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Ideas of Scott Soames, by Text
[American, fl. 1987, Professor at Princeton University, then University of Southern California.]
2006
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Significance of the Kripkean Nec A Posteriori
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p.166
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p.166
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13966
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Analytic philosophy loved the necessary a priori analytic, linguistic modality, and rigour
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p.167
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p.167
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13968
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Kripkean possible worlds are abstract maximal states in which the real world could have been
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p.168 n5
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p.168
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13969
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Kripkean essential properties and relations are necessary, in all genuinely possible worlds
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p.183
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p.183
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13972
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Two-dimensionalism reinstates descriptivism, and reconnects necessity and apriority to analyticity
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p.186
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p.186
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13973
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A key achievement of Kripke is showing that important modalities are not linguistic in source
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p.186
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p.186
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13974
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If philosophy is analysis of meaning, available to all competent speakers, what's left for philosophers?
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2008
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Why Propositions Aren't Truth-Supporting Circumstance
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p.74
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p.74
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13964
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Semantic content is a proposition made of sentence constituents (not some set of circumstances)
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p.78
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p.78
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13965
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Semantics as theory of meaning and semantics as truth-based logical consequence are very different
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2010
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Philosophy of Language
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Intro
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p.1
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15152
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To study meaning, study truth conditions, on the basis of syntax, and representation by the parts
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Intro
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p.2
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15153
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Tarski's account of truth-conditions is too weak to determine meanings
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Intro
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p.3
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15154
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We should use cognitive states to explain representational propositions, not vice versa
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1.22
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p.23
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15156
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The universal and existential quantifiers were chosen to suit mathematics
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1.22
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p.24
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15157
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Recognising the definite description 'the man' as a quantifier phrase, not a singular term, is a real insight
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1.23
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p.24
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15158
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Indefinite descriptions are quantificational in subject position, but not in predicate position
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3.1
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p.53
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15161
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There are more metaphysically than logically necessary truths
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3.1
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p.53
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15162
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We understand metaphysical necessity intuitively, from ordinary life
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3.1
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p.54
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15163
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The interest of quantified modal logic is its metaphysical necessity and essentialism
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