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Ideas of Gabriel M.A. Segal, by Text
[American, fl. 2000, At King's College, London.]
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2000
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A Slim Book about Narrow Content
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1.4
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p.10
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3103
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Maybe content involves relations to a language community
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1.4
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p.10
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3104
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Must we relate to some diamonds to understand them?
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1.6
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p.14
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3105
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Is 'Hesperus = Phosphorus' metaphysically necessary, but not logically or epistemologically necessary?
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1.6
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p.16
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3106
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If claims of metaphysical necessity are based on conceivability, we should be cautious
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1.7
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p.19
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3108
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If 'water' has narrow content, it refers to both H2O and XYZ
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2.1
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p.24
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3110
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Humans are made of H2O, so 'twins' aren't actually feasible
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2.1
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p.24
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3109
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If content is external, so are beliefs and desires
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2.2
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p.31
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3111
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Externalism can't explain concepts that have no reference
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2.2
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p.37
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3112
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Folk psychology is ridiculously dualist in its assumptions
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2.2
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p.43
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3113
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The success and virtue of an explanation do not guarantee its truth
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3.2
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p.73
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3116
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Maybe experts fix content, not ordinary users
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3.3
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p.77
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3117
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Concepts can survive a big change in extension
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4.1
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p.95
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3118
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If thoughts ARE causal, we can't explain how they cause things
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4.1
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p.97
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3119
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Even 'mass' cannot be defined in causal terms
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5
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p.123
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3121
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If content is narrow, my perfect twin shares my concepts
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5
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p.127
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3123
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Science is in the business of carving nature at the joints
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5.1
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p.131
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3124
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Externalists can't assume old words refer to modern natural kinds
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5.3
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p.150
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3125
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Psychology studies the way rationality links desires and beliefs to causality
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