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Ideas of Sydney Shoemaker, by Text

[American, b.1931, Professor at Cornell University.]

1959 Personal Identity and Memory
§4 p.127 1389 If memory is the sole criterion of identity, we ought to use it for other people too
§5 p.129 1390 Bodily identity is one criterion and memory another, for personal identity [PG]
1969 Time Without Change
p.247 4226 If three regions 'freeze' every three, four and five years, after sixty years everything stops for a year [Lowe]
p.52 p.52 8593 Maybe billions of changeless years have elapsed since my last meal
p.54 p.54 8594 People have had good reasons for thinking that the circle has been squared
p.56 p.56 8595 If three regions freeze every 3rd, 4th and 5th year, they all freeze together every 60 years
p.58 p.58 8596 Inability to measure equality doesn't make all lengths unequal
p.59 p.59 8597 We couldn't verify the earth's rotation if everyone simultaneously fell asleep
p.63 p.63 8598 If things turn red for an hour and then explode, we wouldn't say the redness was the cause
1980 Causality and Properties
p.53 9485 Universals concern how things are, and how they could be [Bird]
p.56 12678 Shoemaker says all genuine properties are dispositional [Ellis]
§01 p.207 8542 If causality is between events, there must be reference to the properties involved
§02 p.207 8543 Genuine properties are closely related to genuine changes
§02 p.209 15756 Some truths are not because of a thing's properties, but because of the properties of related things
§02 p.209 8545 A causal theory of properties focuses on change, not (say) on abstract properties of numbers
§03 p.210 15757 'Square', 'round' and 'made of copper' show that not all properties are dispositional
§03 p.211 15758 Things have powers in virtue of (which are entailed by) their properties
§03 p.211 8547 One power can come from different properties; a thing's powers come from its properties
§03 p.211 8548 Dispositional predicates ascribe powers, and the rest ascribe properties
§04 p.212 8549 Properties are functions producing powers, and powers are functions producing effects
§04 p.212 15759 The identity of a property concerns its causal powers
§04 p.213 15760 Properties are clusters of conditional powers
§04 p.214 15761 We should abandon the idea that properties are the meanings of predicate expressions
§04 p.214 8550 Triangular and trilateral are coextensive, but different concepts; but powers and properties are the same
§05 p.214 8551 Properties must be essentially causal if we can know and speak about them
§05 p.215 15762 Could properties change without the powers changing, or powers change without the properties changing?
§05 p.216 8552 If properties are separated from causal powers, this invites total elimination
§05 p.217 8553 It looks as if the immutability of the powers of a property imply essentiality
§05 p.218 8555 There is no subset of properties which guarantee a thing's identity
§05 p.218 8554 Possible difference across worlds depends on difference across time in the actual world
§06 p.219 8556 Grueness is not, unlike green and blue, associated with causal potential
§06 p.220 8557 To ascertain genuine properties, examine the object directly
§07 p.222 4040 The notions of property and of causal power are parts of a single system of related concepts
§07 p.222 8558 One system has properties, powers, events, similarity and substance
§07 p.222 8559 Analysis aims at internal relationships, not reduction
§08 p.222 8560 If causal laws describe causal potentialities, the same laws govern properties in all possible worlds
§09 p.225 15763 If properties are causal, then causal necessity is a species of logical necessity
§09 p.226 8561 If a world has different causal laws, it must have different properties
§10 p.231 8562 It is possible to conceive what is not possible
§10 p.231 15764 'Conceivable' is either not-provably-false, or compatible with what we know?
§11 p.233 15765 Actually, properties are individuated by causes as well as effects
I p.409 15092 Formerly I said properties are individuated by essential causal powers and causing instantiation [Shoemaker]
1994 Introspection
p.395 p.395 5687 For true introspection, must we be aware that we are aware of our mental events?
p.396 p.396 5688 Empirical foundationalism says basic knowledge is self-intimating, and incorrigible or infallible
p.398 p.398 5691 The adverbial account of sensation says not 'see a red image' but be 'appeared to redly'
1998 Causal and Metaphysical Necessity
I p.408 15091 Restrict 'logical truth' to formal logic, rather than including analytic and metaphysical truths
I p.409 15093 We might say laws are necessary by combining causal properties with Armstrong-Dretske-Tooley laws
III p.412 15094 I now deny that properties are cluster of powers, and take causal properties as basic
III p.413 15096 'Grue' only has causal features because of its relation to green
III p.413 15095 A property's causal features are essential, and only they fix its identity
III p.415 15097 I claim that a property has its causal features in all possible worlds
VI p.423 15099 If something is possible, but not nomologically possible, we need metaphysical possibility
VI p.423 15098 Empirical evidence shows that imagining a phenomenon can show it is possible
VI p.424 15100 Imagination reveals conceptual possibility, where descriptions avoid contradiction or incoherence
VII p.425 15101 Once you give up necessity as a priori, causal necessity becomes the main type of necessity
1999 Self, Body and Coincidence
p.297 p.3 14534 Shoemaker moved from properties as powers to properties bestowing powers [Mumford/Anjum]