idea number gives full details.     |    back to list of philosophers     |     expand these ideas

Ideas of Chris Swoyer, by Text

[American, fl. 2000, Professor at the University of Oklahoma.]

2000 Properties
p.2 If a property such as self-identity can only be in one thing, it can't be a universal
1.1 p.3 Conceptualism says words like 'honesty' refer to concepts, not to properties
1.2 p.5 The F and G of logic cover a huge range of natural language combinations
2.2 p.8 Various attempts are made to evade universals being wholly present in different places
2.2 p.8 If properties are abstract objects, then their being abstract exemplifies being abstract
2.3 p.9 Extreme empiricists can hardly explain anything
4.1 p.16 In the iterative conception of sets, they form a natural hierarchy
4.1 p.18 One might hope to reduce possible worlds to properties
4.2 p.19 Logical Form explains differing logical behaviour of similar sentences
4.2 p.23 Intensions are functions which map possible worlds to sets of things denoted by an expression
4.2 p.25 Research suggests that concepts rely on typical examples
4.2 p.28 Anti-realists can't explain different methods to measure distance
4.2 p.30 Two properties can have one power, and one property can have two powers
4.2 p.32 If laws are mere regularities, they give no grounds for future prediction
6 p.41 The best-known candidate for an identity condition for properties is necessary coextensiveness
6.4 p.42 Can properties have parts?
7.1 p.44 There are only first-order properties ('red'), and none of higher-order ('coloured')
7.17 p.51 Supervenience is nowadays seen as between properties, rather than linguistic
7.4 p.45 If relations can be reduced to, or supervene on, monadic properties of relata, they are not real
7.6 p.46 Maybe a proposition is just a property with all its places filled
2008 Abstract Entities
1.1 p.14 Some abstract things have a beginning and end, so may exist in time (though not space)
2.1 p.17 Quantum field theory suggests that there are, fundamentally, no individual things
3 p.22 Ontologists seek existence and identity conditions, and modal and epistemic status for a thing
3 p.24 Can properties exemplify other properties?