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Ideas of Sextus Empiricus, by Text

[Greek, 140 - 200, Probably a doctor.]

180 Against the Ethicists (one book)
II.22 p.395 Reasoning is impossible without a preconception
     Full Idea: It is not possible either to seek or to doubt without a preconception.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Ethicists (one book) [c.180], II.22)
     A reaction: [Sextus quotes this from 'the sapient Epicurus'] I think this may be a message across the centuries to Hegel, who attempted this impossible feat. My picture of philosophy is a continual shift of the preconceptions, to explore thoroughly.
II.35 p.403 Saying the good is useful or choiceworth or happiness-creating is not the good, but a feature of it
     Full Idea: Asserting that the good is 'the useful', or 'what is choiceworthy for its own sake', or 'that which contributes to happiness', does not teach us what good is but states its accidental property.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Ethicists (one book) [c.180], II.35)
     A reaction: This seems to be a pretty accurate statement of Moore's famous Open Question argument. I read it in an Aristotelian way - that that quest is always for the essential nature of the thing itself, not for its role or function or use.
II.69 p.419 Like a warming fire, what is good by nature should be good for everyone
     Full Idea: Just as fire which is warmth-giving by nature warms all men, and does not chill some of them, so what is good by nature ought to be good for all, and not good for some but not good for others.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Ethicists (one book) [c.180], II.69)
     A reaction: This is going to confine the naturally good to the basics of life, which we all share. Is a love of chess a natural good? It seems to capture an aspect of human nature, without appealing to everyone. Sextus says nothing is good for everyone.
II.81 p.425 If a desire is itself desirable, then we shouldn't desire it, as achieving it destroys it
     Full Idea: If the desire for wealth or health is desirable, we ought not to purse wealth or health, lest by acquiring them we cease to desire them any longer.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Ethicists (one book) [c.180], II.81)
     A reaction: He is investigating whether desires can be desirable, and if so which ones. Roots of this are in Plato's 'Gorgias' on drinking water. Similar to 'if compassion is the highest good then we need lots of suffering'. Desire must be a means, not an end.
180 Against the Logicians (two books)
I.042 p.21 Fools, infants and madmen may speak truly, but do not know
     Full Idea: The fool and the infant and the madman at times say something true, but they do not possess knowledge of the true.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Logicians (two books) [c.180], I.042)
     A reaction: This may be correct of someone who is insane, but seems unfair to the fool and the infant. At what age do children begin to know things? If speech was just random nonsense, an accidental truth seems impossible.
I.062 p.33 Madmen are reliable reporters of what appears to them
     Full Idea: The madman is a trustworthy criterion of the appearances which occur in madness.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Logicians (two books) [c.180], I.062)
     A reaction: It is hard to conceive of an genuinely insane person deliberately misreporting their hallucinations. They are, of course, the sole witness.
I.270 p.145 Some properties are inseparable from a thing, such as the length, breadth and depth of a body
     Full Idea: Some properties are inseparable from the things to which they belong - as are length, breadth and depth from bodies, for without their presence it is impossible to perceive Body.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Logicians (two books) [c.180], I.270)
     A reaction: For the opposite case he suggests a man running, talking or sleeping. He doesn't mention essential natures, but this is clearly correct. We might say that they are properties which need to be mentioned in a full definition.
II.058 p.267 We can only dream of a winged man if we have experienced men and some winged thing
     Full Idea: He who in his sleep dreams of a winged man does not dream so without having seen some winged thing and a man. And in general it is impossible to find in conception anything which one does not possess as known by experience.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Logicians (two books) [c.180], II.058)
     A reaction: This precisely David Hume's empiricist account of the formation of concepts. Hume's example is a golden mountain, which he got from Aquinas. How do we dream of faces we have never encountered, or shapes we have never seen?
II.129 p.305 Ordinary speech is not exact about what is true; we say we are digging a well before the well exists
     Full Idea: We must allow ordinary speech to use inexact terms, as it does not seek after what is really true but what is supposed to be true. We speak of digging a well or weaving a cloak, but there is no well or cloak when they are being dug or woven.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Logicians (two books) [c.180], II.129)
     A reaction: Nice examples. The imprecision is reduced if I say I am creating a well, because that implies something that is not yet complete. If I say I intend to dig a well, is that imprecise because the well does not exist?
