| 2000 | On Husserl |
| 2.4.3 | p.33 | 21215 | The representation may not be a likeness |
| Full Idea: Representationalism is the doctrine that maintains that the object is represented in consciousness by means of an image. ...One should not confuse an image with a likeness. | |||
| From: Victor Velarde-Mayol (On Husserl [2000], 2.4.3) | |||
| A reaction: Helpful reminder that sense-data or whatever may not be a likeness. But then how do they represent? Symbolic representation needs massive interpretation. |
| 3.2.2 | p.45 | 21219 | Find the essence by varying an object, to see what remains invariable |
| Full Idea: Eidetic Reduction consists of producing variations in the individual object until we see what is invariable in it. What is invariable is its essence or Eidos. | |||
| From: Victor Velarde-Mayol (On Husserl [2000], 3.2.2) | |||
| A reaction: This strikes me as an excellent idea. It more or less describes the method of science. Chemical atoms were thought to be unsplittable, until someone tried a new variation for dealing with them. |
| 4.7.2 | p.75 | 21227 | The Cogito demands a bridge to the world, and ends in isolating the ego |
| Full Idea: All philosophies inspired in the Cogito have the problem of building a bridge from the starting point of consciousness to the external world. The result of this is the isolation and solitude of the very ego. | |||
| From: Victor Velarde-Mayol (On Husserl [2000], 4.7.2) | |||
| A reaction: This strikes me as a pretty good reason not to develop a philosophy which is inspired by the Cogito. |