| 1971 | Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity |
| p.75 | p.63 | 13128 | 'Ultimate sortals' cannot explain ontological categories [Westerhoff] |
| 1980 | Sameness and Substance |
| Pre 1 | p.1 | 16492 | Individuation needs accounts of identity, of change, and of singling out |
| Pre 1 | p.2 | 16493 | Individuation can only be understood by the relation between things and thinkers |
| Pre 2 | p.4 | 16494 | We want to explain sameness as coincidence of substance, not as anything qualitative |
| Pre 2 | p.5 | 16495 | The only singling out is singling out 'as' something |
| Pre 2 | p.6 | 16496 | Singling out extends back and forward in time |
| 1.1 | p.18 | 17529 | Maybe the concept needed under which things coincide must also yield a principle of counting |
| 1.2 | p.21 | 16497 | Leibniz's Law (not transitivity, symmetry, reflexivity) marks what is peculiar to identity |
| 1.2 n7 | p.21 | 16498 | Identity cannot be defined, because definitions are identities |
| 1.5 | p.29 | 16499 | A restored church is the same 'church', but not the same 'building' or 'brickwork' |
| 2.1 | p.48 | 16501 | In Aristotle's sense, saying x falls under f is to say what x is |
| 2.1 | p.49 | 16502 | Identity is primitive |
| 2.1 | p.54 | 16503 | 'What is it?' gives the kind, nature, persistence conditions and identity over time of a thing |
| 2.2 | p.57 | 16505 | By the principle of Indiscernibility, a symmetrical object could only be half of itself! |
| 2.4 | p.60 | 16506 | Every determinate thing falls under a sortal, which fixes its persistence |
| 2.8 | p.73 | 17530 | The sortal needed for identities may not always be sufficient to support counting |
| 3.1 | p.77 | 16510 | Nominal essences don't fix membership, ignore evolution, and aren't contextual |
| 3.1 | p.77 | 16509 | Natural kinds are well suited to be the sortals which fix substances |
| 3.1 | p.79 | 16511 | A 'conception' of a horse is a full theory of what it is (and not just the 'concept') |
| 3.1 n4 | p.81 | 16512 | Semantic facts are preferable to transcendental philosophical fiction |
| 3.3 | p.90 | 16514 | Artefacts are individuated by some matter having a certain function |
| 3.3 | p.91 | 16515 | A thing begins only once; for a clock, it is when its making is first completed |
| 3.3 | p.93 | 16517 | Priests prefer the working ship; antiquarians prefer the reconstruction |
| 3.5 | p.101 | 16518 | We conceptualise objects, but they impinge on us |
| 4.3 | p.110 | 16521 | A is necessarily A, so if B is A, then B is also necessarily A |
| 4.5 | p.117 | 16522 | It is hard or impossible to think of Caesar as not human |
| 5.2 | p.133 | 16523 | Realist Conceptualists accept that our interests affect our concepts |
| 5.5 | p.139 | 16524 | Conceptualism says we must use our individuating concepts to grasp reality |
| 5.6 | p.141 | 16525 | Our sortal concepts fix what we find in experience |
| 5.7 n18 | p.144 | 16526 | Animal classifications: the Emperor's, fabulous, innumerable, like flies, stray dogs, embalmed…. |
| 1995 | Substance |
| 192a30 | p.31 | 12057 | Matter underlies things, composes things, and brings them to be |
| 4.1 | p.214 | 12047 | We refer to persisting substances, in perception and in thought, and they aid understanding |
| 4.10.1 | p.230 | 12055 | Sortal predications are answers to the question 'what is x?' |
| 4.10.1 | p.231 | 12056 | An ancestral relation is either direct or transitively indirect |
| 4.11.2 | p.235 | 12059 | A river may change constantly, but not in respect of being a river |
| 4.13.1 | p.242 | 12063 | Sortal classification becomes science, with cross reference clarifying individuals |
| 4.13.2 | p.244 | 12064 | The category of substance is more important for epistemology than for ontology |
| 4.13.3 | p.245 | 12065 | Seeing a group of soldiers as an army is irresistible, in ontology and explanation |
| 4.3.3 | p.218 | 12049 | Naming the secondary substance provides a mass of general information |
| 4.4.1 | p.219 | 12050 | Substances contain a source of change or principle of activity |
| 4.5.1 | p.220 | 12051 | If the kinds are divided realistically, they fall into substances |
| 4.5.1 | p.221 | 12052 | We never single out just 'this', but always 'this something-or-other' |