180 Against the Mathematicians
440 p.36 How can sceptics show there is no criterion? Weak without, contradiction with
     Full Idea: The dogmatists ask how the sceptic can show there is no criterion. If without a criterion, he is untrustworthy; with a criterion he is turned upside down. He says there is no criterion, but accepts a criterion to establish this.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Mathematicians [c.180], 440)
     A reaction: This is also the classic difficulty for foundationalist views of knowledge. Is the foundation justified, or not?
442 p.3 Some things are their own criterion, such as straightness, a set of scales, or light
     Full Idea: Dogmatists say something can be its own criterion. The straight is the standard of itself, and a set of scales establishes the equality of other things and of itself, and light seems to reveal not just other things but also itself.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Mathematicians [c.180], 442)
     A reaction: Each of these may be a bit dubious, but deserves careful discussion.
180 Against the Physicists (two books)
I.016 p.9 Gods were invented as watchers of people's secret actions
     Full Idea: It is asserted that those who first led mankind …invented gods as watchers of all the sinful and righteous acts of men, so that none should dare to do wrong even in secret.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Physicists (two books) [c.180], I.016)
     A reaction: Sextus is a sceptic about everything, so this scepticism about the gods is nothing special. I'm not sure if this is why the gods were invented, but it seems to be the main role assigned to God by the Christian church, as the basis of religious morality.
I.033 p.19 All men agree that God is blessed, imperishable, happy and good
     Full Idea: All men have one common preconception about God, according to which he is a blessed creature and imperishable and perfect in happiness and receptive of nothing evil.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Physicists (two books) [c.180], I.033)
     A reaction: He observes this after he has pointed the enormous variety of religious beliefs. He offers this unanimity as a reason to believe that it is true.
I.040 p.23 It is mad to think that what is useful to us, like lakes and rivers, are gods
     Full Idea: To suppose that lakes and rivers, and whatsoever else is of a nature to be useful to us, are gods surpasses the height of lunacy.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Physicists (two books) [c.180], I.040)
     A reaction: He also points out the what is useful to us decays and changes. Sextus lived in a time when monotheism was becoming dominant.
I.045 p.25 The perfections of God were extrapolations from mankind
     Full Idea: It is said that …the idea that God is eternal and imperishable and perfect in happiness was introduced by way of transference from mankind.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Physicists (two books) [c.180], I.045)
     A reaction: This view is found in Hume, and in Feuerbach. I presume 'transference' means extrapolation and idealisation. If God exists, we may have no option but to think of God anthropomorphically.
I.060 p.35 God is defended by agreement, order, absurdity of denying God, and refutations
     Full Idea: Arguments for God have four modes: from universal agreement, from the orderly arrangement of the universe, from the absurd consequences of denying God, and from undermining the opposing arguments.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Physicists (two books) [c.180], I.060)
     A reaction: [compressed] The loss of status of the argument from universal agreement has had a huge influence. We now realise that a very wide consensus is no guarantee of truth in anything.
I.075 p.43 The original substance lacked motion or shape, and was given these by a cause
     Full Idea: They say that the substance of existing things being of itself motionless and shapeless must be put in motion and shape by some cause.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Physicists (two books) [c.180], I.075)
     A reaction: Interestingly, Sextus doesn't seem to think that the existence of the original substance also needs a cause. This substance sounds like a relative of Aristotle's Prime Matter. The source of motion isn't really a 'design' argument.
I.146 p.79 God's sensations imply change, and hence perishing, which is absurd, so there is no such God
     Full Idea: If God has sensation he is altered, …so he is receptive of change, including change for the worse. If so, he is also perishable, but that is absurd; therefore it is absurd also to claim that God exists.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Physicists (two books) [c.180], I.146)
     A reaction: [compressed] It is certainly paradoxical to think that God is eternal and unchanging, but also capable of perception and thought, which necessitate change. Some theological ingenuity is needed to explain this.
I.151 p.81 An incorporeal God could do nothing, and a bodily god would perish, so there is no God
     Full Idea: The Divine is not incorporeal, since that is inanimate and insensitive and incapable of any action; nor is it a body, since that is subject to change and perishable; so the Divine does not exist.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Physicists (two books) [c.180], I.151)
     A reaction: I find this quite persuasive. An incorporeal God has to be ascribed magical powers in order to interact with what is corporeal. A corporeal God is subject to entropy and all the depredations of the physical world.
