| 1979 | Atomism |
| p.374 | 23417 | If the state is neutral, there won't be sufficient community to support a welfare state | |
| Full Idea: Charles Taylor says the neutral [liberal] state undermines the sense of community which is required for citizens to accept the sacrifices demanded by the welfare state. | |||
| From: report of Charles Taylor (Atomism [1979]) by Will Kymlicka - Community 'legitimacy' | |||
| A reaction: As someone who believes in the welfare state, I think this is correct. Extreme individualistic liberalism is incompatible with a welfare state. A liberal society needs institutions which draw free individuals into the community. |
| p.29 | p.29 | 22809 | The social contract sees society as constituted by and for individuals |
| Full Idea: The social contract theory …has a vision of society as in some sense constituted by individuals for the fulfilment of ends which are primarily individual. | |||
| From: Charles Taylor (Atomism [1979], p.29) | |||
| A reaction: It seems to be initiated by individuals who are only motivated by what is in it for them. This presumes self-sufficient adults, rather than children, or parents with children, or dependent people. The epitome of liberalism, perhaps. |
| p.33 | p.33 | 22811 | Assigning a right based on a human capacity implies that the capacity should be developed |
| Full Idea: It would be incomprehensible and incoherent to ascribe rights to human beings in respect of the specifically human capacities (such as the right to beliefs or life-style) while at the same time denying that those capacities ought to be developed. | |||
| From: Charles Taylor (Atomism [1979], p.33) | |||
| A reaction: Developed by whom? The agent, their family, or the state? At what point has someone got a capacity, with no further requirement to develop it? Taylor pulls rather large rabbits out of small hats. |
| p.33 | p.33 | 22810 | A right is not just a rule, but also asserts certain ideas of moral worth |
| Full Idea: Asserting a right is more than issuing an injunction. It has an essential conceptual background, in some notion of the moral worth of certain properties or capacities, without which it would not make. | |||
| From: Charles Taylor (Atomism [1979], p.33) | |||
| A reaction: A simple right may arise from a contract, which could be quite trivial, and of no moral importance. The winner of the egg and spoon race has a right to the prize, which is an ice cream. I think he means legal rights in a state. |
| p.40 | p.40 | 22812 | For most people the primacy of rights mainly concerns freedom |
| Full Idea: Most of those who want to affirm the primacy of rights are more interested in asserting the right of freedom, and in a sense which can only be attributed to humans. | |||
| From: Charles Taylor (Atomism [1979], p.40) | |||
| A reaction: This is probably more pronounced in North America than in Europe. It may be that without freedom a lot of the other rights are impossible. |
| p.41 | p.41 | 22813 | Property is not essential for life, but it may be essential for independence |
| Full Idea: It is standardly said that we need the right to property as an essential underpinning of life, but this is patently not true. …In reality it is actually seen as an essential part of a life of independence. | |||
| From: Charles Taylor (Atomism [1979], p.41) | |||
| A reaction: Hence it has a high value for liberals, for whom an independent life is the prime social aspiration. The law of trespass will define the degree of independence provided by property. |
| p.42 | p.42 | 22814 | Our reliance on other people close to us does not imply any political obligations |
| Full Idea: We must all be nurtures by others as children, and we only flourish as adults in relationship with friends, mates, children and so on. But this has nothing to do with any obligation to belong to political society. | |||
| From: Charles Taylor (Atomism [1979], p.42) | |||
| A reaction: He is defending community, but not at that minimal human level. Political obligations follows from our need for a wider society, to achieve justice, education, travel, health etc. There are no rights without a society |
| p.47 | p.47 | 22815 | If freedom depends on society and culture, the greatest freedom is in shaping them |
| Full Idea: If realising our freedom partly depends on the society and culture in which we live, then we exercise a fuller freedom if we can help determine the shape of this society and culture. | |||
| From: Charles Taylor (Atomism [1979], p.47) | |||
| A reaction: This is clearly in response to the critics of communitarianism who say that it is too conservative, because your values are created for you, by your community. |
| 1989 | Sources of the Self |
| §1.1 | p.3 | 4003 | Selfhood and moral values are inextricably intertwined |
| Full Idea: Selfhood and the good, or in another way selfhood and morality, turn out to be inextricably intertwined. | |||
| From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], §1.1) | |||
| A reaction: This seems an inevitable convergence of three centuries of thought about personal identity and morality. |
| §1.1 | p.7 | 4004 | Consistency presupposes intrinsic description |
| Full Idea: The issue of consistency presupposes intrinsic description. | |||
| From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], §1.1) | |||
| A reaction: This may be the key criticism of Kant. The so-called 'maxim' of an action can be almost infinitely re-expressed to suit the agent. |
| §1.1 | p.8 | 4005 | To have respect for people, you must feel their claims, or their injustices, or hold them in awe |
| Full Idea: If you want to discriminate more finely what makes humans worthy of respect, you must call to mind the claim of human suffering, or what is repugnant about justice, or the awe you feel about human life. | |||
| From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], §1.1) | |||
| A reaction: A persuasive part of the claim that such feelings are inseparable from thinking about people in any way at all. |
| §2.3 | p.50 | 4006 | I can only be aware of myself as a person who changes by means of my personal history |
| Full Idea: As a being who grows and becomes I can only know myself through the history of my maturations and regressions, overcomings and defeats. | |||
| From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], §2.3) | |||
| A reaction: An important insight. My immediate sense of self makes my personal history central, not an extra. But a history must be a history OF something. |
| §3.3 | p.82 | 4009 | Nominalists defended the sovereignty of God against the idea of natural existing good and evil |
| Full Idea: Late medieval nominalism defended the sovereignty of God as incompatible with there being an order in nature which by itself defined good and bad. | |||
| From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], §3.3) | |||
| A reaction: Part of their attack on Platonism. But what made them place such a high value on the sovereignty of God? |
| §3.3 | p.82 | 4010 | In later utilitarianism the modern stress on freedom leads to the rejection of paternalism |
| Full Idea: In mature utilitarianism , the stress on modern freedom emerges in the rejection of paternalism. | |||
| From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], §3.3) | |||
| A reaction: This seems good; it is the beginnings of a rejection of paternalism. What is better, happiness or freedom? What is the value of freedom? |
| Pref | p.-3 | 4002 | My aim is to map the connections between our sense of self and our moral understanding |
| Full Idea: My entire way of proceeding involves mapping connections between the sense of the self and moral visions, between identity and the good. | |||
| From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], Pref) | |||
| A reaction: An interesting project. Modern brain research supports the idea that emotions and values are tightly integrated into al thought. |
| §13.1 | p.211 | 4020 | The modern self has disengaged reason, self-exploration, and personal commitment |
| Full Idea: The modern notion of the self is defined by disengaged reason (with its associated freedom and dignity), by self-exploration, and by personal commitment. | |||
| From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], §13.1) | |||
| A reaction: Taylor makes a good case that this broader view of how the self is seen is as important as narrow debates about personal identity. |
| §13.1 | p.212 | 4021 | Willingness to risk life was the constitutive quality of the man of honour |
| Full Idea: Willingness to risk life was the constitutive quality of the man of honour. | |||
| From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], §13.1) | |||
| A reaction: Which is why war is required. The growth of civil society meant the inevitable rise of other virtues. |