| 1950 | On Referring |
| p.37 | 6413 | 'The present King of France is bald' presupposes existence, rather than stating it | |
| Full Idea: Strawson argues that in saying 'the present King of France is bald' one is not stating that a present King of France exists, but presupposing or assuming that it does. | |||
| From: report of Peter F. Strawson (On Referring [1950]) by A.C. Grayling - Russell Ch.2 | |||
| A reaction: We have the notion of a leading question, such as 'when did you stop beating your wife?' But is a presupposition not simply an implied claim, as Russell said it was? |
| p.402 | 10430 | Reference is mainly a social phenomenon | |
| Full Idea: Strawson's early work gave a new direction to the study of reference by stressing that it is a social phenomenon. | |||
| From: report of Peter F. Strawson (On Referring [1950]) by Mark Sainsbury - The Essence of Reference 18.2 | |||
| A reaction: The question is whether speakers refer, or sentences, or expressions, or propositions. The modern consensus seems to be that some parts of language are inherently referring, but speakers combine such tools with context. Sounds right. |
| p.535 | 10448 | If an expression can refer to anything, it may still instrinsically refer, but relative to a context | |
| Full Idea: Strawson claimed that virtually any expression that can be used to refer to one thing in one context can be used to refer to something else in another context. Maybe expressions still refer, but only relative to a context. | |||
| From: comment on Peter F. Strawson (On Referring [1950]) by Kent Bach - What Does It Take to Refer? 22.2 | |||
| A reaction: If there is complete freedom, then Bach's criticism doesn't sound plausible. If something is semantically referential, that should impose pretty tight restrictions on speakers. Why distinguish names as intrinsically referential, and descriptions as not? |
| §1 | p.65 | 8354 | Russell asks when 'The King of France is wise' would be a true assertion |
| Full Idea: The way in which Russell arrived at his analysis was by asking himself what would be the circumstances in which we would say that anyone who uttered the sentence 'The King of France is wise' had made a true assertion. | |||
| From: Peter F. Strawson (On Referring [1950], §1) | |||
| A reaction: This seems to connect Russell's theory of definite descriptions with the truth conditions theory of meaning which is associated (initially) with Frege. Truth will require some reference to what actually exists. |
| §2 | p.68 | 8355 | Expressions don't refer; people use expressions to refer |
| Full Idea: 'Mentioning', or 'referring', is not something an expression does; it is something that someone can use an expression to do. | |||
| From: Peter F. Strawson (On Referring [1950], §2) | |||
| A reaction: That can't be whole story, because I might make a mistake when referring, so that I used the expression to refer to x, but unfortunately the words themselves referred to y. The power of language exceeds the intentions of speakers. |
| §2 | p.68 | 8356 | The meaning of an expression or sentence is general directions for its use, to refer or to assert |
| Full Idea: To give the meaning of an expression is to give general directions for its use to refer to or mention particular objects or persons; in like manner, sentences are for use to make true or false assertions. | |||
| From: Peter F. Strawson (On Referring [1950], §2) | |||
| A reaction: The influence of Wittgenstein? I don't like it. The general idea that you can say what something is by giving directions for its use is what I think of as the Functional Fallacy: confusing the role of x with its inherent nature. Shirt as goalpost. |
| §2 | p.70 | 8357 | If an utterance fails to refer then it is a pseudo-use, though a speaker may think they assert something |
| Full Idea: If an utterance is not talking about anything, then the speaker's use is not a genuine one, but a spurious or pseudo-use; he is not making either a true or a false assertion, though he may think he is. | |||
| From: Peter F. Strawson (On Referring [1950], §2) | |||
| A reaction: This is Strawson's verdict on 'The present King of France is bald'. His view puts speculative statements in no man's land. What do we make of 'Elvis lives' or 'phlogiston explains fire'? |
| §5 | p.85 | 8358 | There are no rules for the exact logic of ordinary language, because that doesn't exist |
| Full Idea: Neither Aristotelian nor Russellian rules give the exact logic of any expression of ordinary language; for ordinary language has no exact logic. | |||
| From: Peter F. Strawson (On Referring [1950], §5) | |||
| A reaction: This seems to imply that it is impossible to find precise logical forms, because of the pragmatic element in language, but I don't see why. Even more extreme modern pragmatics (where meaning is shifted) doesn't rule out precise underlying propositions. |
| 1950 | Truth |
| §1 | p.449 | 10841 | The word 'true' always refers to a possible statement |
| Full Idea: It is of prime importance to distinguish the fact that the use of 'true' always glances backwards or forwards to the actual or envisaged making of a statement by someone. | |||
| From: Peter F. Strawson (Truth [1950], §1) | |||
| A reaction: 'The truth of this matter will never be known'. Strawson is largely right, but it is crazy for any philosopher to use the word 'always' if they can possibly avoid it. |
| §2 | p.452 | 10842 | The fact which is stated by a true sentence is not something in the world |
| Full Idea: The fact which is stated by a true sentence is not something in the world. | |||
| From: Peter F. Strawson (Truth [1950], §2) | |||
| A reaction: Everything is in the world. This may just be a quibble over how we should use the word 'fact'. At some point the substance of what is stated in a sentence must eventually be out there, or we would never act on what we say. |
| §2 | p.453 | 10843 | Facts aren't exactly true statements, but they are what those statements say |
| Full Idea: Facts are what statements (when true) state; they are not what statements are about. ..But it would be wrong to identify 'fact' and 'true statement' for these expressions have different roles in our language. | |||