I.151 p.81 The Divine must lack the virtues of continence and fortitude, because they are not needed
     Full Idea: If the Divine is all-virtuous, it possesses all the virtues. But it does not possess the virtues of continence and fortitude unless there are certain things which are hard for God to abstain from and hard to endure.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Physicists (two books) [c.180], I.151)
     A reaction: Courage would also be unnecessary, we assume. Good people are not tempted to steal, and hence do not need to resist it. It is a mistake to attribute human virtues to the Divine. Humans lack the virtues of a good frog.
I.163 p.85 God must suffer to understand suffering
     Full Idea: God cannot have a notion of suffering if he has not experience it.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Physicists (two books) [c.180], I.163)
     A reaction: Christians like to portray God as suffering because of his son's horrible death. We can imagine experiences we have never had, and presumably God is better at that than we are.
I.176 p.91 God without virtue is absurd, but God's virtues will be better than God
     Full Idea: If the Divine exists it either has or has not virtue. If it has not it is base and unhappy, which is absurd. But if it has it, there will exist something which is better than God, just as a virtue of a horse is better than the horse itself.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Physicists (two books) [c.180], I.176)
     A reaction: It is obviously better to think of a virtue as some mode of a thing, rather than as a separate attachment. This is an ontological argument, because it is inferred from the concept of God.
I.225 p.113 The incorporeal is not in the nature of body, and so could not emerge from it
     Full Idea: The incorporeal will never come into existence from body because the nature of the incorporeal does not exist in body.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Physicists (two books) [c.180], I.225)
     A reaction: So nothing high could be made of pebbles because pebbles are not high? His argument depends on incorporeality having an intrinsically incorporeal nature. Pebbles have some height which can be extended.
I.269 p.133 Socrates either dies when he exists (before his death) or when he doesn't (after his death)
     Full Idea: Socrates either dies when existing, or when not existing. …He does not die when he exists, for he is alive, and he does not die when he has died, for then he will be dying twice, which is absurd. So then, Socrates does not die.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Physicists (two books) [c.180], I.269)
     A reaction: A nice dramatisation of a major dilemma. The present moment is just the boundary between the past and the future, and so has no magnitude, and hence nothing can occur during the present. Perhaps my favourite philosophical dilemma.
I.343 p.167 Parts are not parts if their whole is nothing more than the parts
     Full Idea: If the whole is nothing more than the sum of the parts, the parts will not be parts.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Physicists (two books) [c.180], I.343)
     A reaction: Nice. Bricks lying on the ground are not parts of a wall. For them to be parts of a wall there has to be a wall which is not just the bricks. Nihilists like Van Inwagen can deny the wall in ontology, but in thought we need walls. Conceptual dependence.
I.392 p.187 If we try to conceive of a line with no breadth, it ceases to exist, and so has no length
     Full Idea: When we have gone so far as to deprive the length of its breadth altogether, we no longer conceive even the length, but along with the removal of the breadth the conception of the length is also removed.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Physicists (two books) [c.180], I.392)
     A reaction: The only explanation of our retaining an understanding of a line even after we have removed its breadth is that we have abandoned experience and conceptualised the line - by idealising it.
II.056 p.239 A man walking backwards on a forwards-moving ship is moving in a fixed place
     Full Idea: If a ship moves forward and a man carries a rod backwards on it, then it is possible for an object to move without quitting its place.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Physicists (two books) [c.180], II.056)
     A reaction: [summary of a verbose paragraph] The point is that you cannot define movement as change of place (contrary to Russell's proposal!). The concept of a place seems to be relative. Walking on a treadmill.
II.062 p.241 Some say motion is perceived by sense, but others say it is by intellect
     Full Idea: Some assert that motion is perceived by sense, but others that it is not perceived at all by sense but by the intellect through sensation.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Physicists (two books) [c.180], II.062)
     A reaction: Descartes' wax argument defends the idea that change is perceived by intellect. The intellect has to distinguish the relative aspect of each motion, such as when someone is walking around on a moving ship. Even sense also need memory.
