaction: This seems to me a simple but really important distinction, even though it wickedly uses the word 'higher', which Greeks like but post-Humeans struggle with. But we all know it is higher, don't we? |
| p.15 | p.15 | 4266 | Having beliefs involves recognition, expectation and surprise |
| Full Idea: With the concept of belief (e.g. in animals) comes recognition, expectation and surprise. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.15) | |||
| A reaction: A good observation. It is always tempting to see mental faculties in isolation, but each one drags along other capacities with it. Looks a bit holistic. |
| p.15 | p.15 | 4265 | If an animal has beliefs, that implies not only that it can make mistakes, but that it can learn from them |
| Full Idea: To say that an animal has beliefs is to imply not just that it can make mistakes, but also that it can learn from them. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.15) | |||
| A reaction: A bold claim which is hard to substantiate. Seems right, though. Why would they change a belief? It can't be a belief if it isn't changeable. That would be an instinct. |
| p.16 | p.16 | 4267 | Conditioning may change behaviour without changing the mind |
| Full Idea: Conditioning involves a change of behaviour, but not necessarily a change of mind. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.16) | |||
| A reaction: I am inclined to doubt this. If I was conditioned in some way, I would expect my conscious state to change as well as my behaviour. |
| p.16 | p.16 | 4268 | Animals command our sympathy and moral concern initially because of their intentionality |
| Full Idea: It seems to me that the concept of intentionality introduces the first genuine claim of animals upon our sympathies and our moral concern. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.16) | |||
| A reaction: Good. If one's approach to morality is Humean (via sympathy) this seems right. Utilitarianism bases animal rights on qualia (pleasures and pains). |
| p.17 | p.17 | 4269 | An emotion is a motive which is also a feeling |
| Full Idea: An emotion is a motive which is also a feeling. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.17) | |||
| A reaction: What is a motive without feeling? A universalised judgment, perhaps. Which comes first, the motivation or the feeling? |
| p.19 | p.19 | 4270 | Do we use reason to distinguish people from animals, or use that difference to define reason? |
| Full Idea: The difficulty of defining reason suggests that while pretending to use it to define the difference between humans and animals, they are actually using that difference to define reason. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.19) | |||
| A reaction: Too pessimistic. We are perfectly capable of saying there is no significant difference between us and an alien. We have obvious abilities, which we can partly specify. |
| p.23 | p.23 | 4271 | There is consciousness whenever behaviour must be explained in terms of mental activity |
| Full Idea: There is consciousness whenever behaviour must be explained in terms of mental activity. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.23) | |||
| A reaction: Not a point that would trouble an eliminativist, as it sounds suspiciously circular or question-begging. |
| p.28 | p.28 | 4272 | Our concept of a person is derived from Roman law |
| Full Idea: Our concept of a person is derived from Roman law. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.28) | |||
| A reaction: Interesting. I don't believe Roman legislators invented it, so where did it originate? Interesting that it is legalistic - a thing to which rights can accrue. Compare character, to which virtues accrue. |
| p.30 | p.30 | 4273 | Kant's Moral Law is the rules rational beings would accept when trying to live by agreement |
| Full Idea: We can see the Kantian 'Moral Law' as consisting precisely in those rules which rational beings would accept, when attempting to live by agreement. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.30) | |||
| A reaction: If this combines Kantian notions of duty with the obligations of contracts, it is the core of a very powerful moral theory. See the work of Tim Scanlon. Classic problems are still the weak, animals and free riders. |
| p.33 | p.33 | 4274 | The modern virtues are courage, prudence, wisdom, temperance, justice, charity and loyalty |
| Full Idea: The antique virtues of courage, prudence, wisdom, temperance and justice, amplified by Christian charity and pagan loyalty, still form the core idea of human excellence. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.33) | |||
| A reaction: I always think sense of humour has become a key modern virtue. Where did that come from? Maybe a sense of irony is a good thing. How about efficiency (which is Plato's idea of justice!)? |
| p.39 | p.39 | 4276 | An animal has individuality if it is nameable, and advanced animals can respond to their name |
| Full Idea: An animal has acquired individuality if the gift of a proper name seems appropriate, the high point being reached with animals such as dogs which actually respond to their own name. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.39) | |||
| A reaction: Interesting, even though it is rather chauvinistic. I might name the fleas in my circus, but regard a whole section of the human race as indistinguishable and not worth naming. |
| p.41 | p.41 | 4277 | I may avoid stepping on a spider or flower, but fellow-feeling makes me protect a rabbit |
