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Ideas of Chris Swoyer, by Text
[American, fl. 2000, Professor at the University of Oklahoma.]
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p.2
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10399
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If a property such as self-identity can only be in one thing, it can't be a universal
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1.1
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p.3
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10400
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Conceptualism says words like 'honesty' refer to concepts, not to properties
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1.2
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p.5
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10401
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The F and G of logic cover a huge range of natural language combinations
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2.2
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p.8
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10402
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Various attempts are made to evade universals being wholly present in different places
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2.2
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p.8
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10403
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If properties are abstract objects, then their being abstract exemplifies being abstract
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2.3
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p.9
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10404
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Extreme empiricists can hardly explain anything
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4.1
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p.16
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10405
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In the iterative conception of sets, they form a natural hierarchy
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4.1
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p.18
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10406
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One might hope to reduce possible worlds to properties
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4.2
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p.19
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10407
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Logical Form explains differing logical behaviour of similar sentences
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4.2
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p.23
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10408
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Intensions are functions which map possible worlds to sets of things denoted by an expression
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4.2
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p.25
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10409
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Research suggests that concepts rely on typical examples
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4.2
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p.28
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10410
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Anti-realists can't explain different methods to measure distance
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4.2
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p.30
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10411
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Two properties can have one power, and one property can have two powers
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4.2
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p.32
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10412
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If laws are mere regularities, they give no grounds for future prediction
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6
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p.41
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10413
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The best-known candidate for an identity condition for properties is necessary coextensiveness
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6.4
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p.42
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10416
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Can properties have parts?
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7.1
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p.44
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10417
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There are only first-order properties ('red'), and none of higher-order ('coloured')
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7.17
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p.51
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10421
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Supervenience is nowadays seen as between properties, rather than linguistic
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7.6
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p.46
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10420
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Maybe a proposition is just a property with all its places filled
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1.1
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p.14
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14592
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Some abstract things have a beginning and end, so may exist in time (though not space)
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2.1
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p.17
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14593
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Quantum field theory suggests that there are, fundamentally, no individual things
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3
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p.22
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14594
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Ontologists seek existence and identity conditions, and modal and epistemic status for a thing
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3
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p.24
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14595
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Can properties exemplify other properties?
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