II.188 p.305 Time doesn't end with the Universe, because tensed statements about destruction remain true
     Full Idea: It is absurd to say that when the Universe is destroyed time does not exist; for the statement that it was destroyed once and that it is being destroyed are indicative of times.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Physicists (two books) [c.180], II.188)
     A reaction: Intriguing. He takes it that a proposition can be true even though nothing exists. This is not merely an affirmation of the tensed A-series view of time, but he even offers tenses as evidence that the A-series is correct. That time could cease was a view.
II.193 p.307 Time is divisible, into past, present and future
     Full Idea: Time cannot be indivisible, since it is divided into past, present and future.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Physicists (two books) [c.180], II.193)
     A reaction: Does the fact that you can name the parts of something prove that it is divisible? Do electrons have left and right-hand sides?
II.201 p.311 If the present is just the limit of the past or the future, it can't exist because they don't exist
     Full Idea: If the present is the limit of the past, and the limit of the past has passed away together with that of which it is the limit, the present no longer exists. And if the present begins the future, which doesn't exist, the present does not yet exist.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Physicists (two books) [c.180], II.201)
     A reaction: If I mark a line on the ground where the wall will begin, the limit seems prior to the object. The gun starts the race, but is not part of it. That said, I cannot think of any more mysterious entity than the present moment. It isn't a line or a bang.
180 Against the Professors (six books)
11.8 p.180 'Man is a rational mortal animal' is equivalent to 'if something is a man, that thing is a rational mortal animal'
     Full Idea: Definitions are identical to universal propositions in meaning, and only differ in syntax, for whoever says 'Man is a rational mortal animal' says the same thing in meaning as whoever says 'If something is a man, that thing is a rational mortal animal'.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Professors (six books) [c.180], 11.8)
     A reaction: How strikingly like Bertrand Russell's interest and solutions. Sextus shows a straightforward interest in logical form, of a kind we associate with the twentieth century. Did Sextus Empiricus invent quantification?
7.158 p.451 Right actions, once done, are those with a reasonable justification
     Full Idea: Right action is whatever, once it has been done, has a reasonable justification.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Professors (six books) [c.180], 7.158)
     A reaction: Why does he add 'once it has been done'? Wouldn't a proposed action be right if it had a reasonable justification? This grows out of the classical and Stoic emphasis on reason in ethics, and leads towards Scanlon's Contractualism.
7.95 p.102 The tektraktys (1+2+3+4=10) is the 'fount of ever-flowing nature'
     Full Idea: The tektraktys (1+2+3+4=10) is the 'fount of ever-flowing nature', because nature is a harmony of three concords (4th,5th and octave), and these ratios (4:3, 3:2, and 2:1) are found in the tektraktys.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Professors (six books) [c.180], 7.95)
8.331a p.249 How can you investigate without some preconception of your object?
     Full Idea: A preconception and conception must precede every object of investigation, for how can anyone even investigate without some conception of the object of investigation?
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Professors (six books) [c.180], 8.331a)
     A reaction: The Duhem-Quine thesis about the 'theory-ladenness of observation' is just a revival of some routine ancient scepticism. As well as a conceptual scheme to accommodate the observation, there must also be some motivation for the investigation.
8.74 p.203 It is only when we say a proposition that we speak truly or falsely
     Full Idea: It is only when we say a proposition that we speak truly or falsely.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Professors (six books) [c.180], 8.74)
     A reaction: This makes assertions truth-bearers, rather than propositions. But a proposition can be true or false if it is stamped with a date and/or place. "Shakespeare was born in Stratford on 23rd April 1664". No one needs to assert that.