| 4.5.1 | p.222 | 12053 | 'Human being' is a better answer to 'what is it?' than 'poet', as the latter comes in degrees |
| 4.5.1 | p.222 | 12054 | Secondary substances correctly divide primary substances by activity-principles and relations |
| 2001 | Sameness and Substance Renewed |
| p.118 | 11896 | A sortal essence is a thing's principle of individuation [Mackie,P] |
| p.119 | 15835 | Wiggins's sortal essentialism rests on a thing's principle of individuation [Mackie,P] |
| p.149 | 11900 | We can accept criteria of distinctness and persistence, without making the counterfactual claims [Mackie,P] |
| p.154 | 14744 | Objects can only coincide if they are of different kinds; trees can't coincide with other trees [Sider] |
| p.156 | 14746 | What exists can't depend on our conceptual scheme, and using all conceptual schemes is too liberal [Sider] |
| p.161 | 14749 | Identity is an atemporal relation, but composition is relative to times [Sider] |
| p.427 | 10679 | 'Sortalism' says parts only compose a whole if it falls under a sort or kind [Hossack] |
| p.603 | 14362 | Relative Identity is incompatible with the Indiscernibility of Identicals [Strawson,P] |
| p.604 | 14363 | Identity a=b is only possible with some concept to give persistence and existence conditions [Strawson,P] |
| p.605 | 14364 | A thing is necessarily its highest sortal kind, which entails an essential constitution [Strawson,P] |
| Pr.2 | p.4 | 11831 | The formal properties of identity are reflexivity and Leibniz's Law |
| Pr.3 | p.5 | 11832 | We learn a concept's relations by using it, without reducing it to anything |
| Pr.5 | p.10 | 11836 | We can use 'concept' for the reference, and 'conception' for sense |
| 1.1 | p.22 | 11838 | Relativity of Identity makes identity entirely depend on a category |
| 1.2 | p.27 | 11839 | Do both 'same f as' and '=' support Leibniz's Law? |
| 2.2 | p.58 | 11847 | To identify two items, we must have a common sort for them |
| 2.2 | p.61 | 11848 | Asking 'what is it?' nicely points us to the persistence of a continuing entity |
| 2.3 | p.29 | 11841 | The evening star is the same planet but not the same star as the morning star, since it is not a star |
| 2.3 | p.32 | 11843 | Identity over a time and at a time aren't different concepts |
| 2.4 | p.66 | 11850 | Not every story corresponds to a possible world |
| 2.6 | p.38 | 11844 | If I destroy an item, I do not destroy each part of it |
| 2.6 | p.69 | 11851 | Many predicates are purely generic, or pure determiners, rather than sortals |
| 2.7 | p.46 | 11845 | Substitutivity, and hence most reasoning, needs Leibniz's Law |
| 2.7 | p.75 | 11852 | Is the Pope's crown one crown, if it is made of many crowns? |
| 3.4 | p.98 | 11858 | The question is not what gets the title 'Theseus' Ship', but what is identical with the original |
| 3.6 | p.105 | 11859 | The mind conceptualizes objects; yet objects impinge upon the mind |
| 4.1 | p.107 | 11860 | Lawlike propensities are enough to individuate natural kinds |
| 4.11 | p.136 | 11869 | Possible worlds rest on the objects about which we have suppositions |
| 4.12 | p.137 | 11870 | Activity individuates natural things, functions do artefacts, and intentions do artworks |
| 4.2 | p.109 | 11861 | We can forget about individual or particularized essences |
| 4.2 | p.113 | 11863 | (λx)[Man x] means 'the property x has iff x is a man'. |
| 4.3 | p.116 | 11864 | Hesperus=Hesperus, and Phosphorus=Hesperus, so necessarily Phosphorus=Hesperus |
| 4.5 | p.121 | 11865 | The possibility of a property needs an essential sortal concept to conceive it |
| 4.7 | p.126 | 11866 | The idea of 'thisness' is better expressed with designation/predication and particular/universal |
| 5.2 | p.143 | 11871 | Essences are not explanations, but individuations |
| 6.5 | p.166 | 11875 | Boundaries are not crucial to mountains, so they are determinate without a determinate extent |
| 6.9 | p.178 | 11876 | It is easier to go from horses to horse-stages than from horse-stages to horses |
| Ch.4 | p.4 | 11879 | Essentialism is best represented as a predicate-modifier: □(a exists → a is F) [Mackie,P] |
| III.iii.15 | p.417 | 11835 | The nominal essence is the idea behind a name used for sorting |