| Full Idea: I instinctively recoil from stepping on a spider or a forget-me-knot in my path, but neither of these responses expresses the fellow-feeling that forbids me to step on a rabbit or a mouse. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.41) | |||
| A reaction: It is fellow-feeling that makes us prefer mammals to reptiles. It seems wrong to build a moral system purely on empathy, because psychopaths don't even empathise with nice human beings. Externalism in morality. |
| p.43 | p.43 | 4278 | Lucky animals are eaten by large predators, the less lucky starve, and worst is death by small predators |
| Full Idea: Lucky animals die in the jaws of a large predator; predators themselves are less lucky, when they die of lingering starvation; least fortunate are those killed by smaller creatures, such as maggots and bacteria. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.43) | |||
| A reaction: A nice insight, even if it does slide into claiming that we are simply large predators, and that therefore fox-hunting is a virtue… |
| p.44 | p.44 | 4279 | We can easily remove the risk of suffering from an animal's life, but we shouldn't do it |
| Full Idea: It is easy to remove the risk of suffering from an animal's life, but the result is not a life which an animal should lead. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.44) | |||
| A reaction: I'm not clear where the "should" derives from here. You can't save them all, and large interventions would destroy the ecosystem. But should we never, say, put a victim out of its misery? |
| p.50 | p.50 | 4280 | Utilitarianism is wrong precisely because it can't distinguish animals from people |
| Full Idea: It was precisely the inability of utilitarianism to explain the distinction between animals and people which led to its rejection. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.50) | |||
| A reaction: A nice turning of the tables, rejecting the utilitarian pride in incorporating animals into their theory where others (like Kant) reject them. Yet in one respect (suffering) they are inescapably very like us. |
| p.52 | p.52 | 4282 | Morality is not a sort of calculation, it is what sets the limits to when calculation is appropriate |
| Full Idea: It is nearer the truth to see morality as setting the limits to practical reasoning, rather than being a species of it. Moral principles tell us precisely that we must go no further along the path of calculation. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.52) | |||
| A reaction: Well said. If you are assessing whether an act of vicious brutality is required, you have probably already gone morally astray. It is not hard, though, to think of counterexamples, especially in wartime. |
| p.52 | p.52 | 4281 | Utilitarianism says we can't blame Stalin yet, but such a theory is a sick joke |
| Full Idea: Stalin and Hitler justified their actions in utilitarian terms, ..and no one can accuse them, for who knows what the long-term effects of their actions might be? But a morality which can't pass final judgement on Hitler or Stalin is a kind of sick joke. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.52) | |||
| A reaction: A powerful argument against simplistic consequentialism. We can judge an action at any time, even beforehand, and that must be part of morality, which can't just observe the unfolding consequences. |
| p.54 | p.54 | 4283 | Sympathy can undermine the moral order just as much as crime does |
| Full Idea: A person who lives by sympathy may undermine the moral order as effectively as the one who lives by crime. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.54) | |||
| A reaction: A slightly chilling remark. Presumably one should not feel too much for suffering which is deserved. What about unavoidable suffering? It is certainly important to see that some suffering is morally good (e.g. grief or remorse). |
| p.56 | p.56 | 4284 | All moral life depends ultimately on piety, which is our recognition of our own dependence |
| Full Idea: The three forms of moral life (respect for persons, the pursuit of virtue and natural sympathy) all depend, in the last analysis, on piety, which is the deep-down recognition of our frailty and dependence. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.56) | |||
| A reaction: MacIntyre agrees. 'Piety' is an odd word, which attempts to link the point to religious teachings. 'Dependence' seems an adequate term. But can fully independent creatures dispense with morality? I think not. |
| p.59 | p.59 | 4285 | As soon as we drop self-interest and judge impartially, we find ourselves agreeing about conflicts |
| Full Idea: As soon as we set our own interests aside and look on human relations with the eye of the impartial judge, we find ourselves agreeing over the rights and wrongs of any conflict. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.59) | |||
| A reaction: A nice, and fairly plausible, defence of Kantian ethics. Maybe the UN should actually settle all disputes, instead of just peace-keeping. The idea merely describes the function of the law, and especially an independent judiciary. |
| p.61 | p.61 | 4286 | Only just people will drop their own self-interests when faced with an impartial verdict |
| Full Idea: Only just people will act on the impartial verdict when their own interests conflict with it. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.61) | |||
