| 1974 | The Mind and the Soul |
| Ch.1 | p.4 | 9292 | The Soul has no particular capacity (in the way thinking belongs to the mind) |
| Full Idea: On the whole, the Soul has no capacities which belong to it pre-eminently in the way that thinking 'belongs' to the mind. | |||
| From: Jenny Teichmann (The Mind and the Soul [1974], Ch.1) | |||
| A reaction: There are no phenomena which have to be saved by postulating a soul. It lacks a function within a human being, but it has a crucial function within a large theological picture. |
| Ch.2 | p.15 | 9293 | Body-spirit interaction ought to result in losses and increases of energy in the material world |
| Full Idea: Since the interaction of bodies themselves involves energy-flow, it looks as if interaction between body and spirit ought to result in losses and increases of energy in the material world. | |||
| From: Jenny Teichmann (The Mind and the Soul [1974], Ch.2) | |||
| A reaction: A nice statement of an important argument. It forces the dualist to go the whole way, asserting that not only is the mind immaterial, but that it can be active without energy, and cover its traces in the physical world. Doesn't look good. |
| Ch.2 | p.16 | 9294 | No individuating marks distinguish between Souls |
| Full Idea: There are no individuating marks which could serve to differentiate one Soul from another. | |||
| From: Jenny Teichmann (The Mind and the Soul [1974], Ch.2) | |||
| A reaction: Presumably they could have at least much identity as two different electrons (if they are in space-time?). It is hard to see why anyone would be interested in their 'own' immortality, if loss of all individuality was a condition. |
| Ch.2 | p.20 | 9295 | Not only substances have attributes; events, actions, states and qualities can have them |
| Full Idea: It is not true that only substances have attributes; events, actions, states and qualities can all be characterized. | |||
| From: Jenny Teichmann (The Mind and the Soul [1974], Ch.2) | |||
| A reaction: This is why it is so important to distinguish the actual properties in nature from those that can be fancifully hypothesized by a linguistic being. Is there any limit to the possible number of levels of meta-properties? |