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Ideas of Wilson,G/Schpall,S, by Text

[American, fl. 2012, At the University of Southern California.]

2012

Action

Intro	p.1	20012	Maybe the explanation of an action is in the reasons that make it intelligible to the agent
			Full Idea: Some have maintained that we explain why an agent acted as he did when we explicate how the agent's normative reasons rendered the action intelligible in his eyes.
			From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], Intro)
			A reaction: Modern psychology is moving against this, by showing how hidden biases can predominate over conscious reasons (as in Kahnemann's work). I would say this mode of explanation works better for highly educated people (but you can chuckle at that).

Intro	p.1	20013	It is generally assumed that reason explanations are causal
			Full Idea: The view that reason explanations are somehow causal explanations remains the dominant position.
			From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], Intro)
			A reaction: I suspect that this is only because no philosopher has a better idea, and the whole issue is being slowly outflanked by psychology.

1	p.2	20014	Actions include: the involuntary, the purposeful, the intentional, and the self-consciously autonomous
			Full Idea: There are different levels of action, including at least: unconscious and/or involuntary behaviour, purposeful or goal-directed activity, intentional action, and the autonomous acts or actions of self-consciously active human agents.
			From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 1)
			A reaction: The fourth class is obviously designed to distinguish us from the other animals. It immediately strikes me as very optimistic to distinguish four (at least) clear categories, but you have to start somewhere.

1.1	p.2	20016	Strong Cognitivism identifies an intention to act with a belief
			Full Idea: A Strong Cognitivist is someone who identifies an intention with a certain pertinent belief about what she is doing or about to do.
			From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 1.1)
			A reaction: (Sarah Paul 2009 makes this distinction) The belief, if so, seems to be as much counterfactual as factual. Hope seems to come into it, which isn't exactly a belief.

1.1	p.2	20017	Weak Cognitivism says intentions are only partly constituted by a belief
			Full Idea: A Weak Cognitivist holds that intentions are partly constituted by, but are not identical with, relevant beliefs about the action. Grice (1971) said an intention is willing an action, combined with a belief that this will lead to the action.
			From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 1.1)
			A reaction: [compressed] I didn't find Strong Cognitivism appealing, but it seems hard to argue with some form of the weak version.

1.1	p.3	20018	Strong Cognitivism implies a mode of 'practical' knowledge, not based on observation
			Full Idea: Strong Cognitivists say intentions/beliefs are not based on observation or evidence, and are causally reliable in leading to appropriate actions, so this is a mode of 'practical' knowledge that has not been derived from observation.
			From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 1.1)
			A reaction: [compressed - Stanford unnecessarily verbose!] I see no mention in this discussion of 'hoping' that your action will turn out OK. We are usually right to hope, but it would be foolish to say that when we reach for the salt we know we won't knock it over.

1.2	p.3	20019	Maybe bodily movements are not actions, but only part of an agent's action of moving
			Full Idea: Some say that the movement's of agent's body are never actions. It is only the agent's direct moving of, say, his leg that constitutes a physical action; the leg movement is merely caused by and/or incorporated as part of the act of moving.
			From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 1.2)
			A reaction: [they cite Jennifer Hornsby 1980] It seems normal to deny a twitch the accolade of an 'action', so I suppose that is right. Does the continual movement of my tongue count as action? Only if I bring it under control? Does it matter? Only in forensics.

1.2	p.5	20021	Is the action the arm movement, the whole causal process, or just the trying to do it?
			Full Idea: Some philosophers have favored the overt arm movement the agent performs, some favor the extended causal process he initiates, and some prefer the relevant event of trying that precedes and 'generates' the rest.
			From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 1.2)
			A reaction: [Davidson argues for the second, Hornsby for the third] There seems no way to settle this, and a compromise looks best. Mere movement won't do, and mere trying won't do, and whole processes get out of control.

2	p.7	20022	To be intentional, an action must succeed in the manner in which it was planned
			Full Idea: If someone fires a bullet to kill someone, misses, and dislodges hornets that sting him to death, this implies that an intentional action must include succeeding in a manner according to the original plan.
			From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 2)
			A reaction: [their example, compressed] This resembles Gettier's problem cases for knowledge. If the shooter deliberately and maliciously brought down the hornet's nest, that would be intentional murder. Sounds right.

2	p.7	20023	If someone believes they can control the lottery, and then wins, the relevant skill is missing
			Full Idea: If someone enters the lottery with the bizarre belief that they can control who wins, and then wins it, that suggest that intentional actions must not depend on sheer luck, but needs competent exercise of the relevant skill.
			From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 2)
			A reaction: A nice companion to Idea 20022, which show that a mere intention is not sufficient to motivate and explain an action.

2	p.8	20025	We might intend two ways to acting, knowing only one of them can succeed
			Full Idea: If an agent tries to do something by two different means, only one of which can succeed, then the behaviour is rational, even though one of them is an attempt to do an action which cannot succeed.
			From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 2)
			A reaction: [a concise account of a laborious account of an example from Bratman 1984, 1987] Bratman uses this to challenge the 'Simple View', that intention leads straightforwardly to action.

2	p.10	20028	Groups may act for reasons held by none of the members, so maybe groups are agents
			Full Idea: Rational group action may involve a 'collectivising of reasons', with participants acting in ways that are not rationally recommended from the individual viewpoint. This suggests that groups can be rational, intentional agents.
			From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 2)
			A reaction: [Pettit 2003] is the source for this. Gilbert says individuals can have joint commitment; Pettit says the group can be an independent agent. The matter of shared intentions is interesting, but there is no need for the ontology to go berserk.

2	p.10	20027	If there are shared obligations and intentions, we may need a primitive notion of 'joint commitment'
			Full Idea: An account of mutual obligation to do something may require that we give up reductive individualist accounts of shared activity and posit a primitive notion of 'joint commitment'.
			From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 2)
			A reaction: [attributed to Margaret Gilbert 2000] If 'we' are trying to do something, that seems to give an externalist picture of intentions, rather like all the other externalisms floating around these days. I don't buy any of it, me.

3	p.11	20029	Causalists allow purposive explanations, but then reduce the purpose to the action's cause
			Full Idea: Most causalists allow that reason explanations are teleological, but say that such purposive explanations are analysable causally, where the primary reasons for the act are the guiding causes of the act.
			From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 3)
			A reaction: The authors observe that it is hard to adjudicate on this matter, and that the concept of the 'cause' of an action is unclear.

4	p.13	20031	On one model, an intention is belief-desire states, and intentional actions relate to beliefs and desires
			Full Idea: On the simple desire-belief model, an intention is a combination of desire-belief states, and an action is intentional in virtue of standing in the appropriate relation to these simpler terms.
			From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 4)
			A reaction: This is the traditional view found in Hume, and is probably endemic to folk psychology. They cite Bratman 1987 as the main opponent of the view.