| A reaction: The Kantian account of the virtues. Virtues are seen in the acceptance of a range of obvious human duties. Very helpful point if one is aiming for one unified theory of morality. |
| p.63 | p.63 | 4287 | Utilitarianism merely guides us (by means of sympathy) when the moral law is silent |
| Full Idea: Utilitarian thinking does not replace or compete with the moral law, but guides us when the moral law is silent and only sympathy speaks. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.63) | |||
| A reaction: If the moral law is silent, it is not quite clear why we should follow sympathy rather than contempt. There is the well-known danger here of the moral law turning out to lack content. |
| p.75 | p.75 | 4288 | Many breeds of animals have needs which our own ancestors planted in them |
| Full Idea: Many breeds of animals have needs which our own ancestors planted in them. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.75) | |||
| A reaction: He is talking about race horses and St Bernards. This doesn't avoid the moral dilemma, because we could race horses die out if we thought we had created a bad life for them. |
| p.81 | p.81 | 4289 | Sheep and cattle live comfortable lives, and die an enviably easy death |
| Full Idea: Sheep and beef cattle live a quiet and comfortable life among their companions, and are despatched in ways which human beings, if they are rational, must surely envy. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.81) | |||
| A reaction: No rational person could envy a premature death, and we don't wait for cattle to be old before eating them. A quick death is little consolation for being murdered, and many people would prefer a slower death (without agony, of course). |
| p.86 | p.86 | 4290 | That which can only be done by a callous person, ought not to be done |
| Full Idea: That which can only be done by a callous person, ought not to be done. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.86) | |||
| A reaction: The problem cases all arise in wartime. Ideally we want to show sympathy even when being necessarily ruthless, but in practice we send the callous ones to do the horrible deed. |
| p.87 | p.87 | 4292 | Concern for one animal may harm the species, if the individual is part of a bigger problem |
| Full Idea: Too much concern for individual animals may in fact harm the species, by promoting diseased or degenerate members, or preventing population control. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.87) | |||
| A reaction: Okay till we reach human beings, where this principle won't go away, even if further principles about personhood, rationality and deep sympathy enter the picture. We can't be utilitarian about animals, and something else about humans. |
| p.87 | p.87 | 4291 | Letting your dog kill wild rats, and keeping rats for your dog to kill, are very different |
| Full Idea: There is a difference between the person who allows his terrier to kill wild rats, and the person who keeps tame rats for his terrier to kill. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.87) | |||
| A reaction: There are areas in the middle, where I encourage pheasants to breed 'wild' on my land. The purchase of a Rottweiller also tests the moral boundaries here. |
| p.91 | p.91 | 4293 | Introducing a natural means of controlling animal population may not be very compassionate |
| Full Idea: It is hard to believe that those who would introduce wolves as a means of controlling the deer population have much sympathy for deer. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.91) | |||
| A reaction: Good point. If we assume that culling is required at all, then the decisive human actions which shock us on television may be nicer than the natural deaths that occur during the night. |
| p.97 | p.97 | 4294 | Animals are outside the community of rights, but we still have duties towards them |
| Full Idea: Animals exist outside the web of reciprocal rights and obligations, created by dialogue, but because they have no rights it does not mean that we have no duties towards them. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.97) | |||
| A reaction: The modern Kantian view of animals, though Kant struggled to show why we might have any duties to animals. Is mere compassion enough to produce a duty, or is it a luxurious indulgence of our nature? |
| 2011 | Beauty: a very short introduction |
| 1 | p.3 | 18541 | Beauty (unlike truth and goodness) is questionable as an ultimate value |
| Full Idea: The status of beauty as an ultimate value is questionable, in the way that the status of truth and goodness are not. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Beauty: a very short introduction [2011], 1) | |||
| A reaction: We suspect that a love of beauty may be a bit parochial, where it is hard to conceive of living creatures anywhere in the cosmos who don't value the other two. |
| 1 | p.4 | 18542 | Defining truth presupposes that there can be a true definition |
| Full Idea: How can you define truth, without already assuming the distinction between a true definition and a false one? | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Beauty: a very short introduction [2011], 1) | |||
| A reaction: Don't say we have to accept truth as yet another primitive! Philosophers are out of business if all the basic concepts are primitive. The axiomatic approach to truth is an alternative - by specifying how the primitive should be used. |