| From: Peter F. Strawson (Truth [1950], §2) | |||
| A reaction: Personally I like to reserve the word 'facts' for what is out there, independent of any human thought or speech. As a realist, I believe that the facts are quite independent of our attempts to understand the facts. True statements attempt to state facts. |
| §2 | p.453 | 10844 | The statement that it is raining perfectly fits the fact that it is raining |
| Full Idea: What could fit more perfectly the fact that it is raining than the statement that it is raining? | |||
| From: Peter F. Strawson (Truth [1950], §2) |
| 1959 | Individuals:Essay in Descript Metaphysics |
| Intro | p.9 | 7920 | Descriptive metaphysics aims at actual structure, revisionary metaphysics at a better structure |
| Full Idea: Descriptive metaphysics (e.g. Aristotle and Kant) is content to describe the actual structure of our thought about the world; revisionary metaphysics (e.g. Descartes, Leibniz, Berkeley) is concerned to produce a better structure. | |||
| From: Peter F. Strawson (Individuals:Essay in Descript Metaphysics [1959], Intro) | |||
| A reaction: This distinction by Strawson was incredibly helpful in reinstating metaphysics as a feasible activity. I don't want to abandon the revisionary version. We can hammer the current metaphysics into a more efficient shape, or even create new concepts. |
| Intro | p.9 | 7921 | Close examination of actual word usage is the only sure way in philosophy |
| Full Idea: Up to a point, the reliance upon a close examination of the actual use of words is the best, and indeed the only sure, way in philosophy. | |||
| From: Peter F. Strawson (Individuals:Essay in Descript Metaphysics [1959], Intro) | |||
| A reaction: Probably the last bold assertion of ordinary language philosophy, though Strawson goes on the defend his 'deeper' version of the activity, which he says is 'descriptive metaphysics', rather than mere 'analysis'. Mere verbal analysis now looks hopeless. |
| Intro | p.10 | 7922 | Descriptive metaphysics concerns unchanging core concepts and categories |
| Full Idea: Descriptive metaphysics is primarily concerned with categories and concepts which, in their fundamental character, change not at all. They are the commonplaces of the least refined thinking, and the indispensable core for the most sophisticated humans. | |||
| From: Peter F. Strawson (Individuals:Essay in Descript Metaphysics [1959], Intro) | |||
| A reaction: This seems to be the basic premise for a modern metaphysician such as E.J.Lowe, though such thinkers are not averse to suggesting clarifications of our conceptual scheme. The aim must be good foundations for a successful edifice of knowledge. |
| 3.4 | p.100 | 9282 | I can only apply consciousness predicates to myself if I can apply them to others |
| Full Idea: One can ascribed states of consciousness to oneself only if one can ascribe them to others. One can ascribe them to others only if one can identify other subjects of experience, and they cannot be identified only as subjects of experience. | |||
| From: Peter F. Strawson (Individuals:Essay in Descript Metaphysics [1959], 3.4) | |||
| A reaction: A neat linguistic twist on the analogy argument, but rather dubious, if it is actually meant to prove that other minds exist. It is based on his view of predicates - see Idea 9281. If the rest of humanity are zombies, why would I not apply them? |
| 3.4 | p.101 | 9263 | A person is an entity to which we can ascribe predicates of consciousness and corporeality |
| Full Idea: What I mean by the concept of a person is the concept of a type of entity such that both predicates ascribing states of consciousness and predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics are equally applicable to a single individual of that single type. | |||
| From: Peter F. Strawson (Individuals:Essay in Descript Metaphysics [1959], 3.4) | |||
| A reaction: As Frankfurt points out, merely requiring the entity to be 'conscious' is a grossly inadequate definition of what we mean by a person, which is typically a being that is self-aware and capable of rational decisions between alternatives. |
| 3.4 n1 | p.99 | 9281 | The idea of a predicate matches a range of things to which it can be applied |
| Full Idea: The idea of a predicate is correlative with a range of distinguishable individuals of which the predicate can be significantly, though not necessarily truly, affirmed. | |||
| From: Peter F. Strawson (Individuals:Essay in Descript Metaphysics [1959], 3.4 n1) | |||
| A reaction: Said to be one of Strawson's most important ideas. The idea is that you understand a predicate if you understand its range, not just a one-off application. So you must understand the implied universal, whatever that is. |
| 1978 | Entity and Identity |
| I | p.34 | 16979 | It makes no sense to ask of some individual thing what it is that makes it that individual |
| Full Idea: For no object is there a unique character or relation by which it must be identified if it is to be identified at all. This is why it makes no sense to ask, impersonally and in general, of some individual object what makes it the individual object it is. | |||
| From: Peter F. Strawson (Entity and Identity [1978], I) | |||
| A reaction: He links this remark with the claim that there is no individual essence, but he seems to view an individual essence as indispensable to recognition or individuation of the object, which I don't see. Recognise it first, work out its essence later. |
| I n4 | p.38 | 16980 | We need a logical use of 'object' as predicate-worthy, and an 'ontological' use |
| Full Idea: There is a good case for a conservative reform of the word 'object'. Objects in the 'logical' sense would be all predicate-worthy identifiabilia whatever. Objects in the 'ontological' sense would form one ontological category among many others. | |||
| From: Peter F. Strawson (Entity and Identity [1978], I n4) | |||
| A reaction: This ambiguity has caused me no end of confusion (and irritation!). I wish philosophers wouldn't hijack perfectly good English words and give them weird meanings. Nice to have a distinguished fellow like Strawson make this suggestion. |