180 Outlines of Pyrrhonism
I.101 p.46 Water that seems lukewarm can seem very hot on inflamed skin
     Full Idea: The same water which seems very hot when poured on inflamed spots seems lukewarm to us.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.101)
I.103 p.46 Sickness is perfectly natural to the sick, so their natural perceptions should carry some weight
     Full Idea: Health is natural for the healthy but unnatural for the sick, and sickness is unnatural for the healthy but natural for the sick, so we must give credence to the natural perceptions of the sick.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.103)
I.109 p.48 Some actions seem shameful when sober but not when drunk
     Full Idea: Actions which seem shameful to us when sober do not seem shameful when drunk.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.109)
I.119 p.51 The same oar seems bent in water and straight when out of it
     Full Idea: The same oar seems bent when in the water but straight when out of the water.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.119)
I.12 p.19 The basis of scepticism is the claim that every proposition has an equal opposing proposition
     Full Idea: The main basic principle of the sceptic system is that of opposing to every proposition an equal proposition.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.12)
I.120 p.51 The necks of doves appear different in colour depending on the angle of viewing
     Full Idea: The necks of doves appear different in hue according to the differences in the angle of inclination.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.120)
I.20 p.22 Whether honey is essentially sweet may be doubted, as it is a matter of judgement rather than appearance
     Full Idea: Honey appears to sceptics to be sweet, but whether it is also sweet in its essence is for us a matter of doubt, since this is not an appearance but a judgement.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.20)
I.32 p.26 The same tower appears round from a distance, but square close at hand
     Full Idea: The same tower appears round from a distance, but square close at hand.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.32)
I.47 p.30 If we press the side of an eyeball, objects appear a different shape
     Full Idea: When we press the eyeball at one side the forms, figures and sizes of the objects appear oblong and narrow.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.47)
I.59 p.33 How can we judge between our impressions and those of other animals, when we ourselves are involved?
     Full Idea: We cannot judge between our own impressions and those of other animals, because we ourselves are involved in the dispute.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.59)
I.80 p.39 If we enjoy different things, presumably we receive different impressions
     Full Idea: The enjoyment of different things is an indication that we get varying impressions from the underlying objects.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.80)
I.96 p.44 If we had no hearing or sight, we would assume no sound or sight exists, so there may be unsensed qualities
     Full Idea: A man with touch, taste and smell, but no hearing or sight, will assume nothing audible or visible exists, so maybe an apple has qualities which we have no senses to perceive.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.96)
II.109 p.132 If we utter three steps of a logical argument, they never exist together
     Full Idea: If we say "If day exists, lights exists", and then "day exists", and then "light exists", then parts of the judgement never exist together, and so the whole judgement will have no real existence.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], II.109)
II.110 p.132 A valid hypothetical syllogism is 'that which does not begin with a truth and end with a falsehood'
     Full Idea: Philo (of Megara) says that a valid hypothetical syllogism is 'that which does not begin with a truth and end with a falsehood,' as for instance the syllogism 'If it is day, I converse,' when in fact it is day and I am conversing.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], II.110)
     A reaction: Russell endorses this, and Rumfitt quotes it as the classic case of denying that there is any modal aspect (such as 'logical necessity') involved in logical consequence. He labels it 'material or Philonian consequence'.
II.135 p.141 Proof moves from agreed premises to a non-evident inference
     Full Idea: Dogmatists define proof as "an argument which, by means of agreed premises, reveals by way of deduction a nonevident inference".
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], II.135)
II.204 p.164 If you don't view every particular, you may miss the one which disproves your universal induction
     Full Idea: Induction cannot establish the universal by means of the particular, since limited particulars may omit crucial examples which disprove the universal, and infinite particulars are impossible to know.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], II.204)
II.215 p.168 You cannot divide anything into many parts, because after the first division you are no longer dividing the original
     Full Idea: You cannot divide anything (such as the decad) into many parts, because as soon as you separate the first part, you are no longer dividing the original.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], II.215)
II.252 p.182 If an argument has an absurd conclusion, we should not assent to the absurdity, but avoid the absurd argument
     Full Idea: If an argument leads to confessedly absurd conclusions, we should not assent to the absurdity just because of the argument, but avoid the argument because of the absurdity.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], II.252)
     A reaction: cf. G.E.Moore. Denying that you have a hand seems to be an absurdity, but I'm not sure if I can give a criterion for absurdity in such a case. One person's modus ponens is another person's modus tollens.
II.258 p.184 We distinguish ambiguities by seeing what is useful
     Full Idea: It is the experience of what is useful in each affair that brings about the distinguishing of ambiguities.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], II.258)
II.75 p.120 How can the intellect know if sensation is reliable if it doesn't directly see external objects?