| 1 | p.7 | 18543 | Do aesthetic reasons count as reasons, if they are rejectable without contradiction? |
| Full Idea: The judgement of beauty makes a claim about its object, and can be supported by reasons. But the reasons do not compel the judgement and can be rejected without contradiction. So are they reasons or aren't they? | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Beauty: a very short introduction [2011], 1) | |||
| A reaction: I suspect that what he is really referring to is evidence rather than reasons. |
| 1 | p.11 | 18544 | Maybe 'beauty' is too loaded, and we should talk of fittingness or harmony |
| Full Idea: Maybe we can understand the 'beauty' of a building better if we describe it in another and less loaded way, as a form of fittingness or harmony. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Beauty: a very short introduction [2011], 1) | |||
| A reaction: Almost everyone accepts the word 'beauty' for some things, such as a beautiful face, or goal, or steak. I remember a female interviewer writing that, reluctantly, the only appropriate word she could find for Nureyev's face was 'beautiful'. |
| 1 | p.26 | 18546 | The pleasure taken in beauty also aims at understanding and valuing |
| Full Idea: Like the pleasure in friendship, the pleasure in beauty is curious: it aims to understand its object, and to value what it finds. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Beauty: a very short introduction [2011], 1) | |||
| A reaction: At least he is trying to pin down the way in which aesthetic pleasure is phenomenologically different from other kinds of pleasure. |
| 2 | p.55 | 18548 | Natural beauty reassures us that the world is where we belong |
| Full Idea: The experience of natural beauty is not a sense of 'how nice!' or 'how pleasant!' It contains a reassurance that this world is a right and fitting place to be - a home in which our human powers and prospects find confirmation. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Beauty: a very short introduction [2011], 2) | |||
| A reaction: To call it a 'reassurance' and 'confirmation' sounds like theism, anthropomorphism, or the pathetic fallacy. That said, this is certainly a heart-warming idea, and hence must contain a grain of truth. |
| 5 | p.90 | 18550 | Art gives us imaginary worlds which we can view impartially |
| Full Idea: One aim of art is to present imaginary worlds, towards which we can adopt, as part of the integral aesthetic attitude, a posture of impartial concern. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Beauty: a very short introduction [2011], 5) | |||
| A reaction: It connects to the pleasure of watching people when they don't know they are being watched (such as watching the street from a restaurant window). Scruton's suggestion makes art resemble examples in philosophy. Cf the Frege-Geach problem in ethics. |
| 5 | p.105 | 18551 | Croce says art makes inarticulate intuitions conscious; rival views say the audience is the main concern |
| Full Idea: The Croce model is of an inarticulate inner state (an 'intuition') becoming articulate and conscious through artistic expression. The rival model is fitting thing together so as to create links which resonate in the audience's feelings. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Beauty: a very short introduction [2011], 5) | |||
| A reaction: The first model tells you nothing about how the artist imagines the audience reacting. The second model tells you nothing about what matters personally to the artist. A good theory must do both! |
| 7 | p.123 | 18553 | Beauty shows us what we should want in order to achieve human fulfilment |
| Full Idea: Beauty speaks to us of human fulfilment: not of things that we want, but of things that we ought to want, because human nature requires them. Such, at least, is my belief. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Beauty: a very short introduction [2011], 7) | |||
| A reaction: I'm not sure how this works with a beautiful natural landscape. And what should I see that I ought to desire after viewing a great Rembrandt self-portrait? That I don't want to end up looking as bleak as that? Hm. Lofty words. |
| 7 | p.137 | 18554 | Prostitution is wrong because it hardens the soul, since soul and body are one |
| Full Idea: The condemnation of prostitution was not just puritan bigotry; it was a recognition of a profound truth, that you and your body are not two things but one, and by selling the body you harden your soul. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Beauty: a very short introduction [2011], 7) | |||
| A reaction: No one, I imagine, who condones or even enthuses about prostitution would hope that their own daughter followed the profession, so there is something wrong with it. But must an enthusiastic and cheerful prostitute necessarily have a hard soul? |
| 9 | p.163 | 18556 | Beauty is rationally founded, inviting meaning, comparison and self-reflection |
| Full Idea: Beauty is rationally founded; it challenges us to find meaning in its object, to make critical comparisons, and to examine our own lives and emotions in the light of what we find. | |||
| From: Roger Scruton (Beauty: a very short introduction [2011], 9) | |||
| A reaction: This is the Kantian tradition, and I'm not finding it very persuasive. It seems to place the value of beauty in what we do with it afterwards, and he seems to make beauty a necessary stepping stone to virtue. I see beauty as more sui generis. |