| 2006 | Significance of the Kripkean Nec A Posteriori |
| p.166 | p.166 | 13966 | Analytic philosophy loved the necessary a priori analytic, linguistic modality, and rigour |
| p.167 | p.167 | 13967 | Kripke's essentialist necessary a posteriori opened the gap between conceivable and really possible |
| p.167 | p.167 | 13968 | Kripkean possible worlds are abstract maximal states in which the real world could have been |
| p.168 | p.168 | 13970 | Kripke gets to the necessary a posteriori by only allowing conceivability when combined with actuality |
| p.168 n5 | p.168 | 13969 | Kripkean essential properties and relations are necessary, in all genuinely possible worlds |
| p.180 | p.180 | 13971 | Kripke claims that some properties, only knowable posteriori, are known a priori to be essential |
| p.183 | p.183 | 13972 | Two-dimensionalism reinstates descriptivism, and reconnects necessity and apriority to analyticity |
| p.186 | p.186 | 13974 | If philosophy is analysis of meaning, available to all competent speakers, what's left for philosophers? |
| p.186 | p.186 | 13973 | A key achievement of Kripke is showing that important modalities are not linguistic in source |
| p.187 | p.187 | 13975 | Kripke was more successful in illuminating necessity than a priority (and their relations to analyticity) |
| 2008 | Why Propositions Aren't Truth-Supporting Circumstance |
| p.74 | p.74 | 13964 | Semantic content is a proposition made of sentence constituents (not some set of circumstances) |
| p.78 | p.78 | 13965 | Semantics as theory of meaning and semantics as truth-based logical consequence are very different |
| 2010 | Philosophy of Language |
| Intro | p.1 | 15152 | To study meaning, study truth conditions, on the basis of syntax, and representation by the parts |
| Intro | p.2 | 15153 | Tarski's account of truth-conditions is too weak to determine meanings |
| Intro | p.3 | 15154 | We should use cognitive states to explain representational propositions, not vice versa |
| 1.22 | p.23 | 15156 | The universal and existential quantifiers were chosen to suit mathematics |
| 1.22 | p.24 | 15157 | Recognising the definite description 'the man' as a quantifier phrase, not a singular term, is a real insight |
| 1.23 | p.24 | 15158 | Indefinite descriptions are quantificational in subject position, but not in predicate position |
| 3.1 | p.53 | 15162 | We understand metaphysical necessity intuitively, from ordinary life |
| 3.1 | p.53 | 15161 | There are more metaphysically than logically necessary truths |
| 3.1 | p.54 | 15163 | The interest of quantified modal logic is its metaphysical necessity and essentialism |