     Full Idea: Just as you can't know if a portrait of Socrates is good without seeing the man, so when the intellect gazes on sensations but not the external objects it cannot know whether they are similar.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], II.75)
III.111 p.226 Since Socrates either died when he was alive (a contradiction) or died when he was dead (meaningless), he didn't die
     Full Idea: If Socrates died, he died either when he lived or when he died; so he was either dead when he was alive, or he was twice dead when he was dead. So he didn't die.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.111)
     A reaction: One of my favourites. Of all the mysteries facing us, the one that boggles me most is how anything can happen in the 'present' moment, if the present is just the overlap point between past and future.
III.14 p.191 Some say that causes are physical, some say not
     Full Idea: Some affirm cause to be corporeal, some incorporeal.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.14)
III.141 p.236 If motion and rest are abolished, so is time
     Full Idea: Since time does not seem to subsist without motion or even rest, if motion is abolished, and likewise rest, time is abolished.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.141)
III.142 p.236 Time must be unlimited, but past and present can't be non-existent, and can't be now, so time does not exist
     Full Idea: There can't be a time when there was no time, so time is not limited; but unlimited time means past and present are non-existent (so time is limited to the present), or they exist (which means they are present). Time does not exist.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.142)
III.143 p.236 How can time be divisible if we can't compare one length of time with another?
     Full Idea: Time is clearly divisible (into past, present and future), but it can't be, because a divisible thing is measured by some part of itself (divisions of length), but the two parts must coincide to make the measurement (e.g. present must coincide with past).
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.143)
III.15 p.191 Causes are either equal to the effect, or they link equally with other causes, or they contribute slightly
     Full Idea: The majority say causes are immediate (when they are directly proportional to effects), or associate (making an equal contribution to effects), or cooperant (making a slight contribution).
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.15)
III.18 p.193 If there were no causes then everything would have been randomly produced by everything
     Full Idea: If causes were non-existent everything would have been produced by everything, and at random.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.18)
III.203 p.257 With us it is shameful for men to wear earrings, but among Syrians it is considered noble
     Full Idea: It is a shameful thing with us for men to wear earrings, but among some of the barbarians, such as the Syrians, it is a token of nobility.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.203)
III.21 p.193 Knowing an effect results from a cause means knowing that the cause belongs with the effect, which is circular
     Full Idea: To know an effect belongs to a cause, we must also know that that cause belongs to that effect, and this is circular.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.21)
III.234 p.267 Even if all known nations agree on a practice, there may be unknown nations which disagree
     Full Idea: Even among practices on which all known cultures are agreed, disagreement about them may possibly exist amongst some of the nations which are unknown to us.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.234)
III.27 p.196 Cause can't exist before effect, or exist at the same time, so it doesn't exist
     Full Idea: If cause neither subsists before its effect, nor subsists along with it, nor does the effect precede the cause, it would seem that it has no substantial existence at all.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.27)
III.3 p.187 How can we agree on the concept of God, unless we agree on his substance or form or place?
     Full Idea: How shall we be able to reach a conception of God when we have no agreement about his substance or his form or his place of abode?
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.3)
III.6 p.188 The existence of God can't be self-evident or everyone would have agreed on it, so it needs demonstration
     Full Idea: The existence of God is not pre-evident, for if it was the dogmatists would have agreed about it, whereas their disagreements show it is non-evident, and in need of demonstration.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.6)
III.68 p.212 Does the original self-mover push itself from behind, or pull itself from in front?
     Full Idea: Self-movement must move in some particular direction, but if it pushes it will be behind itself, and if it pulls it will be in front of itself.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.68)
     A reaction: This is the same as Aquinas's First Way of proving God's existence.
III.76 p.215 If time and place are infinitely divided, it becomes impossible for movement ever to begin
     Full Idea: If bodies, and the places and times when they are said to move, are divided into infinity, motion will not occur, it being impossible to find anything which will initiate the first movement.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.76)
III.77 p.215 If all atoms, times and places are the same, everything should move with equal velocity
     Full Idea: If objects are reducible to atoms, and each thing passes in an atomic time with its own first atom into an atomic point of space, then all moving things are of equal velocity.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.77)
III.9 p.189 If God foresaw evil he would presumably prevent it, and if he only foresees some things, why those things?
     Full Idea: If God had forethought for all, there would be no evil in the world, yet they say the world is full of evil. And if he forethinks some things, why those and not others?
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.9)